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Abstract
This dissertation includes three chapters. The rst chapter studies the question of whether countries with
di¤erent scal capacity should optimally have di¤erent ex-ante minimum bank capital requirements. In
an environment with endogenously incomplete markets and overinvestment because of moral hazard and
pecuniary externalities, I show that countries with larger scal capacity should have lower minimum ex-ante
bank capital requirements. I also show that, in addition to the minimum capital requirement, regulators in
countries with a concentrated nancial sector and large scal capacity (which are also countries with strong
moral hazard) should impose a limit on the amount of liquidity pledged by nancial institutions in a crisis
state (for example, restrict the amount of put options/CDS contracts sold by nancial institutions). The
second chapter studies the welfare implications of a concentrated, imperfectly competitive banking sector,
which faces a bank net worth constraint in a small open economy (SOE) environment. There are two standard
sources of ine¢ ciency  pecuniary externalities, which lead to overinvestment, and a standard monopolistic
underinvestment force. I show that the optimal policy instruments include subsidies on rm borrowing costs
in certain periods and capital account controls in others, which is a good proxy for the behavior of emerging
markets. For every country, there exists a nancial sector with a particular banking sector concentration,
for which the ine¢ ciencies o¤set each other and no government intervention is required in some periods.
Furthermore, this paper documents a novel theoretical result  the interaction between future binding bank
net worth constraints and dynamic (future) underinvestment could lead to ex-ante overinvestment even in
economies with a single monopolistic bank where there are no pecuniary externalities. The last third chapter,
which is coauthored with Kenneth Rogo¤, evaluates a new class of exchange rate forecasting studies, which
claim that structural models are getting closer to being able to forecast exchange rates at short horizons. We
argue that misinterpretation of some new out-of-sample tests for nested models, over-reliance on asymptotic
test statistics, and failure to su¢ ciently check robustness to alternative time windows have led many studies
to overstate even the relatively thin positive results that have been found.
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Chapter 1
Optimal Bank Regulation and Fiscal
Capacity
1.1 Introduction
This paper addresses the question of whether countries with di¤erent abilities to bail-out their banking system
during a nancial crisis should have more or less stringent ex-ante minimum bank capital requirements.
Countries vary widely in their ability to bail out their nancial system. A bank bail-out can be nanced
either by taxing, borrowing or printing money if independent monetary policy is available. In equilibrium,
a country will use all of those instruments up to the point where the marginal cost of each one of them is
equalized and is, in turn, equal to the marginal cost of the bail-out. All else constant, the marginal cost of
the bail-out will be larger, if a country has a smaller tax base, higher cost of sovereign borrowing during a
crisis or does not have an access to an independent monetary policy. I refer to the marginal cost of an extra
dollar of bail-out as the scal capacity of a country. For example, as shown in Figure 1.1, a country like
Switzerland, which has a large banking sector relative to the GDP of the country is relatively more scally
constrained than the United States and would optimally choose to bail out a smaller fraction of its banking
sector during a crisis.1
1Using BankScope data, in 2007, in the US, the assets of the banking sector were 120% of the GDP of the country. This
number also includes foreign subsidiaries/branches in the US such as UBS but does not include subsidiaries/branches of US
banks abroad. Even counting the shadow banking sector in the US, the total assets of the banking sector (as dened above)
plus the shadow banking system becomes 300% of the US GDP in 2007 (see the Financial Stability Board estimates, 2007). In
2007, in Switzerland, the assets of just the Swiss branches of UBS and Credit Swiss were 700% of the GDP of the country.
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Figure 1.1
During the 2011-2012 European sovereign debt crisis, Greece and Spain are two prime examples of
countries that were scally constrained since they faced a high cost of sovereign borrowing and were limited
in the amount of bail-outs they could provide to their nancial sectors.2
Despite clear di¤erences in the ability of countries to provide bank bail-outs during nancial crises, most
countries have synchronized their ex-ante minimum bank capital requirements following the Basel Accords.
The minimum bank capital requirement constrains banks to nance at least a fraction of risky bank assets
using equity. This fraction is referred to as the minimum bank capital ratio.3 In response to the 2007-2008
nancial crisis, in 2011, Swiss regulators deviated from the Basel I norm of 8 percent minimum bank capital
ratio by signicantly increasing the minimum bank capital requirement to 19 percent. This triggered a
vigorous debate as to whether the actions of Swiss regulators were optimal.
This paper provides a theoretical justication for heterogeneous cross country minimum bank capital
requirements, a hypothesis that contrasts with the current synchronization of minimum bank capital require-
ments across most countries. More specically, I show that in a model with both pecuniary externalities
and moral hazard, countries with larger scal capacity should have lower ex-ante minimum bank capital
requirements. Furthermore, a second interesting and novel result emerges, which is that countries with large
scal capacity and a concentrated banking sector should also impose a limit on bank liabilities in a crisis,
2 In 2011, the 10 year sovereign debt interest rate was 5.4% in Spain and 35% in Greece.
3The World Bank survey on bank regulation indicates that, in 2010, the majority of countries had a minimum bank capital
requirement of eight percent, which is the capital ratio recommended by Basel I. Among the high income OECD countries, 25
out of 27 had a minimum bank capital requirement of 8 percent (the exceptions are Israel and Estonia).
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when a government bail-out is anticipated. In particular, it would be optimal to limit the payments bankers
promise in a crisis state by selling put option contracts such as CDS contracts, for example.
I build a three period model in the spirit of Lorenzoni (2008). Bankers are modelled as entrepreneurs that
have access to a linear production technology. They borrow every period using short term state contingent
contracts subject to borrowing constraints and invest in every period. The project has to be renanced in
the middle period in order to remain productive. If a crisis state occurs, in order to renance the project,
bankers are forced to sell part of the capital to the less productive outside sector, which generates re sales.
The government can intervene during a crisis and provide a bail-out to the bankers by taxing the consumers.
However, taxing is costly, and the cost depends on the scal capacity of the country. The combination of
future re sales and the assumption that the banking sector is more productive than consumers generates
pecuniary externalities in the spirit of Lorenzoni (2008), which lead to overinvestment. Bankers do not
internalize the fact that the more they invest ex-ante, the larger the re sale of nancial assets during a future
crisis is, which tightens the budget constraints of the other bankers and increases the ine¢ cient transfer of
resources from the bankers  the more productive agents  to the consumers  the less productive agents.
The presence of ex-post anticipated bail-outs leads to moral hazard if the nancial sector has a nite number
of banks and is a second source of overinvestment. When banks expect a bail-out in the future in the event
of a crisis, if they are not innitesimally small, they overinvest because they internalize the fact that larger
ex-ante investment increases the size of the re sale and, therefore, increases the bail-out received. The
moral hazard is stronger, the more concentrated the banking sector is and the larger the scal capacity of
the country is.
The key result of the paper  that countries with larger scal capacity should have lower ex-ante
minimum bank capital requirements  is driven by the assumptions which are at the core of the pecuniary
externalities and the overinvestment  the presence of re sales combined with the assumption that the
banking sector is more productive than the outside sector. The intuition behind the result is the following.
For a given amount of ex-ante investment, the countries that can provide a smaller bail-out during a crisis
will have a larger re sale, and the transfer of capital from the more productive sector to the less productive
sector will be larger. Therefore, the Central Planner in more scally constrained countries perceives ex-ante
investment as less attractive, and he optimally chooses to invest less in period zero than does the Central
Planner of a country with a larger scal capacity. Since the period zero investment chosen by the Central
Planner and the optimal minimum bank capital ratio are inversely related, smaller scal capacity implies
optimally higher ex-ante minimum bank capital ratio. In summary, countries with larger scal capacity can
a¤ord to prop up prices by more in a crisis and alleviate any ine¢ ciencies arising from re sales. As a result,
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they can "a¤ord" to have larger investment booms ex-ante.
Since a larger bail-out will lead to a stronger moral hazard if the banks are not innitesimally small,
intuitively, one would expect that larger scal capacity would imply higher (not lower) minimum bank
capital requirements. The reason why this intuition proves to be incorrect relies crucially on the fact that
the ex-ante regulatory instrument considered, a minimum bank capital requirement, is a "quantity" policy
instrument and on the assumption that the policy maker has a su¢ cient number of instruments to replicate
the constrained Central Planners allocation. By setting the minimum bank capital ratio, the policy maker
can directly determine the amount of bank investment. The moral hazard does not play a role since it does not
a¤ect the optimal amount of investment chosen by the Central Planner. The moral hazard would enter only
the rst order conditions of the banker from the decentralized equilibrium since the banker internalizes the
benet but not the cost of the bail-out. However, if the constrained Central Planners allocation is replicated,
when the regulatory instrument is a "quantity" instrument, the rst order condition of the banker from the
decentralized problem is no longer relevant. This will di¤er if a "price" instrument was used instead, such
as a tax on ex-ante investment.4
The second key result of this paper is that countries with strong moral hazard, which are the countries
with a few banks and a concentrated banking sector, should impose a second ex-ante regulatory instrument,
which limits the liabilities of bankers in a crisis state when a bail-out is expected. The moral hazard in this
model works through two di¤erent channels. Bankers are tempted to overinvest ex-ante, and if the moral
hazard is strong enough, they are also tempted to pledge too high of a payment in the crisis state using
the state contingent contract, relative to what the Central Planner would optimally do. The intuition is
that a larger promised payment in the crisis state leads to a more severe re sale and, therefore, to a larger
expected bail-out. More than one hundred countries worldwide currently have some form of a minimum
liquidity requirement and there is little understanding as to why such an instrument will be required, in
addition to the minimum bank capital requirement5 . According to the results of this model, the liquidity
that policy makers should be particularly concerned about is the liquidity of the nancial sector in a crisis.
Therefore, regulating derivative contracts for countries with strong moral hazard would be important.
Related Literature
4"Price" instruments, such as a tax on period zero capital, have been considered in the theoretical literature (see Stein
(2012), Bianchi (2011) and Jeanne and Korinek (2012)).
5The World Bank survey on bank regulation shows that in 2010, 103 out of 127 countries had some form of a minimum
ratio on liquid assets, such as a regulatory minimum ratio on liquid assets as a percentage of total balance sheet or deposit
base.
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There are three key assumptions that lead to the main result of this paper and they are fairly standard
in the literature. The rst assumption, that bankers face a borrowing constraint, is in the spirit of Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997) and is based on the seminal paper by Hart and Moore (1994).6 The second assumption
is that the banking sector is more productive than the outside sector (the consumers), and it has been
used in many papers such as Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Lorenzoni (2008), Brunnermeier and Sannikov
(2013). It can be further justied by the fact that nancial institutions are considered more e¢ cient than
savers at providing credit to rms, because of their ability to monitor the borrower at a lower cost (for
example see Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)). Hence, the value of loans (capital) is higher in the hands of the
bankers than in the hands of the consumers. On the empirical side, the importance of the banking sector
and the value lost by terminating the relationship between banks and rms are studied by the literature on
relationship banking (see Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek (1993), Peek and Rosengren (1997), Gan (2007),
Boot (2000) and Freixas and Rochet (2008) for a literature review). The third key assumption  that the
government can circumvent the bankers borrowing constraint via its power to tax  was used, besides
others, by Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) and Gorton and Huang (2004). Similarly to this paper, they also
show that such government intervention can be welfare improving.7
Starting with the seminal work of Bagehot (1873), moral hazard has been proposed as one of the main
reasons for bank regulation. However, a growing literature on nancial sector regulation has emerged, which
emphasizes the role of re sales and pecuniary externalities 
Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986), Lorenzoni (2008), Stein (2012), Jeanne and Korinek (2012), He
and Kondor (2012). The importance of re sales during nancial crises has been emphasized by many papers
starting with the seminal work by Shleifer and Vishny (1992) (see Shleifer and Vishny (2011) for a survey of
the literature). I build on the paper by Lorenzoni (2008) who shows how pecuniary externalities can emerge
in a microfounded environment 89 . The di¤erence between this paper and the one by Lorenzoni (2008) is
that neither he allows for an ex-post bail-out, nor does he ask the question how optimal policy should vary
with the scal capacity of the country, which is the key contribution of this paper. The only other paper,
besides this one, that studies the optimal mix of ex-ante regulation and ex-post bail-out, which has both
6Hart and Moore (1994) show that if entrepreneurs can run away with the cash ow and can threaten to withdraw their
human capital, they can borrow only against collateral.
7Other papers that nd ex-post bail-outs to be welfare-improving include Bianchi (2012) and Keister (2012).
8There is a large literature on pecuniary externalities where the ine¢ ciency comes from binding borrowing constraints and
prices enter the borrowing constraint (for example Stein (2012), Bianchi (2011)). In this paper, as in Lorenzoni (2008), the
source of the pecuniary externality will be that bankers do not internalize the fact that their actions are tightening the budget
constraints of the other bankers, not the borrowing constraints.
9Lorenzoni (2008) also assumes that in addition to the borrowing constraint on the side of the bankers there is a limited
commitment friction on the side of the consumers. I show that as long as the banks are owned by the consumers (an implicit
ex-post transfer), limited commitment of the consumers will not be necessary to generate pecuniary externalities.
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pecuniary externalities and moral hazard, is the one by Jeanne and Korinek (2012). In contrast to this paper,
in Jeanne and Korinek (2012) markets are exogenously incomplete. Endogenous market incompleteness is
important to understand the key sources of ine¢ ciency. It is also crucial for some of the key results of
the paper such as the result that, for countries with stronger moral hazard, regulators need to control the
liabilities of the banking sector in a crisis state. Most importantly, Jeanne and Korinek (2012) do not ask
the question raised by this paper: How the optimal mix of ex-ante and ex-post bank regulation should vary
with the scal capacity of the country?
Some of the recent papers which also nd that there is a role for minimum liquidity regulations due
to moral hazard are Farhi and Tirole (2012), Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer (2011), Repullo (2005) and
Keister (2012). In an environment with a non-targeted bail-out in the form of lowering the borrowing rate
of banks, Farhi and Tirole (2012) show that there are complementarities in the actions of bankers and, as a
result, multiple equilibria. If banks expect low interest rates during crises, they might end up holding too
little of the safe asset which, in equilibrium, will force the policy maker to keep interest rates low. As a
result, minimum liquidity requirements can improve welfare. In a Diamond and Dybvig (1983) environment
with multiple equilibria, Keister (2012) shows that an expected government bail-out ex-post leads to moral
hazard and to bankers choosing lower liquidity ex-ante relative to what the Central Planner would choose.
The Basel Accord recommendation of synchronized regulation is often justied by the idea of creating a
"level-playing" eld for banks. For a summary of the bank regulation literature see Santos (2001). Acharya
(2002) studies whether minimum capital requirements should be synchronized across countries given the
presence of di¤erent bank closure policies and he argues in favor of heterogeneous cross country bank regu-
lation. Bengui (2011) builds a two country model and discusses optimal bank regulation in an environment
with pecuniary externalities where he emphasizes the importance of international coordination.
Finally the paper also relates to the literature about di¤erent types of regulatory instruments pioneered
by Weitzman (1974). According to Weitzman (1974), if the policy maker has an access to state contingent
policy instruments, she can replicate the constrained Central Planners allocation using either a "price" or
a "quantity" instrument. However, comparative statics can be very di¤erent depending on which type of
instruments is used, as I show in this paper.
The structure of the paper is the following. In Section 1.2, I present the set up of the model. Section
1.3 provides the solution of the decentralized equilibrium and the constrained Central Planners problem.
Section 1.4 proves that there is overinvestment in this economy while Section 1.5 shows how the constrained
Central Planners allocation can be decentralized. Section 1.6 proves the key result of the paper  that
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countries with larger scal capacity should have lower ex-ante minimum bank capital requirements. Section
1.7 compares "quantity" regulatory instruments to "price" regulatory instruments. Section 1.8 concludes
and provides further discussion.
1.2 Model Set-Up
There are three agents in the economy  consumers, bankers/entrepreneurs and the government. The banks
are owned by the consumers and the consumers receive all the prots in the form of dividends.1011 Hence,
all the dividends are paid out to the consumers who are risk neutral. The discount factor between periods
is one. The model is a three period model where t = 0; 1; 2 and there is no discounting: There is uncertainty
only in the middle period, t = 1. In t = 1 there are two states of nature  a high state and a low state.
The period zero probability of the high state occurring is h and the period zero probability of the low state
occurring is l where l + h = 1: In equilibrium, the re sale will occur only in the low state in period one,
which is what I will refer to as the crisis state. There are two goods  a capital good and a consumption
good where the consumption good is the numeraire good. Each period and state of nature, the consumption
good can be transformed into a capital good one-to-one. There is no storage technology either for the capital
good or for the consumption good. The capital good has to be employed in a production technology in every
period and the consumption good is perishable.
1.2.1 Bankers
Production Technology
Assume that there areN bankers/entrepreneurs. Every banker has an access to a bank specic production
technology. In t = 0; banker i has to choose the amount he invests given by ki0: In t = 1 and state s; the
project produces a1ski0 units of the consumption good where a1l < a1h. In t = 1; in order for the capital
stock, ki0; to remain productive, it has to be renanced. The banker has to invest an additional amount of
10The model can be easily changed so that some weight is placed on the bankers and they consume as well. In addition,
I can impose a requirement for an ex-ante welfare Pareto improvement for both the bankers and the consumers. The results
remain unchanged as long as the government has an access to ex-post lump sum transfers from the bankers to the consumers.
11Alternatively, one can think of this set up as there being a representative family that splits into bankers and consumers in
the beginning of period zero and the bankers are given the exogenous starting capital n. The bankers and consumers reunite in
t = 2 and consume jointly. The bankers borrow from consumers that are not members of their family. The latter interpretation
is in the spirit of Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010).
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 < 1 per every unit of period zero capital, ki0 in total.
12 Otherwise, the capital depreciates one hundred
percent. I assume that the resale price of capital in period one, q1s; is always greater than  and, hence,
all the capital is renanced. In addition, in t = 1, banker i also decides on the period one scale of the
project, ki1s: If the banker has the resources and nds it optimal, he can increase the scale of the project,
ki1s > k
i
0. If he does not have the resources or it is not optimal to do so, he can end up investing less than
the period zero investment, ki1s < k
i
0: The capital sold by banker i in period one is k
i;T
1s = min

0; ki0   ki1s
	
I will refer to ki;T1s as the re-sold capital and the aggregate amount of re-sold capital is dened as an
average kT1s =
PN
i=1
1
N k
i;T
1s : Using averages, instead of simple sums, implies that the model can be intuitively
mapped to the case with a continuum of banks distributed uniformly on [0; 1]; when one takes the limit of
N ! 1:13 In equilibrium, there will be a re sale only in the crisis state. Finally, In t = 2; there is no
further uncertainty and the amount invested in t = 1 produces Aki1s; where A > 0; and the capital can be
sold to the consumers for the price of q2s; after the banker pays the renancing cost .
State Contingent Debt Contracts Subject to a Borrowing Constraint
In t = 0; each banker is endowed with n units of the consumption good. n is an exogenous parameter and
in this model represents the equity of the banker. Banker i can also borrow from the consumers but credit
markets are imperfect due to an agency friction in the spirit of Hart and Moore (1994) and Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997). I assume that the state of nature is veriable and contractible but the banker can always run
away with the cash ow in t = 1, a1sk0; and in t = 2; Ak1s: However the consumer can seize the collateral
and resell it. In period zero, banker i can borrow only against the value of period one collateral. The reason
is that once in period one, banker i gives an enforceable "take-it-or-leave-it" o¤er to the consumer  either
take  (q1s   ) ki0 in period one as a payment or the bank will be closed (the banker will withdraw his human
capital) and no output will be produced in period two. 1    is the fraction of the value of the collateral
that has to be paid in legal fees if the consumer has to seize the collateral:14 If the bank is closed, the
consumer will withhold the capital, pay the legal fees and the renancing cost and resell the capital, which
will generate  (q1s   ) ki0 units of the consumption good. In equilibrium, the consumer will always accept
the "take-it-or-leave-it" o¤er. Anticipating that, in t = 0; the consumer will write only a short term state
contingent debt contact with the banker subject to the collateral constraint. Once the banker repays his old
debt in t = 1; he can enter a new collateralized contract with the consumers. Since, in period two, he will
12One can think of the renancing cost as a long term project that requires renancing in order to remain productive (for
example workers have to be paid, more equipment has to be purchased etc). Alternatively I could have set  to zero and
assumed that a1l < 0 which would be another way to generate a re sale.
13The results do not change if simple sums are used instead of averages.
14One can set  = 1 and all the results remain. In the simulations presented in the paper I will set  = 1:
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never pay more than the value of the collateral after legal fees, the maximum amount the banker can borrow
in t = 1 and state s is  (q2s   ) ki1s.
In summary, the contract that emerges in equilibrium is a short-term, state contingent debt contract
subject to a collateral constraint on the part of the banker. In t = 0; banker i can sell a promise to pay di1s
units of the consumption good in t = 1; state s; at the price sp1s:This implies that the total period zero
borrowing of banker i is
P
s sp1sd
i
1s: Also in t = 1 state s; banker i can sell a new promise to pay d
i
2s units
of the consumption good in t = 2 state s at the price p2s: As a result, his period one, state s borrowing is
di2sp2s. The prices, p1s and p2s; will be determined in equilibrium. The amount that the banker can borrow
is limited by the state contingent value of his collateral; di1s   (q1s   ) ki0 and di2s   (q2s   ) ki1s.
Finally, banker i might receive an additional source of funding in the crisis state in the form of a bail-
out. In the low state in period one, banker i receives Bil as a transfer from the government, where B
i
l is
endogenously determined. Banker i can pay dividends every period and state of nature but he will optimally
do so only in the last period, t = 2; when he gives all of the prots to the consumers.
1.2.2 Consumers
There is a continuum of risk neutral consumers distributed uniformly over the unit interval. They are the
only agents that consume in this economy. In every period and state of nature, every consumer receives an
endowment e: He can enter a state contingent contract with each banker both in periods zero and in period
one, as described in the previous section. The preferences of the representative consumer are given by
U c0 = c0 +
X
s
s (c1s + c2s)
Consumers also have an access to a production technology which uses capital as an input good and trans-
forms it into the consumption good within the same period. Once the production technology produces the
consumption good, the capital depreciates one hundred percent. When modelling the production technology
of the consumers in t = 1, in order to generate a downward sloping demand for capital, I use an approach
similar to many papers in the literature on nancial frictions that follow the seminal paper of Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997). In t = 1; the production technology of the consumers is given by F
 
kT1s

where kT1s is the
amount of capital employed, which, in equilibrium, will be the aggregate amount of capital re-sold by the
9
bankers: In equilibrium, if the production technology of the consumer is employed, the price of capital will
be pinned down by the marginal product of capital, q1s = F 0
 
kT1s

: In t = 2; I assume that the production
technology is such that one unit of capital is transformed into one unit of consumption.15 In equilibrium,
the price of capital in t = 0 and t = 2 will be pinned down to one, q0 = q2s = 1. 16
The production technology satises the following assumptions: F (kT1s) is at least three times di¤erentiable
on kT1s 2 (0;1); F (kT1s) and F 0(kT1s) are continuos on 2 [0;1); F (0) = 0,F 0 (0) = 1; F 00 (0) = F 000 (0) = 0;
F 00
 
kT1s

< 0 on kT1s 2 (0;1) and limkT1s!1 F 0
 
kT1s
  : Assuming that F 0 (0) = 1; and F 00 () < 0 implies
that the production technology of the consumers will not be used unless there is a re sale.17 The assumption
F 00 () < 0 guarantees that the larger the re sale is, the lower the price of capital will be, which is a proxy
for a downward sloping demand for capital. Finally limkT1s!1 F
0  kT1s   ensures that the scrapping of
capital will be never optimal. Notice that the bankersproduction technology is more productive than the
consumers. A detailed solution to the consumers problem is provided in the Appendix, Section A.1.1. Since
consumers are risk neutral, in equilibrium, from the Euler equation, the prices of the state contingent debt
contracts will be p1s = p2s = 1:
1.2.3 Policy Maker
The policy maker optimizes the ex-ante welfare of consumers who are the owners of the banks. He has
an access to ex-ante and ex-post policy instruments. The ex-ante policy instruments are a minimum bank
capital requirement and a limit on the payment promised in the crisis state by bankers. The minimum bank
capital requirement is dened as i  n
ki0
where i is the minimum bank capital ratio of bank i. i is the
minimum fraction of period zero investment that has to be nanced using equity. I chose to focus throughout
most of the paper on the minimum bank capital requirement as the ex-ante policy instrument used to address
overinvestment, because this is the instrument currently implemented by almost all countries worldwide. I
allow the policy maker also to explicitly restrict the amount of payments a banker pledges in the crisis state
by imposing the constraint di1l  i: While such an instrument is currently not used in practice, in this
15The assumption that the production technology is di¤erent across periods is for simplication and can be relaxed. However,
given that the model is a nite period model, relaxing it would imply that there will be always re sales in t = 2 both in the
high and the low state, which will be an unappealing feature of the model. Usually crises are followed by normal times and this
would be captured in an innite period model.
16The assumption that capital cannot be stored implies that consumers cannot simply purchase capital in t = 1 in the low
state and keep it until t = 2 in order to use their production technology that allows them to transform capital into consumption
one-to-one. If that were the case, there would be no re sales. Also the price of capital is one in period zero since I start the
economy with no stock of capital. Therefore, q0 = 1 as long as some investment in capital is made.
17 If there is no re sale, it will be never protable for the consumers to transform consumption one-to-one into capital in
t = 1 in order to use the production technology since the marginal product of capital is less than one.
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paper I will show that the presence of such an instrument will allow policy makers of countries with strong
moral hazard to improve upon aggregate welfare. In order to map this regulation to contracts used in the
real world, policy makers would want to limit the liabilities bankers face in a crisis state due to standard
debt contracts as well as derivative contracts such as CDS contracts and the sale of other put options.
The ex-post regulatory instrument is an optimal government bail-out during crises. I implicitly assume
that the government can circumvent the collateral constraint of bankers during crises via its power to tax
the consumers and transfer resources to the bankers. This is equivalent to allowing the policy maker a
bail-out technology during a crisis. For simplicity, I assume that bail-outs are prohibitively costly when
there is no crisis due to high political costs of transferring money from taxpayers to the nancial system in
normal times.18 The bail-out is nanced by taxing the consumers in the crisis state, where the tax levied
is T1l: Market clearing implies that T1l = Bl: I assume that bailing out the banking system is costly, and
this cost can vary across countries. The size of the deadweight loss from the bail-out is given by  (Bl; )
where Bl =
PN
i=1
1
NB
i
l is the aggregate bail-out
19 , Bil is the bail-out given to bank i; and 0   < 1 is
an exogenous parameter that captures how scally constrained the country is. The smaller  is, the more
scally constrained the country is (lower scal capacity).
I assume that  (Bl; ) is a convex and increasing function with respect to the aggregate bail-out, which
implies @(Bl;)@Bl > 0 and
@2(Bl;)
@Bl@Bl
> 0. @(Bl;)@Bl > 0 guarantees that the larger the total size of the bail-out
is, the larger the deadweight loss is. @@
2(Bl;)
@Bl@Bl
> 0 implies that the marginal cost of the bail out increases
with the total size of the bail out. The convexity of the deadweight loss is a standard assumption in the
public nance literature to capture the cost of distortionary labor taxation in a reduced form way. There are
a few additional assumptions: I assume that @(Bl;)@ < 0; which implies that the larger the scal capacity
of a country is, the smaller the deadweight loss from the bail-out is. Also I assume that @@
2(Bl;)
@Bl@
< 0 which
implies that the marginal cost of taxing is lower, the larger the scal capacity is: The nal set of assumptions
are that @@
3(Bl;)
@B2l @
< 0 and the deadweight loss of the bail-out, (Bl; ) ;
@(Bl;)
@Bl
and @@
2(Bl;)
@Bl@Bl
are all equal
to zero when !1 and approach innity when  = 0. For example, a functional form that satises all of
these conditions and will be used in the simulations is  (Bl; ) = 1B

l where  > 1:
Notice that instead of introducing the exogenous parameter ; I could have chosen to model the cost
of the bail-out simply as the deadweight loss from taxing scaled by the tax base, e; which would have a
18One can relax the assumption that there are bail-outs only in the crisis state. The result that larger scal capacity implies
a lower ex-ante minimum bank capital requirement remains.
19This assumption captures the fact that it is the aggregate bail-out that a¤ects the marginal cost of government borrowing
or taxing.
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closer mapping to the public policy literature.20 However, in reality, bail-outs are nanced in three di¤erent
ways  - by taxing the residents of the country during the nancial crisis, by sovereign borrowing or by
printing money if the government has an access to an independent monetary policy. The costs associated
with sovereign borrowing, taxing and printing money can be realistically proxied using convex cost functions.
In equilibrium, a country which has access to all three instruments will use all of them up to the point where
the marginal cost of taxing is equal to the marginal cost of printing money and to the marginal cost of
sovereign borrowing, which will, in turn, equal the marginal cost of bail-out. As a result, even if I were
to write a full blown model with sovereign borrowing, taxing and printing of money, the marginal cost of
the bail-out would be a su¢ cient statistics. Therefore, I choose to model the marginal cost of the bail-out,
@(Bl;)
@Bl
; in a reduced form way in order to obtain analytical results. The parameter  captures the ability
of a country to provide an extra dollar of bail-out, which I call scal capacity in this paper.
The reason why the government would optimally choose to provide a bail-out to the banking sector, even
though the bail-out is costly, is that the bail-out will reduce the size of the re sale during nancial crises.
As a result, less capital will be transferred from the more productive sector (the banking sector) to the less
productive sector (the consumers). The consumers end up beneting because they receive the prots of the
banks in the last period in the form of dividends. As I show later, the optimal bail-out will be determined
in equilibrium by equating the marginal cost of the bail-out to the marginal benet. The optimal bail-out
will be a function of the scal capacity of the country, . The larger the scal capacity is, the smaller the
deadweight loss is, and, hence, the optimal bail-out will be larger relative to a country with smaller scal
capacity. A country with innite scal capacity (!1) will have a zero deadweight loss from the bail-out.
A country with no scal capacity ( = 0) will have an innite deadweight loss from the bail-out. This will be
a country that cannot print money, nds it too costly or impossible to tax and it is also completely shut-o¤
from foreign debt markets.
1.2.4 Assumptions
In addition to the assumptions made so far on the functional forms of F () and  (), I also assume that the
following inequalities are satised. The rst assumption ensures that period zero investment does not have
expected return greater than one in period one if the return in the low state is zero
h (1 + a1h   ) < 1 Assumption 1.1
20 If I were to use the following functional form for the deadweight loss from taxing 

Bl
e

; then one can interpret  as e:
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If Assumption 1.1 is violated, it will always be optimal to lever to the maximum in period zero and invest
as much as possible, which will make the problem trivial. The following assumption ensures that if there is
no re sale, the expected return on period zero investment is greater than the cost
1 <
X
s
s [1   + a1s] Assumption 1.2
If Assumption 1.2 was violated, period zero investment would be zero. In order to have a re sale in
the model, it has to be the case that the fraction of the capital value that can be pledged,  (1  ) ; plus
the return to period zero capital in the crisis state, a1l ;is less than the renancing cost of capital, : I also
assume that the renancing cost is less than one, which is the highest possible price of capital.
a1l +  (1  ) <  < 1 Assumption 1.3
To ensure uniqueness, I also assume21
F 0
 
kT1l
   (1  ) + F 00  kT1l kT1l > 0 Assumption 1.4
@
 
F 0
 
kT1l
   (1  ) + F 00  kT1l kT1l
@kT1l
= F 000
 
kT1l

kT1l + F
00  kT1l < 0
Assumption 1.5 guarantees that in the high state there is never a re sale (i.e. the return per unit of k0 is
higher than the renancing cost of k0)
a1h >  Assumption 1.5
Assumption 1.6 guarantees that the optimal bail-out and the amount of resources that can be transferred to
the crisis state using the state contingent debt contract are not too large so that there will be a re sale in
the crisis state.
(a1l   )n
1   (1  ) +
 
0
 1 A  
1   (1  )

< 0 Assumption 1.6
Assumption 1.7 ensures that the return to period zero and period one investment (after the renancing cost
is paid) is non-negative
A   > 0; a1s  0 Assumption 1.7
21 In models with binding borrowing constraints there might be multiple equilibria because both the demand for and the
supply of resold capital is downward sloping. For details, see Lorenzoni (2008).
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1.3 Solving the Model
1.3.1 The Problem of Banker i
In this section I solve the optimization problem of banker i; assuming no commitment and that the policy
maker provides an optimal ex-post bail-out during a crisis.
Banker i optimizes the dividend payments to the equity owners (consumers). He takes as given the prices
of the state contingent borrowing contracts, p1s = 1 and p2s = 1; which are determined by the rst order
conditions of the consumers problem and are not a¤ected by banker is choice variables. However, banker
i internalizes the fact that his actions a¤ect the price of capital in the middle period, which is given by
q1s = F
0  kT1s (where q0 = q2s = 1). Furthermore, in equilibrium, it will be never optimal to pay dividends
in t = 0 and t = 1 and, hence, I omit those choice variables from the set-up without loss of generality. Since
I assume that banker i does not have an access to a commitment technology, I solve the model backwards.22
The actions in reverse order are the following. In t = 2; all bankers produce and pay out all the prots
as dividends to the consumers. At the end of t = 1; banker i maximizes the dividend payment in the last
period by choosing

ki1s; d
i
2s
	
and taking as given the state variables

Bis; k
i
0; d
i
1s
	
: Banker i maximizes
max
ki1s;d
i
2s
(A+ 1  ) ki1s   di2s
subject to the collateral constraint in t = 1
di2s   (1  ) ki1s

i2s

(1.3.1)
where the Lagrangians are given in square brackets. Banker i also takes into account the period one budget
constraint
ki1sF
0  kT1s+ di1s   F 0  kT1s+ a1s    ki0 +Bis + di2s hzi;11s i (1.3.2)
where Bih = 0 since I assumed bail-outs are prohibitively costly if there is no crisis.
23
22There will be a time inconsistency problem since when banks are large, they internalize the fact that their period one
investment decision will a¤ect the tightness of their period zero borrowing constraint (there will be no time inconsistency in
the case with a continuum of banks). For more details see Davila (2011).
23The implicit assumption is that there is a large xed cost of providing a transfer of money from the consumers to bankers
if there is no re sale (no crisis).
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At the beginning of t = 1; rst, banker i repays the promised debt di1s to the consumers: After that, if
the low state is realized, the policy maker chooses Bil given the state variables

ki0; d
i
1s
	
and the optimal
decision of banker i at the end of t = 1. He also takes into account that his choice of Bil a¤ects the choices
banker i will make at the end of t = 1. Given that consumers are risk neutral, the objective function of a
benevolent policy maker in t = 1 in the low state is to maximize last periods total output.
max
ki1l;B
i
l
2e+ F
 
kT1l
  F 0  kT1l kT1l    (Bl) + d1l
+
NX
i=1
1
N
264 (A+ 1  ) ki1l   di2l  Bil+
zi;1;P1l
  
F 0
 
kT1l

+ a1l   

ki0 +B
i
l + d
i
2s   ki1lF 0
 
kT1l
  di1l
375
(A+ 1  ) ki1l   di2l are the dividends paid by banker i to the equity owners (consumers) in t = 2 in the
low state, F
 
kT1l
  F 0  kT1l kT1l are the prots of the consumers from operating their production technology
if a re sale is present. d1l is the period one payment by the bankers to the consumers:  (Bl) + Bl is the
cost of the bail out  direct cost plus the deadweight loss from taxing.24
At the end of t = 0; banker i optimizes the expected value of dividends paid to the consumers in t = 2;
taking into account his future optimal actions and the formula for the optimal bail-out in the crisis state.
The period zero objective function of banker i is given by
max
ki0;d
i
1s
X
s
s

(A+ 1  ) ki1s   di2s

subject to the budget constraints in t = 1 given by equation 1.3.2, the period zero Lagrangian of which is
sz
i;0
1s . Also banker i takes into account the period zero budget constraint
ki0 
X
s
sd
i
1s + n

zi0

(1.3.3)
The optimization problem is also subject to the t = 0 collateral constraints.
di1s  
 
F 0
 
kT1s
   ki0 si1s (1.3.4)
For detailed derivations see Appendix, Section A.1.2. From now on the  denotes the optimal allocation
from the decentralized equilibrium.
24 I also assume that the endowment of the consumer, e; is large enough so that Bl < e+ d1l   p2ld2l:
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Proposition 1.3.1 Given Assumptions 1.1-1.7 and the Assumptions made on the functional forms of F ()
and  (), considering a symmetric equilibrium with an ex-post optimal bail-out and no ex-ante regulation: (i)
There is no re sale in the high state, q1h = 1 and there is a re sale in the low state, q1l < 1: (ii) Given the
additional Assumption 1.8 provided in the Appendix, (required only for the N < 1 case); the equilibrium
is unique and exists and is one of the following types: Type 1) z0 = z

1l > z

1h; (

1l = 0; 

1h > 0) (interior
equilibrium) Type 2) z0 > z

1s; (

1s = 0) (corner equilibrium where the banker borrows to the maximum in
t = 0) where
z0 =
X
s
s
264 z1s

F 0
 
kT1s

+ a1s    + 1N F 00
 
kT1s

kT1s +
1
00(Bs)N
@z1;P1s
@kT1s

+1s
 
F 0
 
kT1s
   + 1N F 00  kT1s k0
375 (1.3.5)
z1s =
A+ (1  ) (1  )  1s 1N F 00
 
kT1s

k0
1
N F
00  kT1s kT1s + 100(Bs)N @z1;P1s@kT1s + F 0  kT1s   (1  ) (1.3.6)
and z1s = z
0;
1s . The optimal bail-out is pinned down by
1 + 0 (Bl) = z
1;P
1l =
F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l +A+ (1  ) (1  )
F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l + F
0  kT1l   (1  ) (1.3.7)
where @B
i
s
@ki0
=   @Bis
@ki1s
= 100(Bs)N
@z1;P1s
@kT1s
; and the rst order conditions with respect to d2s and d1s imply 

2s >
0; 1s = z

0   z1s  0:
Proof of Proposition 1.3.1. See Appendix, Section A.1.4.
The key variables that characterize the equilibrium type are z1s and z

0 . z

0 is the period zero marginal
value of an extra unit of the consumption good (which, from now on, I will refer to as an extra dollar) in the
hands of the banker as perceived by the banker. z1s is the scaled marginal value of an extra dollar in t = 1;
state s; in the hands of the banker as perceived by the banker. When the banker decides optimally whether
to keep an extra dollar in t = 0 or to "transfer" it to t = 1; state s; using a state contingent contract, the
relevant variables to compare are z0 and z

1s: If the banker saves/"transfers" an extra dollar from t = 0 to
period 1; state s; he will get 1s units of the consumption good in t = 1, state s; and his ex-ante welfare will
increase by (sz1s)
1
s
= z1s: If the banker keeps the dollar in t = 0, his ex-ante welfare will improve by z

0 :
Throughout the rest of the paper, I will refer to z1s and z

0 as the marginal value of wealth in the hands of
the banker as perceived by the banker in t = 1; state s; and in t = 0 respectively.
Let us analyze the rst order conditions in more detail. One can prove that z1s > 1 and z

0 > 1:This
implies that in t = 0 and in t = 1; the banker optimally does not pay dividends to the consumer whose
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marginal value of wealth is one. This conrms the assumption made when solving the problem that dividends
will be optimally paid out only in t = 2: Also z1s > 1 implies that the banker wants to transfer the maximum
amount of resources from period two to period one since in the last period the marginal value of wealth is
simply one (equal to the marginal utility of consumption of the consumers). As a result, the period one
borrowing constraints will always bind, implying that 2s > 0 and d2s =  (1  ) k1s. If the equilibrium is
interior, then z0 = z

1l > z

1h; which implies that the banker values wealth more in period zero and in the
crisis state than he values wealth in the high state in t = 1. Therefore, in period zero, the banker borrows
to the maximum against the high state which implies 1h > 0:
The economic intuition behind the rst order conditions is the following. The rst order condition of the
policy maker with respect to the bail-out at the beginning of t = 1, equation 1.3.7; determines the optimal
bail-out, Bl; by equating the marginal cost to the marginal benet of the bail-out. The marginal cost of
the bail-out is simply the direct transfer of one dollar from the consumer to the banker plus the marginal
increase of the deadweight loss from the bail-out, 0 (Bl). The marginal benet of the bail-out is the marginal
value of an extra dollar in the hands of the bankers in the crisis state as perceived by the policy maker,
z1;P1l
 
kT1l

. From equation 1.3.7, it is clear that only the aggregate bail-out is pinned down, Bl; and not the
bank specic one, Bil : In order to solve the model, I assume that the equilibrium is symmetric where the
government gives the same bail-out to each bank, Bl = Bil ; and every banker internalizes that when making
decisions in period t = 0:25
By totally di¤erentiating equation 1.3.7 with respect to ki;T1l ; one can derive how banker i perceives his
individual re sale to a¤ect the targeted bail-out he receives, @B
i
l
@ki;T1l
; which will be an important term that
enters the rst order conditions with respect to ki0 and k
i
1l:
@Bil
@ki;T1l
=
8><>:
1
00(Bl)N
@z1;P1l (k
T
1l)
@kT1l
> 0 if N <1 and  > 0
0 if N !1 or  = 0
When banks are not innitesimally small and the country has some scal capacity, N <1 or  > 0; banker
i partially internalizes the fact that the larger his individual re sale is, the larger the optimal bail-out
is, @B
i
l
@ki;T1l
> 0: The reason is the following. If the re sale is large, the price of capital in t = 1; state l; is
25 In this model, with linear production technology of the bankers, the policy maker is indi¤erent whether to give the bail-out
money to Bank of America which takes over Merill Lynch (the bank that needs the bail-out) or he gives the money directly to
Merill Lynch. Optimally, the policy maker wants to achieve an aggregate re sale of kT1l which is determined by equation 1.3.7.
For a proof of this result, see Appendix, Section A.1.2. Of course, the ex-post bail-out design a¤ects the ex-ante incentives
of banks. Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer (2011) and Nosal and Ordonez (2013) are two interesting papers that address the
question of what is the optimal ex-post bail-out design that minimizes moral hazard ex-ante.
In this model I focus on an environment where the policy maker has a su¢ cient number of ex-ante instruments to correct for
the moral hazard (he can replicate the constrained Central Planners allocation). Therefore, the ex-post bail-out design is not
crucial for the results.
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lower and the transfer of resources from the more productive sector  bankers  to the less productive
sector  consumers  is larger. As a result, when the re sale is larger, the policy maker values an extra
dollar in the hands of the banker in a crisis by more,
@z1;P1l (k
T
1l)
@kT1l
> 0; and optimally provides a larger bail-out:
However, for countries with a large number of banks, for a given level of the re sale, the perceived impact
of the individual re sale on the aggregate re sale is smaller, which is captured by the 1N term: Finally,
the bail-out received is smaller, for a given level of the re sale, if the country is more scally constrained,
which is captured by the fact that 00
 
Bil

is positive and increases when  decreases: In the limit case with
a continuum of banks, N ! 1; @Bil
@ki;T1l
= 0 because z1;P1l is a function only of the aggregate re sale and
bankers are too small to a¤ect the aggregate re sale and, hence, the bail-out they receive. (This result will
be crucial to prove later on that in the case with a continuum of banks there is no moral hazard while there
will be moral hazard if banks are large.) Also if the country has no scal capacity,  = 0; the bail-out will
be zero and, hence, @B
i
l
@ki;T1l
= 0:
Equation 1.3.6 is the rst order condition with respect to ki1s (from the period zero optimization problem),
which pins down the marginal value of wealth in the hands of the bankers in period one as perceived by the
banker, z1s. In equilibrium, z

1s is equal to the marginal benet of k1s over the "e¤ective" marginal cost
of purchasing an extra unit of k1s:The direct marginal cost of capital is the price of capital q1s = F 0
 
kT1s

which is lowered by the fact that the banker can lever against the capital  captured by the term   (1  ).
The indirect marginal cost is given by the term 1N F
00  kT1s kT1s + 100(Bs)N @z1;P1s@kT1s and is relevant only if the
bank is not innitesimally small (N <1) and there is a re sale. The indirect cost includes a monopo-
listic e¤ect, 1N F
00  kT1s kT1s < 0; which makes the "e¤ective" cost of period one capital lower because the
banker realizes that an extra unit of period one capital will increase the per unit price of the re-sold capital
(for a given k0), kT1s; if any. In addition, if the bank is large and there is a re sale, it also realizes that
an extra k1s will decrease the marginal bail-out received by
@Bis
@ki1s
=   100(Bs)N
@z1;P1s
@kT1s
< 026 because the re
sale will be smaller. This last e¤ect will increase the "e¤ective" marginal cost of period one capital. The
marginal benet of an extra dollar invested is the cash ow received in t = 2; A, plus the resale value of
capital of one minus the renancing cost and minus the debt payment (1  ) (1  ) : If the Lagrangian
on the period zero borrowing constraint in the crisis state is binding,1s > 0, the extra unit of capital in
period one will increase the resale value of period zero capital and relax the period zero constraint, which is
captured by the  1s 1N F 00
 
kT1s

k0 term:27 This will increase the marginal benet of k1s:
The rst order condition with respect to k0; given by equation 1.3.5, pins down the marginal value of
26 @Bs
@ki1s
is a partial derivative for a given ki0
27 In the interior equilibrium case (Type 1 equilibrium), which is the more interesting case, 1l = 0:
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wealth in period zero as perceived by the banker, z0 . Since the price of period zero capital is one, an extra
dollar in t = 0 implies an extra unit of capital purchased in t = 0: Therefore, the marginal value of wealth
in period zero z0 , in equilibrium, is equal to the marginal benet of k0: In t = 1; state s; the return from an
extra dollar of period zero investment is the cash ow a1s plus the resale price, q1s = F 0
 
kT1s

; minus the
renancing cost, . In addition, if the banker is not innitesimally small, he internalizes the fact that the
"e¤ective" marginal return to k0 is smaller, because an extra k0 leads to a larger re sale and a lower price of
the re-sold capital. Hence the return will decrease by 1N F
00  kT1s kT1s < 0 (a monopolistic e¤ect):28 However,
higher k0 will also increase the perceived bail-out received by increasing the re sale, which is captured by
the term @B
i
s
@ki0
= 100(Bs)N
@z1;P1s
@kT1s
> 0 (partial derivative given k1s) : This would increase the "e¤ective" return
to an extra dollar invested in period zero. Notice that the banker internalizes only the benet but not the
cost of the bail-out. The "e¤ective" period one return on k0 is re-invested, which is why it is multiplied by
the marginal value of wealth in t = 1 state s; z1s: If the period zero collateral constraint is binding, an extra
k0 has the additional benet of relaxing the borrowing constraint, which is why the marginal benet of k0
also includes the term 1s
 
F 0
 
kT1s
   + 1N F 00  kT1s k0 :
Graphical Proof of Existence and Uniqueness
In order to solve for the optimal allocation, rst, I solve for the optimal amount of period zero investment,
k0 : I will provide intuition for the proof of existence and uniqueness using a graphical approach of how k

0
is determined. In subsequent sections, I will build on Figure 1.3.1 to prove that there is overinvestment
if the policy maker does not have an access to any regulatory instruments besides the ex-post bail-out. I
will also use a gure similar to Figure 1.3.1 to prove the key result of this paper  that smaller scal
capacity optimally implies a larger ex-ante minimum bank capital ratio conditional on su¢ cient number of
instruments to replicate the constrained Central Planners allocation.
Dene the following function of k0
  (k0) = z1l (k0)  z0 (k0) where k0 2
h
~k0; k
max
0
i
h
~k0; k
max
0
i
is the relevant range for k0 if the equilibrium is the interior equilibrium of Type 1 (See the proof
of Proposition 1.3.1 for details regarding how to derive the relevant range) and z1l (k0) and z

0 (k0) are the
marginal values of wealth in period zero and in the low state in period one if the equilibrium is of Type
28 In the proof of Proposition 1.3.1 in the Appendix, I show that the larger period zero investment is, k0; the larger the re
sale is, kT1l; and there is a one-to-one mapping between k0 and k
T
1l:
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1. If the equilibrium is of Type 1 (interior equilibrium), k0 will be determined by  
 (k0) = 0 and if the
equilibrium is of Type 2 (corner equilibrium) k0 = k
max
0 (the bank will borrow to the maximum in t = 0):
29
Let us focus on the interior equilibrium of Type 1 which will be the more interesting case. k0 is pinned
down using the rst order condition with respect to di1l; which is similar to an Euler equation and given by
z1l (k

0) = z

0 (k

0) : In equilibrium, the banker is indi¤erent between investing an extra dollar in period zero
and saving the extra dollar for the crisis state using a state contingent contract: If the banker invests the extra
dollar in period zero, his ex-ante welfare increases by the marginal benet of an extra k0; z0 (k

0) : If he saves
the extra dollar towards the crisis state and invests it then, his ex-ante welfare increases by z1l (k

0) : Figure
1.3.1 depicts   (k0) :30
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Figure 1.3.1
First, notice that   (k0) is a strictly increasing function of k0 because the marginal value of wealth in the
crisis state, as perceived by the banker, @z

1l
@k0
> 0; increases with period zero investment while the marginal
value of wealth in period zero decreases with period zero investment, @z

0
@k0
> 0. Let us start with @z

1l
@k0
> 0:
In the case with a continuum of banks, N ! 1; @z1l@k0 > 0 because a larger k0 increases the re sale which
lowers the price of capital q1l = F 0
 
kT1l

: As a result, an extra dollar is more valuable in the crisis state since
it can purchase more units of capital. If banks are large, N < 1; in order for @z1l@k0 > 0; Assumption 1.8 is
required as well. Assumption 1.8 guarantees that the "e¤ective" cost of capital in the crisis state decreases
29 If   (k0) < 0 for all k0 2
h
~k0; kmax0
i
; the equilibrium is of Type 2 and in Proposition 1.3.1 in the Appendix, I prove that
it will be never the case that   (k0) > 0 for all k0 2
h
~k0; kmax0
i
:
30The functional forms used for  () and F () in the Figure are given in the beginning of the Appendix. The parameters
used to produce Figure 1.3.1 are  = 0:7;  = 0:8; A = 1; a1h = 1:5; a1l = 0; h = :55; n = :5;  = 1;  = 1:5; N = 10
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as k0 increases, because the direct e¤ect of the price decrease as k0 increases is not o¤set by the fact that
the perceived marginal bail-out received increases with k0;
@2Bil
@ki;T1l @k0
> 0.31
In addition to @z

1l
@k0
> 0; also @z

0
@k0
< 0: In equilibrium z0 is equal to the marginal benet of an extra k0:
An extra k0 will lead to a larger re sale and to a lower re-sale price of k0 in the crisis state, q1l; thereby
lowering the marginal benet of an extra dollar invested in t = 0: In the case of a nite number of banks,
N <1; Assumption 1.8 guarantees that this direct e¤ect dominates the indirect e¤ect, where larger k0 leads
to a larger re-sale in the crisis state and larger perceived marginal bail-out, @
2Bil
@ki;T1l @k0
> 0; which increases
the marginal benet of an extra dollar invested in t = 0. Therefore, as k0 increases, z1l increases and z

0
decreases, leading to  0 (k0) > 0: As a result,   (k0) will cross the zero line at most once.
1.3.2 Constrained Central Planners Problem Without Commitment
In this section I solve for the constrained Central Planners problem without commitment. The constrained
Central Planner optimizes the welfare of the consumers who are also the owners of the banks. The Central
Planner faces exactly the same constraints as the banker in the decentralized equilibrium  the borrowing
constraints plus the rst order conditions of the consumer. Setting up the constrained Central Planners
problem in such a way is equivalent to allowing the Central Planner to a¤ect only the actions of the banker but
he cannot directly transfer resources from the consumer to the banker unless he uses the bail-out instrument
which is costly. Given that markets are incomplete due to the borrowing constraints, if we were to allow the
Central Planner to circumvent the rst order conditions of the consumer, he could directly transfer resources
from consumers to bankers without incurring any cost, which would make the problem trivial and unrealistic.
Essentially, the Central Planner chooses the investment and borrowing decision of every banker i; where
he will take into account any externalities this decision imposes on the rest of the bankers and on consumers.
Given that the equilibrium is symmetric, this maps into a problem where the Central Planner chooses
aggregate variables, taking into account that his actions a¤ect prices and, in particular, the price of capital
in t = 1, q1s = F 0
 
kT1s

: The Central Planner also takes into account the rest of the equilibrium prices given
by q0 = q2s = 1; p1s = p2s = 1: In this section, I preserve the assumption that the bail-out will be possible
only if there is a re sale.
31 Intuitively, the direct e¤ect is that an extra k0 leads to a larger re-sale which makes an extra dollar in the crisis state more
valuable because it is cheaper to purchase an extra dollar of capital, and the indirect e¤ect is that it also makes an extra dollar
in the crisis state less valuable because this extra dollar invested in k1l will decrease the re-sale and hence will decrease the
marginal bail-out received. Assumption 1.8 guarantees that the direct e¤ect on the price of capital is the one that dominates.
21
Solving the problem backwards; in t = 1, the Central Planner maximizes the welfare of the consumers
given the state variables fk0; d1sg, which, in this environment with risk neutral consumers, coincides with
maximizing aggregate output. The period one optimization problem is given by
max
Bs;k1s;d2s
2e+ F
 
kT1s
  F 0  kT1s kT1s + d1s   (Bs +  (Bs)) + (A+ 1  ) k1s   d2s
subject to the collateral constraint in period one, equation 1.3.1, with a Lagrangian given by CP2s ; and
subject to the period one budget constraint, equation 1.3.2, with a Lagrangian given by z1;CP1s : Notice that
the Central Planner internalizes the cost of the bail-out,   (Bs +  (Bs)). He also takes into account that a
larger aggregate re sale improves the welfare of the consumer via the prots from operating the consumers
production technology given by F
 
kT1s
  F 0  kT1s kT1s. As a result, the Central Planner will internalize the
externalities imposed by a single banker on the consumers. The Central Planner also internalizes the fact
that the actions of a single banker a¤ect the price of re sold capital in the crisis state which enters the
budget constraint of the banker. This will be the mechanism through which the Central Planner internalizes
the externalities that a single banker will impose an the rest of the bankers. The latter mechanism will be
at the heart of the pecuniary externality.
In t = 0; the Central Planner chooses fk0; d1sg ; taking into account his future optimal actions, in order
to optimize the following ex-ante welfare function
max
k0;d1s
3e+
X
s

F
 
kT1s
  F 0  kT1s kT1s   (Bs +  (Bs)) + (A+ 1  ) k1s   d2s
The period zero optimization problem is subject to the budget constraint in t = 1, equation 1.3.2, with
a Lagrangian given by sz
0;CP
1s and the budget constraint in t = 0, equation 1.3.3, where the Lagrangian
is zCP0 : The Central Planner also takes into account the period zero collateral constraint given by equation
1.3.4 and the Lagrangian is s
CP
1s : For details on the set-up and the solution see Appendix, Section A.1.3.
Proposition 1.3.2 (i) Given Assumptions 1.1-1.7 and the assumptions made on the functional forms of
F () and  () ; there is never a re sale in the high state, q1h = 1 and there is a re sale in the low
state, q1l < 1:(ii)The equilibrium of the constrained Central Planners problem exists and is unique and is
one of the following types: Type 1) zCP0 = z
CP
1l > z
CP
1h (interior equilibrium); Type 2) z
CP
0 > z
CP
1s (corner
equilibrium where the banker borrows to the maximum in t = 0) where zCP1s = z
0;CP
1s . The optimal bail-out is
determined by
1 + 0 (Bl) = z
1;CP
1l (1.3.8)
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(iii) If also Assumption 1.9 is satised (provided in the Appendix, Section Assumption 1.8), the only possible
equilibrium is the interior equilibrium of Type 1 where
X
s
  F 00  kT1s kT1s + zCP1s  F 0  kT1s+ a1s    + F 00  kT1s kT1s+ hCP1h  [1  ] = zCP0 (1.3.9)
zCP1h =
A+ (1  ) (1  )
1   (1  ) (1.3.10)
z1;CP1l = z
CP
1l =
F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l +A+ (1  ) (1  )
F 0
 
kT1l
   (1  ) + F 00  kT1l kT1l (1.3.11)
and the rst order conditions with respect to d2s and d1s imply 
CP
2s > 0; 
CP
1l = 0; 
CP
1h = z
CP
0   zCP1h  0:
Proof of Proposition Assumption 1.8. See Appendix, Section Assumption 1.8.
Similarly to the decentralized equilibrium, one can prove that zCP1s > 1 and z
CP
0 > 1: The equilibria
types, which are classied based on the borrowing contract between the banker and the consumer, are the
same as the decentralized equilibria types. If the equilibrium is an interior equilibrium, the Central Planner
borrows to the maximum against the value of last period capital, CP2s > 0: Furthermore, in t = 0; he borrows
rst against the high state and only then against the low state in t = 0; i.e. CP1l = 0 and 
CP
1h > 0: The
Central Planner perceives an extra dollar to be more valuable in the crisis state rather than in the non-crisis
state due to the presence of a re sale which increases the ine¢ cient transfer of resources from the more
productive sector  bankers  - to the less productive sector  consumers.
Regarding proving existence and uniqueness of the constrained Central Planners allocation, one can use
a similar graphical approach as in the case of the decentralized equilibrium. Dene the following function
 CP (k0) = z
CP
1l (k0)  zCP0 (k0)
where zCP0 (k0) and z
CP
1l (k0) are the marginal values of wealth in the hands of the bankers as perceived by
the Central Planner in period zero and in the low state in period one if the equilibrium is of Type 1. If the
equilibrium is of Type 1, kCP0 will be determined by  
CP
 
kCP0

= 0 and if the equilibrium is of Type 2,
kCP0 = k
max
0 (the bank will borrow to the maximum in t = 0): In order to prove existence and uniqueness it
will be su¢ cient to prove that  CP 0 (k0) > 0: As before, larger k0 implies larger re sale, kT1l and lower price
of capital. As a result, more wealth is transferred from the more productive to the less productive sector
and, hence, the marginal value of wealth in the crisis state as perceived by the Central Planner, zCP1l ; is
larger: At the same time, zCP0 ; which in equilibrium equals the marginal benet of an extra k0 as perceived
by the Central Planner, decreases with k0. The reason is that a larger k0 implies a larger re sale and larger
23
ine¢ cient transfer of resources. Hence the marginal benet of k0, zCP0 , decreases with k0: (For details on
the derivations see the proof of Proposition 1.3.2).
1.4 Overinvestment
In this sub-section, I compare the constrained Central Planners allocation and the decentralized equilibrium
with no ex-ante regulation: I prove that when we start the economy in normal times, which is the case with
this model (i.e. no re sale in t = 0); there is ex-ante overinvestment.32 If N ! 1; the overinvestment is
due to future pecuniary externalities and, if N < 1, it is due to both future pecuniary externalities and
moral hazard.
Before proving overinvestment, rst I prove Corollary 1.4.1, which states that the marginal value of
wealth in the hands of the banker in the crisis state, as perceived by the Central Planner, is larger than
the marginal value of wealth in the hands of the banker in the crisis state, as perceived by the banker in
the decentralized equilibrium, zCP1l > z

1l: This result will be the main component to the proof that there is
ex-ante overinvestment in this model due to future pecuniary externalities.
Corollary 1.4.1 Conditional on Assumptions 1.1-1.7 and the assumptions made on the functional forms
of F () and  (), also conditional on an interior equilibrium for the Central Planner (Assumption 1.9 is
satised) and given Assumption 1.10, (a su¢ cient and necessary condition only for the N <1 case)
1
00 (Bl)N
@z1;P1l
@kT1l
zCP1l >

1  1
N

zCP1l   1

F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l Assumption 1.10
the Central Planner values an extra dollar in the hands of the banker in the crisis state by more than the
banker in the decentralized equilibrium does, for a given k0.
zCP1l > z

1l
Proof of Corollary 1.4.1. See Appendix, Section Assumption 1.9.
Having proved Corollary 1.4.1, I proceed to prove overinvestment.
32 In an extension in an older version of the paper, I showed that if the economy starts in a crisis state with a re sale,
contemporaneous pecuniary externalities can potentially lead to underinvestment and not overinvestment. The reason why this
is the case is similar to the result in He and Kondor (2012).
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Proposition 1.4.2 Conditional on Assumptions 1.1-1.8 and 1.10 and the Assumptions made on the func-
tional forms of F () and  (), comparing the constrained Central Planners allocation and the decentralized
equilibrium with no ex-ante regulation; there is always overinvestment, kCP0 < k

0 ; if the equilibrium is of Type
1 for the Central Planner (interior equilibrium) and there is no overinvestment, kCP0 = k

0 ; if the equilibrium
is of Type 2 for the Central Planner (corner equilibrium).
Proof of Proposition 1.4.2. Since I already proved in the previous sections that given the assumptions
made,  CP 0 (k0) > 0 and  0 (k0) > 0, in order to prove that there is overinvestment, it is su¢ cient to show
that as long as both the Central Planners equilibrium and the decentralized equilibrium are of Type 1,
 CP (k0) >  
 (k0) (see Figure 2 below). One can re-write  CP (k0)    (k0) as
 CP (k0)    (k0) =
 
zCP1l (k0)  z1l (k0)

(1   [1  ] + l [   a1l])
(1  h [1  ]) > 0 (1.4.1)
where the inequality follows from Assumption 1.3 and Corollary 1.4.1. It is clear that if the equilibrium is
of Type 1 for the Central Planner (Assumption 1.9 is satised) and Type 2 for the banker, then there is
overinvestment since Type 2 equilibrium implies that the banker will borrow to the maximum ex-ante. Also
if the equilibrium of the Central Planner is of type 2, there will be no overinvestment and one can easily
show that the equilibrium will be of Type 2 for the banker as well.
Figure 1.4 depicts   (k0) and  CP (k0) ; using the same parametrization as in Figure 1.3.1.
0 .5 6 0 .5 8 0 .6 0 .6 2 0 .6 4 0 .6 6
-0 .2
-0 .1
0
0 .1
k
0
O verinvestment; c=0.6 ,  N =10
y* = z *
1l
- z *
0
y
CP=zCP
1l
- z CP
0
k
0
CE
k
0
*k
0
CP
Figure 1.4
From equation 1.4.1 one can see that proving overinvestment is equivalent to proving that zCP1l (k0) >
z1l (k0) where the equilibrium is of Type 1 for the Central Planner and for the banker in the decentralized
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equilibrium. There are two reasons why there is overinvestment in this model  future pecuniary externalities
and moral hazard.
Future Pecuniary Externality
In order to isolate the pecuniary externality channel, let us rst consider the case of a country with no
scal capacity,  = 0; and hence, no bail-out Bl = 0. The lack of bail-out implies that the di¤erence between
zCP1l (k0) and z

1l (k0) is only due to the pecuniary externalities. The rst reason why z
CP
1l (k0) di¤ers from
z1l (k0) is that the Central Planner internalizes the fact that an extra dollar in the crisis state in the hands
of a single banker will decrease the re sale, which will relax the budget constraints of the other bankers
(captured by the F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l < 0 term in the denominator of z
CP
1l (k0)). In contrast, the banker only partially
internalizes his impact on prices if N > 1 (captured by the 1N F
00  kT1l kT1l < 0 term in the denominator of
z1l (k0)). This e¤ect pushes z
CP
1l (k0) to be larger than z

1l (k0) : The Central Planner, unlike the banker,
also internalizes the fact that an extra dollar in the hands of the banker in the crisis state implies a smaller
re sale and lower prots for the consumer (which is captured by the F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l term in the numerator of
zCP1l (k0)) which pushes z
CP
1l (k0) to be lower than z

1l (k0).
33 Assumption 1.10 is a su¢ cient and necessary
condition for the former e¤ect to dominate the letter. For example, if N ! 1; Assumption 1.10 is always
satised while if N = 1; it will not be satised if  = 0:34 The economic intuition behind the pecuniary
externality and the overinvestment is that, the Central Planner, unlike the banker, internalizes the fact
that an extra dollar of capital in the hands of the bankers during a crisis implies that less capital will be
transferred from the more productive users of capital  bankers  to the less productive users of capital
 consumers. Since the Central Planner values wealth in the crisis state more than the banker and higher
k0 leads to a lower bank net worth in the crisis state, the Central Planner optimally chooses a lower k0 than
the banker in the decentralized equilibrium (as can be seen on Figure 2). 35
If N ! 1, which is the continuum of banks case, banks take the price of capital as given, and the
pecuniary externality is the strongest. The smaller N is, the smaller the pecuniary externality is and, the
di¤erence between zCP1l (k0) and z

1l (k0) shrinks. Finally, notice that if a country has a continuum of banks
and no scal capacity ( = 0 and N ! 1); zCP1l (k0)   z1l (k0) coincides with the zCP1l (k0)   z1l (k0) of a
country with a continuum of banks and any level of scal capacity (N ! 1 for any ): As a result, it is
33One can think of this force as a monopolistic underinvestment force.
34 If N = 1; there could still be overinvestment due to the moral hazard channel if  > 0:
35 It is a well known fact that in a standard Arrow Debreu economy with no frictions, where agents are small and take prices
as given, there are no pecuniary externalities. The reason is that, in a standard Arrow Debreu economy, the change in the price
is just a wealth transfer from one agent to another and, in equilibrium, the marginal utility of wealth across agents is equalized,
implying that the net e¤ect on welfare is zero. This is why the assumption that bankers are more productive than consumers
(i.e. they have di¤erent marginal valuations of wealth) is crucial for the pecuniary externalities.
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clear that in the case of a continuum of banks, the reason for the overinvestment is only due to the pecuniary
externalities and not due to the moral hazard. The intuition is that when banks are small, they do not
internalize the fact that their actions a¤ect the bail-out they receive since the bail-out, even when targeted,
depends only on the aggregate re sale. Hence the case with a continuum of banks in this model has no
moral hazard despite the presence of a targeted bail-out.36
Moral Hazard
Next consider the case of N < 1 and some scal capacity  > 0; which will be the only case where
there will be moral hazard (captured by the @B
i
l
@ki;T1l
= 100(Bl)N
@z1;P1l
@kT1l
term in the denominator of z1l (k0)). The
intuition why the moral hazard term appears in the rst order condition of the banker in the decentralized
equilibrium but not in the rst order condition of the Central Planner is that the banker internalizes only the
benet of the bail-out while the Central Planner internalizes both the benet and the cost of the bail-out.
Since the benet and the cost are equated in equilibrium, they cancel out from the rst order conditions of
the Central Planner. When banks are large and the country has some scal capacity, they internalize the
fact that an extra dollar in the crisis state will decrease the re sale and hence the marginal bail-out they
receive. As a result, since larger investment in t = 0 will lead to a larger re sale in the crisis state, in order
to maximize the bail-out received, bankers choose a larger k0 than what the Central Planner would want
them to choose. The larger the moral hazard term is, which will be the case when N is small and  is large,
the larger zCP1l (k0)  z1l (k0) is, and the larger the overinvestment is due to the moral hazard (the solid red
line in Figure 2 will shift down).
In general, as we increase N; it is not clear whether the overinvestment will be smaller or larger since the
pecuniary externality is stronger but the moral hazard is weaker.
1.5 Decentralize the Constrained Central Planners Allocation
In the previous section I proved that given the assumptions made, in t = 0; the banker overinvests relative
to the constrained Central Planner and, hence, there is a role for ex-ante regulation: One way to correct for
the overinvestment is to use a minimum bank capital requirement, which is the policy instrument currently
used in practice by almost all countries. Banker i is required to nance at least a fraction i of his risky
investment using internal equity, which, in this model, is equal to the period zero net worth of banker i,
36The linearity of the production technology of the bankers is one of the key reason why the moral hazard is not present in
the case of N !1: Assuming a concave production technology will change the result but even in that case the moral hazard
will be stronger if N is smaller for the same reasons as the ones discussed in this section.
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n: The minimum capital requirement constraint is given by iki0  n and will be an additional constraint
that banker i will have to take into account when choosing his optimal allocation. The following proposition
presents the results from the bankers optimization problem given the minimum bank capital constraint (For
details see Appendix, Section A.1.2).
Proposition 1.5.1 Given Assumptions 1.1-1.8, Assumption 1.10 and the assumptions made on the func-
tional forms of F () and  (), for a given exogenous minimum bank capital requirement such that  > nk0 (=0)
and considering a symmetric equilibrium, the decentralized equilibrium can be one of the following four
types:
Type 1)z1l
 
kT1l ()

= z0
 
kT1l ()

> z1h if k
T
1l () 2 [~kT1l; k^T;max1l )
Type 2) z0
 
kT1l ()

> z1s
 
kT1l ()

if kT1l () = k
T;max
1l
Type 3) z1l
 
kT1l ()

= z0
 
kT1l ()

= z1h if k
T
1l () =
~kT1l
Type 4) z1h = z

0
 
kT1l ()

> z1l
 
kT1l ()

if kT1l () 2 [0; ~kT1l) where kT;max1l is determined in Section A.1.4
in the Appendix. ~kT1l is unique and exists and if 0 < ~k
T
1l < k
T;max
1l ;
~kT1l is determined by M

~kT1l

= 0 where
M
 
kT1l

=
1
N
F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l +
1
00 (Bl)N
@z1;P1l
@kT1l
+ F 0
 
kT1l
  1:
Proof of Proposition 1.5.1. See Appendix, Section Assumption 1.9.
The condition that the exogenous  is such that  > nk0 (=0) guarantees that the minimum capital
requirement constraint will be always binding. The most interesting case to consider is to set the minimum
capital requirement in such a way that in period zero the banker invests the same amount as the Central
Planner would want him to invest, i.e. k0 = k
CP
0 : Therefore, from now on let us consider the case 
 = n
kCP0
:
Notice that the minimum capital ratio is a "quantity" regulatory instrument since it directly determines the
quantity of period zero investment chosen by the banker.
Given the presence of a binding ex-ante minimum bank capital requirement, Proposition 1.5.1 states
that the decentralized equilibrium can be one of four types. What di¤erentiates the equilibria is how much
the banker values wealth in the high state in t = 1 relative to the crisis state (the low state in t = 1): In
Proposition 1.3.2, I already proved that the only two possible borrowing contracts for the Central Planner are
of Type 1 and 2. If the equilibrium is interior (of Type 1), the Central Planner always values wealth more in
the crisis state than in the high state in t = 1 and, hence, borrows to the maximum against the high state and
only then borrows against the crisis state. From Proposition 1.5.1 it is clear that a single minimum capital
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requirement might not be su¢ cient to replicate the constrained Central Planners allocation. In addition to
choosing k0 in t = 0; the banker has another degree of freedom, which is to choose how to transfer resources
across states of nature and time. More precisely, he can choose how much liquidity to transfer to the crisis
state, d1l.37 For example, if the decentralized equilibrium is of Type 4, even though k0 = k
CP
0 ; the banker
optimally chooses to borrow rst to the maximum against the low state and only then to borrow against the
high state, which implies d1l > d
CP
1l . This result is represented graphically below.
Consider parametrization where the equilibrium is of Type 1 for the Central Planner (Assumption 1.9 is
satised) and set  = n
kCP0
.38
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Given that N = 3; when the country has a large scal capacity, the banker optimally chooses to transfer
too little liquidity into the low state relative to the Central Planner. If the dashed line in Figure 1.5 is above
the solid line, the borrowing contract for the banker is either of Type 3 or of Type 4 while for the Central
Planner the borrowing contract is always of Type 1. The intuition for the result is the following.
The moral hazard presents itself in two di¤erent dimensions. On the one hand, the banker is tempted
to invest too much in t = 0 relative to the Central Planner and, on the other hand, the banker might be
also tempted to pledge too high of a payment into the crisis state if the moral hazard is strong enough. The
reason why this is the case is that both too much investment in period zero, k0; and too high of a payment
37The amount of period zero borrowing is given by
P
sd1s = kCP0   n and also d2s is determined by the borrowing
constraint in t = 2 which is binding: Hence, what is left to decide is d1l since d1h =
kCP0  ld1l n
h
and k0 = k
CP
0 :
38The parameters used are the same as in Figures 1.3.1 and 1.4 with the exception that N = 3 and I vary the scal capacity,
.
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pledged in the crisis state, d1l; will lead to a larger re sale which will maximize the bail-out received. This
result is stated formally in the following Corollary 1.5.2.
Corollary 1.5.2 If N <1 and  > 0; bankers realize that they a¤ect the bail-out received both via ki0 and
di1l , i.e.
@Bil
@ki0
=
@Bil
@ki;T1l
@ki;T1l
@ki0
> 0 and @B
i
l
@di1l
=
@Bil
@ki;T1l
@ki;T1l
@di1l
> 0 where @B
i
l
@ki0
and @B
i
l
@di1l
are total derivatives: Also
for a given kT1l; the fewer the banks are and the larger the scal capacity is, the stronger the moral hazard is;
@2Bil
@ki0@N
< 0;
@2Bil
@ki0@
> 0 and @
2Bil
@di1l@N
< 0;
@2Bil
@di1l@
> 0.
Proof of Corollary 1.5.2. See Appendix, Section Assumption 1.9.
Corollary 1.5.2 states that as long as the country has some scal capacity  <1 and the number of banks
is nite, N <1; the banker internalizes the fact that his period zero actions a¤ect the size of the bail-out,
which is how the moral hazard enters the model. The moral hazard is captured by @B
i
l
@ki0
> 0 and @B
i
l
@di1l
> 0:
A large scal capacity and a more concentrated banking sector exacerbate the moral hazard problem. The
intuition is that when the banks are large (small number of banks), they know that their marginal impact
on the re sale is large and, as a result, they a¤ect the optimal bail-out by more, leading to a stronger moral
hazard. Similarly, if a country has a larger scal capacity; it can a¤ord to provide a larger bail-out, which
implies that the moral hazard is stronger.
As a result, a second ex-ante instrument in the form of a limit on the payment promised in the crisis state
di1l  i; in addition to the minimum capital requirement, might be necessary to replicate the constrained
Central Planners allocation for countries with strong moral hazard. The exact conditions is specied in
Proposition 1.5.3.
Proposition 1.5.3 Consider parametrization where the equilibrium is of Type 1 for the constrained Central
Planner. (i) If a) N <1 and  <  (N) or b) if N !1, for any ; a minimum capital requirement (where
 = n
kCP0
) is su¢ cient to replicate the constrained Central Planners allocation where  (N) is pinned down
by the system of equations M
 
kT1l

= 0 and BC1l
 
kT1l

= 0 where
M
 
kT1l

=
1
N
F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l +
1
@2(Bl;)
@Bl@Bl
N
@z1;P1l
@kT1l
+ F 0
 
kT1l
  1 = 0
BC1l
 
kT1l

= l

kT1l
 
F 0
 
kT1l
   (1  )+Bl  kT1l;   [1   (1  ) + l (   a1l)] n   n

(ii) if N <1 and  >  (N) ; a second instrument is required in the form of a limit on the payment pledged
in the crisis state to consumers (where  = dCP1l ): Part 2) (i) a) If  > 0 and N > N
 () or b) if  = 0;
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for any N; a minimum capital requirement (where  = n
kCP0
) is su¢ cient to replicate the constrained Central
Planners allocation where N () is pinned down by the system of equationsM
 
kT1l

= 0 and BC1l
 
kT1l

= 0:
(ii) If  > 0 and N < N () a second instrument is required in the form of a limit on the payment pledged
in the crisis state to consumers:
Proof of Propostition 1.5.3. See Appendix, Section Assumption 1.9.
Proposition 1.5.3 states that a second instrument, in addition to the minimum capital requirement, is
required only if the banking sector is fairly concentrated and a country has a large scal capacity (i.e. the
second instrument is required only if  >  (N) for a given N <1 and if N < N () for a given  > 0):
The intuition why the policy maker should optimally limit the pledged payments by the bankers in the
crisis state only if the moral hazard is strong enough is the following. There are two forces which determine
whether the banker values wealth more in the crisis state or in the high state in t = 1 and they push in
di¤erent directions. The rst set of forces which push towards higher valuation of wealth in the crisis state
are that capital is cheaper during a crisis and also an extra dollar in the crisis state will lead to a lower
re sale, which implies higher resale value of the re sold capital. These forces push the banker towards
maximizing his net worth in the crisis state and, hence, borrowing rst against the high state and only then
against the low state in t = 1. However, the countervailing force is the benet from maximizing the bail-out
by pledging too high of a payment in the crisis state. Only once the perceived benet of the bail-out becomes
large enough (which is the case when the scal capacity is large and banks are large), the banker starts to
value wealth less in the crisis state relative to the high state. That is why a second regulatory instrument
would be required only for countries with strong moral hazard.
The way to interpret the limit on the payment pledged in the crisis state by banker i; i; is as a limit
on the liabilities of banker i in a crisis where a bail-out is highly likely. For example, banks can sell put
options which implies that they will owe payment to the buyer of those options if a stock price falls below
a certain level. Also banks issue CDS contracts as well. Therefore, in order to be able to implement the
regulatory instrument derived in this paper, the policy maker will need information on the payment promised
by the bank in a crisis state where a bail-out will be optimally provided by the government. (For example
projections from the value at risk models that banks use can be a good starting point). In other words, the
limit will be on the implied payments promised via derivative contracts and other types of contracts in crisis
states of nature, where an optimal bail-out will be provided ex-post.
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1.6 Comparative Statics of Optimal Regulation With Respect to
Fiscal Capacity
The question arises how should the optimal minimum bank capital requirement, ; and also the optimal
limit on the payment pledged in the crisis state by bankers, ; vary across countries with di¤erent scal
capacity. In this sub-section, I prove the key result of this paper  that smaller scal capacity implies a
larger optimal ex-ante minimum bank capital requirement.
Proposition 1.6.1 Conditional on Assumptions 1.1-1.8 and 1.10 and the assumptions made on the func-
tional forms of F () and  (), if the policy maker has an access to a su¢ cient number of instruments to
replicate the constrained Central Planners allocation and the parametrization is such that the Central Plan-
ners equilibrium is of Type 1 (Assumption 1.9 is satised), the optimal minimum bank capital ratio is higher
for more scally constrained countries, @

@ < 0:
Proof of Propostition 1.6.1. See Appendix, Section Assumption 1.9.
I already proved in Proposition 1.5.3 that the constrained Central Planners allocation can be decentral-
ized using a single instrument  an ex-ante minimum bank capital requirement  if the moral hazard is
not too strong. A second instrument will be required  a limit on the payment promised in a crisis state by
banks  if the moral hazard is strong. In this section I assume that the policy maker has a su¢ cient number
of instruments to replicate the constrained Central Planners allocation. The optimal minimum bank capital
ratio, ; and kCP0 are inversely related, 
 = n
kCP0
: As a result, in order to prove Proposition 1.6.1, it is
su¢ cient to prove that the Central Planner of a country with a larger scal capacity will optimally choose to
invest more ex-ante relative to the Central Planner of a country with a smaller scal capacity, i.e. @k
CP
0
@ > 0.
I present the intuition of the proof graphically.39
39The rest of the parameters are the same as in Figure 1.3.1.
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Figure 1.6 plots  CP (k0; ) for two countries with di¤erent scal capacity. On Figure 1.6, the country
with  = 0:6 has a smaller scal capacity and a larger marginal cost of an extra dollar of bail-out relative to
the country with  = 1. Given that @ 
CP (k0;)
@k0
> 0; in order to prove that the Central Planner of a country
with a larger scal capacity would optimally choose a larger period zero investment relative to a country
with a smaller scal capacity, it is su¢ cient to prove that, for a given k0; the dashed line is below the solid
line, i.e. @ 
CP (;k0)
@ < 0 (partial derivative). Larger scal capacity for a given k0 implies a larger bail-out
and a smaller re sale during a crisis leading to a smaller ine¢ cient transfer of resources from the bankers
to the consumers. Therefore, the policy maker who can optimally a¤ord a larger bail-out will value a dollar
in the hands of the bankers in a crisis by less, zCP1l ( = 0:6) > z
CP
1l ( = 1). Similarly, given that the policy
maker of a less scally constrained country can contain the downside of a crisis, which would imply that
the return on k0 in a crisis is higher, from an ex-ante perspective the marginal benet of k0 is also higher,
zCP0 ( = 0:6) < z
CP
0 ( = 1) : Intuitively, the policy maker in the country with the larger scal capacity can
prop up prices by more ex-post during a crisis and control the downside, for a given level of bank assets, which
implies that ex-ante he optimally chooses to have a larger investment boom (kCP0 ( = 1) > k
CP
0 ( = 0:6)):
40
The result that countries with larger scal capacity should optimally have lower ex-ante minimum bank
capital requirements might appear counter-intuitive at rst  large scal capacity implies stronger moral
hazard, while the optimal policy recommendation is to regulate less ex-ante if the policy instrument is a
40One can also calculate the optimal ; conditional on no minimum liquidity requirement. For countries with large scal
capacity and a few banks (strong moral hazard), the constrained Central Planners allocation can be no longer replicated.
However, it is still the case that larger scal capacity implies lower  (or even  = 0): If the policy maker cannot prevent the
banker from borrowing rst against the crisis state, the optimal allocation from the problem with only an ex-ante minimum
capital requirement is to borrow to the maximum, which is what the banker from the decentralized equilibrium with no ex-ante
regulation would optimally choose himself.
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minimum bank capital requirement. The explanation is the following. Both the pecuniary externalities and
the moral hazard appear only in the rst order condition of the banker with respect to k0 in the solution of
the decentralized equilibrium with no ex-ante regulation. (The banker internalizes only the benet and not
the cost of the bail-out and also the banker internalizes only partially his impact on prices.) However, the
rst order conditions of the banker play no role in determining the optimal minimum capital requirement or
the minimum liquidity requirement. Both of these instruments are "quantity" instruments, in the sense that
once the policy maker sets  and ; he directly determines the d1l and k0 that will emerge in equilibrium.
Therefore, if the policy maker has a su¢ cient number of instruments to replicate the constrained Central
Planners allocation, in order to analyze the comparative statics of  (or ) with respect to the scal
capacity of a country, one has to use only the rst order conditions from the Central Planners problem.41
This result will be contrasted with the result in the next section where I consider a "price" regulatory
instrument instead of a "quantity" regulatory instrument.
As it turns out, the ingredients that generate the pecuniary externality are the key driving force behind the
result that less scally constrained countries should have lower ex-ante minimum bank capital requirements
(but not the strength of the pecuniary externalities). Without the assumptions that the banking sector is
more productive than the consumers and that there is a re sale (the only two assumptions necessary to
generate pecuniary externalities and overinvestment), if the only source of overinvestment was the moral
hazard, the optimal regulation across countries with di¤erent scal capacity would have been constant in
this model.
Next, let us consider how  varies with the scal capacity of the country where the assumption that the
policy maker has a su¢ cient number of instruments to replicate the constrained Central Planners allocation
is still in place.
The larger  is, the higher the optimal amount of pledged payment in the crisis state is (@

@ > 0). Larger
scal capacity implies larger kCP0 : Given that it is always the case that the period zero borrowing constraint
binds in the high state for the Central Planner, the larger period zero investment is nanced with larger
ex-ante borrowing against the crisis state (or less money transferred to the crisis state). This logic explains
why larger scal capacity implies larger : The minimum liquidity requirement will be binding only for
countries with scal capacity, ; for which the dashed line is above the solid line in Figure 3. In that sense,
41The rst order condition of the banker from the problem with no ex-ante regulation will be used only to solve for the
Lagrangians of the minimum bank capital requirement constraint and the maximum amount of payment pledged in the crisis
state constraint, and those Lagrangians will vary with the strength of the moral hazard and the strength of the pecuniary
externality but  and  will not.
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no regulation will be required for countries with very small scal capacity. However, conditional on the
constraint binding,  increases as the scal capacity increases.
If one compares the US  a country with large scal capacity  and Switzerland  a country with
small scal capacity  the US should optimally have a lower ex-ante minimum bank capital requirement
than Switzerland which is consistent with current regulation. However, since the moral hazard might be
potentially stronger in the US due to the larger scal capacity, US regulators might need to use a second
instrument which limits the amount of CDS contracts and put options that US nancial institutions can
sell. If both the US and Switzerland were to need such an instrument, Swiss banks will face a tighter limit
on the amount of derivative contracts that can sell.
1.7 A "Price" Instrument Versus A "Quantity" Instrument
In this section, I show that whether larger scal capacity implies more or less ex-ante regulation depends
critically on the instrument used. I show that if the policy maker has an access to a "price" instrument such
as a tax on period zero investment, the result is the opposite from the case where the instrument used is a
"quantity" instrument such as a minimum bank capital requirement. If the regulatory instrument was a tax
on period zero investment, larger scal capacity implies an optimally higher tax on period zero investment
if the moral hazard is present.
I solve the problem of the banker using a tax on period zero investment instead of a minimum bank
capital requirement. The only change in the set up is that the period zero budget constraint becomes
ki0
 
1 +  ik0
  n+ T ik0 X
s
sd
i
1s

zi0

(1.7.1)
where  ik0 is the bank specic tax on period zero capital. The revenues from the proportional tax are
distributed equally back to the bankers using the lump sum tax, T ik0 ; which is negative and given by T
i
k0
=
 PNi=1 1N ki0 ik0 . The following proposition proves that a larger scal capacity implies a larger tax on period
zero investment as long as 1 < N < 1; and the tax on period zero investment is constant if N ! 1 (the
case with a continuum of banks and no moral hazard).
Proposition 1.7.1 Conditional on Assumptions 1.1-1.10 and on the functional forms of F () and  () ; if
the policy maker has an access to two ex-ante instruments  an ex-ante tax on period zero investment
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("price" instrument), k0 ; and a limit on the payment promised in the crisis state, ; one can show that
k0 > 0: If N !1 (no moral hazard) then @k0@ = 0: If 1 < N <1 then
@k0
@ > 0: k0 and
@k0
@ are given
by
k0 =
"
zCP1l
 
kT1l

z1l
 
kT1l; 
   1# > 0 (1.7.2)
@k0
@
=  @z

1l
 
kT1l; 

@
zCP1l
 
kT1l; 

z1l
 
kT1l; 
2   0 (1.7.3)
where  = [1 (1 )+l( a1l)]
(1  1N )
> 0:
Proof of Proposition 1.7.1. See Appendix, Section Assumption 1.9.
If the instrument of choice was a tax on period zero investment, equation 1.7.2 shows that the optimal
tax is positive since the banker wants to overinvest relative to the Central Planner due to both the pecuniary
externality and the moral hazard. This is captured by the fact that zCP1l
 
kT1l

> z1l
 
kT1l; 

which I proved
in Corollary 1.4.1:
One can show that the constrained Central Planners allocation can be achieved using either a tax on
period zero investment or a minimum bank capital requirement (conditional on imposing also a limit on the
payment promised in the crisis state if necessary). However, a "price" instrument is very di¤erent from a
"quantity" instrument in the way it achieves the optimal allocation. By setting k0 ; the policy maker can no
longer set directly the amount of k0 ; which was true in the case of a minimum capital requirement. k0 a¤ects
the marginal cost of k0 (or the "price" of k0); as perceived by the banker, which is why a tax instrument can
be thought of as a "price" instrument. In equilibrium, if the ex-ante instrument is a tax, k0 is determined
by the rst order condition of the banker with respect to k0; which equates the marginal benet of k0 to the
marginal cost of k0:
The optimal k0 approximately equals the size of the overinvestment which is given by the scaled di¤erence
between the marginal benet of k0; as perceived by the banker, minus the marginal benet of k0 as perceived
by the constrained Central Planner. This di¤erence is approximately equal to
zCP1l (k
T
1l) z1l(kT1l;)
z1l(kT1l;)
: The larger
the di¤erence in the perceived marginal benet of k0 is, the larger the tax on capital has to be, in order for
the policy maker to be able to replicate the constrained Central Planners allocation. Due to the linearity
assumption, the equilibrium kT1l from the Central Planners problem does not vary with the scal capacity
of the country (see equation 1.3.9).  does not enter directly the marginal benet of k0; as perceived by
the Central Planner, since the Central Planner internalizes both the marginal cost and the marginal benet
of the bail-out and, in equilibrium, they cancel out. In contrast,  enters directly the marginal benet of
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k0; as perceived by the banker. Conditional on a nite number of banks, N < 1; the banker perceives the
bail-out to be larger for countries with a larger scal capacity.42 Therefore, in order to achieve a given level
of k0; the policy maker will have to increase k0 by more for countries with larger scal capacity, since the
perceived bail-out and, hence, the moral hazard in those countries are stronger. If one considers the case
of N ! 1; @z

1l(k
T
1l;)
@ = 0; because there is no moral hazard. In that case, k0 is still positive but it is no
longer a function of the scal capacity.43
In summary, the key reason why the size of the moral hazard a¤ects the "price" instrument and not
the "quantity" instrument is the following. The moral hazard enters into the model through the rst order
condition of the banker since the banker internalizes the benet of the bail-out, but not the cost. If the ex-
ante regulatory instrument is a tax on period zero investment, k0 is determined by combining the rst order
condition of the banker with respect to k0; and the rst order condition of the Central Planner with respect
to k0: In contrast, when the instrument is a minimum bank capital requirement, the rst order condition of
the banker with respect to k0 will no longer play a role and, hence, the strength of the externalities does
not a¤ect the optimal minimum capital requirement. (The strength of the moral hazard will a¤ect only the
Lagrangian of the minimum bank capital requirement which one can think of as a shadow tax.) This is why,
as long as the policy maker can replicate the constrained Central Planners allocation, the size of the moral
hazard per se does not a¤ect the optimal minimum capital ratio  a "quantity" instrument, but it a¤ects
the ex-ante tax on period zero investment  a "price" instrument.
1.8 Further Discussion and Conclusion
The key result derived in this paper is that cross country bank regulation should not be synchronized given
the heterogeneity across countries regarding their ability to bail-out the banking sector during a nancial
crisis and to alleviate the costs of nancial crises. This paper provides a normative result  countries with
larger scal capacity should have lower ex-ante minimum bank capital requirements relative to countries
with smaller scal capacity. In order to know whether one country should have lower ex-ante minimum
42Mathematically, this implies that
@z1l(k
T
1l;)
@
> 0 and
@zCP1l (k
T
1l)
@
= 0:
43The reason why the pecuniary externality does not a¤ect the size of the ex-ante tax is because due to the linearity
assumption the optimal kT;CP1l does not vary with the scal capacity. If one were to introduce concavity in the production
technology of the bankers, then there will be two opposing forces. Larger scal capacity will imply stronger moral hazard
which will push k0 higher. It will also imply smaller re sale in equilibrium (unlike the linear case) and also the pecuniary
externalities will be smaller which will push the ex-ante tax in the opposite direction (make it lower). In contrast, if a minimum
capital requirement was used instead, the comparative static of  with respect to  will be still that larger scal capacity implies
smaller ex-ante minimum capital requirements as long as the decreasing returns to scale are not too strong during a crisis, which
is a reasonable assumption.
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bank capital requirement than another, a policy maker has to measure only the scal capacity of a country.
This can be done by considering variables such as the size of the banking sector relative to the GDP, the
availability of independent monetary policy and a forecast of the cost of sovereign borrowing in a crisis based
on the level of sovereign debt, for example. Therefore, the result is fairly information insensitive assuming
that there are no large di¤erences across countries regarding the other parameters of the model. The second
key result of the paper is that countries with large scal capacity and concentrated banking sectors should
also impose a limit on the amount of derivative contracts that nancial institutions can issue which will leave
them with high liability during a systemic crisis.
One shortcoming of the model presented here is that equity is exogenous and xed. In reality banks
can adjust their equity. In a previous version of the model I explored the possibility that banks can raise
costly equity and the comparative statics remain unchanged. There is a key di¤erence between the models
with and without costly equity. In the presence of costly equity, the minimum bank capital requirement is
no longer su¢ cient to address the overinvestment since bankers end up issuing more equity than socially
optimal in order to circumvent the minimum bank capital requirements. In contrast, if a "price" instrument
is used, instead of a "quantity" one, the policy maker can still replicate the constrained Central Planners
allocation even in the presence of costly equity. Understanding more thoroughly the di¤erences between the
di¤erent types of instruments is left for future work.
Finally, one can make the argument that one of the main reasons why countries followed the Basel
Accords and synchronized their bank regulation was to introduce a "level playing" eld for their banks. This
model is a legacy model and does not consider the dynamics of what might happen if I were to introduce
heterogeneous regulation and banks were allowed to relocate across countries. However, usually there are
large xed costs to banks relocating either because of xed investment in human capital and buildings or due
the fact that markets are naturally segmented. The segmentation is due to the fact that monitoring costs
are lower if the banks are closer to the borrowers. Given the natural market segmentation, governments have
some leeway in terms of having di¤erential minimum bank capital requirements up to a certain limit.
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Chapter 2
Welfare Implications of the Structure
of the Banking Sector in a Small
Open Economy
2.1 Introduction
Models that explicitly introduce a banking sector, facing some type of a borrowing or a bank net worth
constraint, have gained in popularity in the new macro literature (for example, Meh and Moran (2010),
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Queralto (2012), Adrian and Boyarchenko (2012), Mag-
giori (2013), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2013)). At the same time, many papers have emerged that include
imperfectly competitive banking sectors (for example, Gerali, Neri, Sessa, and Signoretti (2010), Hafstead
and Smith (2012), Andres and Arce (2012)). After the nancial crises, it has become apparent that, in order
to match the empirical evidence, it is of rst order importance to introduce the nancial sector into standard
macroeconomic models in a realistic way. It is equally important to understand what are the ine¢ ciencies
that might arise due to the specic structure of the nancial sector and whether policy makers can intervene
in order to improve aggregate welfare. This paper attempts to address the latter.
While economists understand well by now how the presence of future binding net worth constraints/borrowing
constraints can generate pecuniary externalities and how an imperfectly competitive banking sector would
lead to underinvestment, little is known how those two sources of ine¢ ciency interact. What does this en-
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vironment imply for the optimality of existing policies such as capital account controls and subsidies on the
borrowing rates of rms? These are the questions that I study in this paper.
I build a nite period model of a small open economy (SOE) with a banking sector, which is monopo-
listically competitive and concentrated, and faces a net worth borrowing constraint. Bankers borrow from
foreigners at the risk free interest rate and, in turn, lend to domestic entrepreneurs/rms using a standard
debt contract (SDC). Entrepreneurs are risk neutral and are the only consumers in the economy. The implicit
assumption is that domestic rms can borrow only through the domestic banking sector due to its superior
monitoring technology. Entrepreneurs have an access to a concave production technology and they default
on their loans with some probability, at which point the bankers seize the assets of the rm. Every period
and state of nature, bankers face a net worth borrowing constraint which forces them to nance at least a
fraction of the loans they provide using their own equity. There is no bank default in this economy.
First, one can compare the behavior of more and less competitive banking sectors by varying the degree
of substitution of loans, for a given number of banks. There are two forces in play. On the one hand, a
less competitive banking sector wants to underinvest relative to a more competitive one due to a standard
monopolistic e¤ect. However, there is also an overinvestment force which is a novel theoretical result of
this paper. The overinvestment force emerges from the interaction between the desire of a less competitive
banking sector to underinvest in the future and the presence of a binding net worth constraint in the crisis
state in the future. The intuition is the following. Due to its desire to underinvest in the future, a less
competitive banking sector does not value an extra dollar of net worth in the crisis state, when the net
worth constraint binds, as much as a more competitive banking sector. As a result, it does not perceive an
extra dollar invested ex-ante, which depletes the net worth of the banking sector in the crisis state, to be as
costly. If this overinvestment force dominates the ex-ante standard underinvestment force, a less competitive
banking sector might end up overinvesting relative to a more competitive one. This result is in contrast to the
franchise value literature, which argues that it is always welfare improving to have a regulation that restricts
the competitiveness of the banking sector, in addition to imposing a minimum bank capital requirement (see
Keeley (1990), Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000) and the Literature Review section of this paper).
Furthermore, one can compare the decentralized allocation to the constrained Central Planners alloca-
tion. There are two standard sources of ine¢ ciency  pecuniary externalities and a monopolistic underin-
vestment force. The pecuniary externalities, which lead to overinvestment relative to the constrained Central
Planners allocation, work through two di¤erent channels. First, bankers do not fully internalize the fact
that the more they lend in period zero, the lower the marginal rate of return of the other bankers is, when
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the rm defaults. I call this channel a "bankruptcy" pecuniary externality and it is present even if the net
worth constraint does not bind in the future. In addition, if the net worth constraint is binding in the crisis
state in the future, the banker also does not internalize the fact that by lending more ex-ante, he decreases
the return and the net worth of the other bankers during a crisis, which tightens the net worth constraints
of the other bankers even further. I call this channel a "net worth constraint" pecuniary externality.
If the banking sector is imperfectly competitive, there is a standard monopolistic underinvestment force
both in the current period and in future periods. The presence of monopolistic competition and binding net
worth constraints in the crisis state in the future generate a third, novel, source of ine¢ ciency and overin-
vestment in this model, which is separate from the pecuniary externalities. Under certain parametrization,
even a single bank might end up overinvesting relative to the constrained Central Planner. The intuition
is the following. The monopolistic bank wants to underinvest in the crisis state in the future and, as a
result, does not value the marginal dollar of net worth in the crisis state as much as the Central Planner
does. Therefore, the monopolistic bank is tempted to overinvest ex-ante. Whether the monopolistic bank
will under-or-overinvest depends on how the standard current period underinvestment force compares to this
novel overinvestment force.
Having understood the interaction between the di¤erent ine¢ ciencies, I proceed to study how one can
decentralize the constrained Central Planners allocation. I consider two instruments that have been used
by a number of emerging economies  capital account controls on inows in the form of a tax on the
borrowing interest rate from foreigners and subsidies on rm borrowing interest rates. In addition, I allow
the policy maker to provide a lump sum transfer/tax to rms in order to balance his budget and I also
assume commitment on behalf of the policy maker. There is an innite number of ways to decentralize the
constrained Central Planners allocation using these instruments. Imposing the assumption that the policy
maker uses only subsidies or capital account controls in every period and state of nature, I consider one
way to decentralize the equilibrium. Whether the policy maker utilizes subsidies or capital account controls
depends crucially on the presence of uncertainty. The overinvestment forces are potentially present only if
there is future uncertainty. Therefore, there might be a role for capital account controls only for economies
which can end up in a crisis state in the future with a positive probability. If there is no future uncertainty
and the economy is in a steady state, only the underinvestment force is present.1
One of the results that emerges is that there exists a country with an optimal number of banks (as a
1 I consider an implementation where the policy maker always utilizes subsidies if the banking sector is imperfectly compet-
itive and there is no future uncertainty (even if the net worth constraint is binding for both the Central Planner and the banker
in the decentralized equilibrium and no policy instrument is required).
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function of the degree of loan substitution). In that economy, the overinvestment force due to pecuniary
externalities completely o¤sets the monopolistic underinvestment force. Therefore, it is possible that no
ex-ante policy intervention is required, despite the presence of ex-ante ine¢ ciencies. However, if the pecu-
niary externalities are the dominant force ex-ante, a capital account tax will be required to implement the
constrained Central Planners allocation. This tax will be larger, the stronger the degree of substitution
between loans is and the more banks the country has. If the underinvestment force dominates, the country
should optimally impose a subsidy, which will be smaller, the larger the number of banks is and the higher
the degree of substitution between loans is. Finally, it is interesting to note that even if a country has a
single bank, which overinvests relative to the constrained Central Planner, due to the novel overinvestment
force documented in this paper, one way to decentralize the constrained Central Planners allocation is by
using subsidies in the current period and in the future, rather than by using capital account controls.2
Literature Review
There is substantial evidence that the banking sector is imperfectly competitive (due to regulation,
market segmentation, product di¤erentiation). Claessens and Laeven (2004), Bikker and Spierdijk (2008)
and Claessens (2009) estimate the degree of imperfect competition of the nancial sector using Panzar
and Rosse (1987)s methodology and show that it varies signicantly across countries.3 Another important
parameter in the model is banking sector concentration, which could be very di¤erent from the degree of
monopolistic competition of the banking sector, given that in certain cases the threat of entry is su¢ cient to
generate a fairly competitive banking industry. In fact, the correlation between banking sector concentration
and the degree of banking sector competition appears to be slightly positive in the data as shown in Figure
2.1.4
2 It is important to note that these results represent only one way, among many, to implement the constrained Central
Planners allocation.
3The measure captures to what extent the increase in input prices a¤ects the marginal cost and total revenue of a given
bank.
4On the y-axis, Figure 2.1 plots the H measure of banking sector competition calculated by Claessens (2009) using Panzar
and Rosse (1987)s methodology. If the H measure is equal to 1, the nancial sector is perfectly competitive and the smaller the
number is, the less competitive the nancial sector is. On the x-axis, Figure 2.1 plots a measure of banking sector concentration
calculated by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2000). The concentration measure is dened as the assets of the three largest
banks as a share of assets of all commercial banks using BankScope data. (The Figure uses the numbers from the April 2013
version.)
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Figure 2.1
Therefore, it is important to have a model that can distinguish between the concentration of the banking
sector and the degree of imperfect competition of the nancial sector.
Table 2.1 shows the banking sector concentration for a number of countries, which is measured as the
assets held by the largest 3 banks as a fraction of total assets in the country. While there is signicant
heterogeneity across countries, banking sectors appear to be very concentrated.
Table 2.1
Bank Concentration 2008
RUS .14 IDN .64 DNK .79
IND .34 IRL .65 SVK .8
USA .35 COL .65 LTU .81
ITA .40 ROM .65 PER .82
ARG .41 MEX .7 BHR .82
VEN .47 CHN .72 QAT .82
MYS .49 GBR .72 ETH .82
THA .5 BOL .73 BRA .83
LVA .51 DEU .74 GMB .87
JPN .54 POL .75 CHE .88
KOR .54 BGR .75 NER .9
FRA .55 NZL .78 EST .9
CAN .57 ZAF .79 HUN .91
AUS .61 CZE .79 MAR .91
AUT .62 PHL .8 ESP .91
Assets of the three largest  banks as a share of assets of al l commercial
banks.
Source: Fitch's BankScope database
Thortsen Beck and Asl i Demirgüç-Kunt , 2009
The assumption that most of the foreign borrowing is channeled through the banking sector also nds
support in the data. In Table 2.2, which shows bank foreign debt as a fraction of total private foreign debt
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(excluding inter-rm borrowing), one can see that for many countries at least 50% of the private foreign
borrowing is bank borrowing. For example, this is the case for Brazil, Hong Kong, Korea but also for many
developed economies such as Greece, Austria, Germany, Sweden.
Table 2.2
Iceland 1 Philippines 37 Spain 64
Ecuador 2 Russia 39 Hungary 64
Argentina 10 Canada 41 EURO Area 65
Morocco 11 Czech Republic 43 Japan 65
El Salvador 12 Tunisia 44 UK 68
Mexico 13 Turkey 45 Italy 70
Moldova 17 Peru 46 Latvia 70
Indonesia 18 South Africa 46 Australia 71
India 23 Slovak Republic 47 Lithuania 72
Colombia 25 Romania 48 Portugal 73
Egypt 26 Norway 49 Germany 74
Chile 27 Israel 50 Austria 78
Kazakhstan 28 Georgia 51 Netherlands 79
Thailand 30 Malaysia 52 Finland 82
Ukraine 32 Poland 54 Denmark 83
Ireland 32 Armenia 57 Belgium 84
Bulgaria 33 Estonia 58 Sweden 85
Croatia 35 Brazil 59 Greece 87
Luxembourg 36 Slovenia 59 Jordan 88
US 36 Switzerland 64 Hong Kong 92
Belarus 37 Korea 64 Malta 93
Source: WB: Quarterly External Debt Statistics 2011Q3
Gross External Bank Debt/(Gross External Private Sector Debt
Excluding Intra-firm Borrowing)
Therefore, introducing formally the nancial sector is important in order to understand how foreign
inows a¤ect domestic investment and whether there is over or underinvestment relative to the constrained
Central Planners allocation.
The types of policy instruments used by regulators to ensure nancial sector stability are very di¤erent.
They range from minimum bank capital requirements and capital account controls to directly regulating
the competitiveness of the banking sector and subsidies for nal borrowers. In this paper I focus on capital
account controls in the form of a tax on foreign borrowing rates and also on subsidies on rm borrowing
rates. More specically, capital account controls that resemble a tax on foreign borrowing rates ("price"
based capital account controls) have been implemented by Chile  from 1991 to 1998, Colombia  from
2007 to 2008, Thailand  from 2006 to 2008, Russia  from 2004 to 2006 and Brazil starting 2008, among
others (see Ostry, Ghosh, Habermeier, Laeven, Chamon, Qureshi, and Kokenyne (2011)).5
Government subsidies are ubiquitous and are often distributed via subsidized bank lending rates as
modelled in this paper. For example, Brazil provides subsidized interest rates for corporate loans via the
5The instruments used are either a direct tax or unremunerated reserve requirements (URRs), which work exactly like a
tax.
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Brazils National Development Bank (BNDES). The subsidized credit amounts to about "27 percent of all
productive credit". The subsidized rate at which the government lends to the BNDES is signicantly lower
than the nominal interest rate on government bonds. In 2008-2010, the former was 6 percent while the latter
was around 12 percent. (for details and other sources see Antunes, Cavalcanti, and Villamil (2011)) The
United States has the United States Small Business Administration (SBA) loan subsidy program, which
guarantees loans to small businesses and provides an interest rate subsidy.6 For example, during the 2011
scal year, the subsidized new loans provided by the SBA amounted to 19.6 billion dollars (see Dilger (2011)).
South Korea is another country that has relied on government subsidies on lending rates to enterprises during
its industrialization period in the 70s and the 80s (see Lee (1996)).
There are a number of recent theoretical papers that explore how introducing an imperfectly competitive
banking sector in standard macroeconomic models leads to a better data t (see Gerali, Neri, Sessa, and
Signoretti (2010), Hafstead and Smith (2012), Andres and Arce (2012)). There is also an older banking
literature, which emphasizes imperfect banking sector competition (see Klein (1971) and Freixas and Rochet
(2008) for a literature review). In the optimal bank regulation literature, Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz
(2000) argue that it is optimal to restrict the competitiveness of the banking sector, in addition to imposing
minimum bank capital requirements. It prevents banks from overinvesting and risk shifting since they want to
prevent default in order to preserve their franchise value. Keeley (1990) tests the franchise value hypothesis.
The natural experiment that he examines is the nancial sector liberalization in the US in the mid 1960s and
he conrms the link between competitiveness and higher bank default risk. The franchise value literature
encouraged policy makers of many countries to introduce reforms that decreased the degree of banking sector
competition (see Boyd and DeNicolo (2005)).
However, the more recent theoretical and empirical literature disputes the franchise value policy recom-
mendations. For example, Boyd and DeNicolo (2005) show that higher banking sector concentration could
potentially lead to more default by increasing risk shifting by the nal rm. Weaker nancial sector competi-
tion implies higher rm borrowing rates and increased incentive of rms to maximize the upside and, hence,
to risk shift. This channel was missing in Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000) since they considered a
portfolio problem and did not model bankers and rms separately. On the empirical side, Boyd and DeNi-
colo (2005) show that there is no clear cut relationship between banking sector competition and nancial
sector stability. Using a Panzar and Rosse H-statistic measure of banking sector competition, which is a
more precise measure than simply the banking sector concentration of a country, in a sample of 45 countries,
6"Interest rates are negotiated between the borrower and the lender but are subject to SBA maximums, which are pegged to
the prime rate, the LIBOR rate, or an optional peg rate." For details see <http://www.sba.gov/content/7a-terms-conditions>.
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Schaeck, Cihak, and Wolfe (2009) also nd the opposite result  that more competitive banking sectors are
less prone to systemic banking crises.
My paper contributes to the class of papers that introduces a new theoretical channel that pushes in
the opposite direction of the key policy recommendation of the franchise value literature. Namely, I argue
that the interaction between dynamic underinvestment and binding future net worth constraints imply that,
for certain countries and states of nature, a more concentrated banking sector might end up overinvesting
relative to a less concentrated one, leading to a larger loss of bank net worth in a future crisis and a more
severe credit crunch.
Another strand of literature closely related to this paper are models where the nancial sector faces a net
worth constraint or some type of borrowing constraint. One of the key assumptions of the model developed
in this paper is that the nancial sector faces a net worth constraint, which the Central Planner also has
to take as given. The justication why such a net worth constraint will emerge in equilibrium is similar
to Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)s "skin in the game" argument where in order to mitigate potential moral
hazard, lenders require that entrepreneurs invest their own net worth. There is a growing literature which
models nancial institutions as facing value at risk (VaR) constraints, which are constraints internally used
by nancial institutions. For example, Adrian and Shin (2011) microfound the VaR constraint as a way for
lenders to place a limit on the leverage of a bank in order to prevent risk shifting, which becomes equivalent
to preserving a xed probability of default. Adrian and Boyarchenko (2012) model the VaR by assuming that
bankers have to retain enough equity so that a certain fraction of losses is covered. Other papers that model
the nancial sector as facing VaR constraints are Danielsson, Shin, and Zigrand (2011) and Brunnermeier
and Pedersen (2009).
Another class of papers impose the constraint that the net present value or the net worth of the nanciers
has to exceed a certain value. For example, Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2013) impose the constraint that
the bankers net worth cannot exceed zero. Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Queralto (2012) and Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2010) rely on a moral hazard story where the bankers have an access to a less e¢ cient technology and, as a
result, in order to prevent them from using it, lenders limit the amount of loans up to the point where the
net present value the bankers receive has to be greater than or equal to what they would get if they use the
less productive technology. Maggiori (2013) assumes that the net present value of the bank has to be greater
than or equal to zero.
Even though in this paper I assume that the nanciers face a net worth constraint following the literature
described above, all of the analysis could have been done with a borrowing constraint in the spirit of Kiyotaki
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and Moore (1997). The contribution of my paper to both the imperfect competition literature and the
bank net worth constraint/borrowing constraint literature is to combine the two and examine the welfare
implications that emerge.
Finally, my paper builds on the literature that justies the imposition of capital account controls using
pecuniary externalities. International nance papers which study pecuniary externalities include Bianchi
(2011), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001), Korinek (2010), Nikolov (2011) and Bianchi and Mendoza
(2012), among others. They build on the closed economy macroeconomic models with pecuniary externalities
that lead to overinvestment pioneered by Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) and Arnott, Greenwald,
and Stiglitz (1994). The majority of the open economy models with pecuniary externalities do not explicitly
introduce a banking sector and, as we saw in the data, a large fraction of the foreign borrowing is through the
banking sector. Also in those models the borrowers are innitesimally small while in the data the banking
sectors of all countries are very concentrated. The number of banks will a¤ect the strength of the pecuniary
externality and the degree of monopolistic competition. Therefore, it is an important parameter to consider.
2.2 Model
There is a single country which is a small open economy (SOE). There are three periods, t = 0; 1; 2 and
there is uncertainty only in the middle period, t = 1: In t = 1; the economy can be in the high state (a
boom) with a probability H and in the low state (a recession) with a probability L = 1  H : The shock
is an aggregate shock. There are four types of agents  entrepreneurs/borrowers, bankers, foreign lenders
and a policy maker. There are two goods  a capital good and a consumption good where the price of
consumption is the numeraire good and is set equal to one.
There is a continuum of risk neutral entrepreneurs distributed uniformly on [0; 1] :They borrow from the
banks using a short term standard debt contract (SDC). In some states of nature in t = 1, the entrepreneurs
can default upon which their assets will be seized by the bankers. The entrepreneurs are the equity owners
of the banks, but I assume that they cannot borrow from the banks they own equity in.7 Entrepreneurs
have limited liability. If they default, they will be still allowed to borrow again and produce (no exclusion
7One can also think of this set up as having a representative family that splits into two agents in the beginning of period
t = 0 (a banker and an entrepreneur who runs the rm) and they get back together at the end of period t = 2 and consume
(see Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010)). Alternatively, I could have modelled bankers and entrepreneurs as agents that consume
independently and the Central Planner places an exogenous weight on each agent. The intuition behind all the results will
remain unchanged.
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from debt markets for any amount of time).8 Entrepreneurs invest in t = 0; 1 and produce with a lag.
The loans are imperfect substitutes and entrepreneurs can transform the consumption good into the capital
good one-for-one. For simplicity, I assume that the entrepreneurs consume all the prots every period after
producing and that the capital good depreciates one hundred percent after producing. These assumptions
are not crucial for the nal results but allow me to derive analytical results.
The banking sector is monopolistically competitive where the number of banks is nite and equal to n:
In the environment that I consider there will be no default by the banking sector. Banks maximize the
dividends they pay to entrepreneurs. Bankers also face a net worth constraint, which limits the amount they
can borrow from foreigners. I also assume that there is an innite number of risk neutral foreign lenders that
can lend money only to the domestic banks and cannot directly lend to entrepreneurs. 9 In expectation,
foreign lenders receive the world risk free interest rate, Rft .
2.2.1 The Problem of the Representative Entrepreneur
First, let us consider the problem of the entrepreneur. Every period the entrepreneur consumes, borrows
from bankers and invests where the contract between the banker and the entrepreneur is a standard debt
contract (SDC). In period t; the banker o¤ers a lending rate, Rlt; and the entrepreneur takes it as given and
chooses how much to borrow, Lt. The representative entrepreneur maximizes his utility given by
max
Ct;Kt;Li;t
E0
2X
t=0
Ct (2.2.1)
subject to the period t budget constraint
AtK

t 1  RltLt 1 + Lt +Dt  Ct +Kt (2.2.2)
where the discount rate between periods is equal to one and Ct is the consumption of the entrepreneur. The
entrepreneur has an access to a decreasing returns to scale production technology where period t output
is given by AtKt 1: A1 = AL if the low state is realized and A1 = AH if the high state is realized where
AH > AL: A2 = A and is the same in both states of nature. Kt is period t investment which produces in
t + 1; Dt are the dividends paid by the banks which the entrepreneur takes as given. Lt is the amount of
8This assumption is not crucial and one can re-write the problem by modelling the entrepreneurs as overlapping generations
instead or one can interpret the set up as if there is an entry of new entrepreneurs in case of aggregate default.
9One can endogenize this assumption by assuming that domestic banks have a better information regarding domestic
investment projects relative to foreign investors or they have a better monitoring technology, for example.
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new aggregate loans, RltLt 1 is the payment made on loans taken in t 1: The ex-post return on period t 1
loans is equal to Rlt = min
n
AtK

t 1
L^t 1
; Rt 1
o
where L^t 1 =
Pn
i=1
1
nLi;t 1 is a simple average. R
l
t =
AtK

t 1
L^t 1
is
the ex-post return if the rm defaults10 and Rlt = Rt 1 is the ex-post return if the rm does not default. I
assume that in every period, the prots of the rm (if any) and also the dividends received from the banks
are consumed, Ct = AtKt 1   RltLt 1 + Dt; which implies Lt = Kt: This assumption is made only as a
simplication in order to derive intuitive analytical results.11 Assume that loans from di¤erent banks are
imperfect substitutes which allows us to model the banking sector as monopolistically competitive. The CES
aggregator over loans is given by
Lt =
"
nX
i=1
1
n
(Li;t)
( 1)

# 
 1
(2.2.3)
where Li;t is the amount of loans the entrepreneur takes from bank i and  2 (1;1) is the elasticity of
substitution between loans. If !1; all the loans are perfect substitutes and if ! 1 the functional form
approaches Cobb Douglas which has an elasticity of substitution of one. The total expenditure on loans for
each entrepreneur, if there is no default, is given by
RltLt =
nX
i=1
1
n
Rli;tLi;t (2.2.4)
The assumption that the entrepreneur consumes all the prots every period after producing and that capital
depreciates one hundred percent makes the problem of the entrepreneur static. However, since I assume
that in t = 1 there is no longer uncertainty and in t = 0 there is uncertainty I will write the t = 0 and the
t = 1 problems separately to dene notation and highlight the di¤erence in the "uncertainty" versus the "no
uncertainty" case.
I solve the model backwards. In t = 1, the uncertainty is resolved and since there will be no default in
t = 1; then Rl2 = R1and the entrepreneur maximizes
max
Li;1

A (L1 (s1))
   Rl1 (s1)L1 (s1) +D2 (s1)

+A1L

0  Rl1 (s1)L0 +D1 (s1)
subject to equations 2.2.3 and 2.2.4. All the variables are a function of the period one state, s1; which can
10The implicit assumption is that if the rm defaults on one bank, it defaults on all of them and that all banks receive a
share of the output equal to the share of their loans out of total loans (since all the loans are equally productive).
Note that I assume that if the rm defaults, the bankers can seize only the output of the rms and not the dividends paid.
(However, this assumption is irrelevant since dividends will be optimally paid only in the last period and, at that point, there
will be no default since all the uncertainty is resolved in the middle period.)
11Of course, the larger the net worth of the entrepreneur is, which he can reinvest, the lower the welfare loss is due to the fact
that the banking sector is imperfectly competitive. However, as long as there is some borrowing in equilibrium, the qualitative
results presented here remain.
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be either high or low. Also A is the period two TFP shock which is known in t = 1 and for simplicity A
is the same after either state of nature. One can think of A as a steady state productivity. Section B.1.1
in the Appendix presents the details of the optimization problem. The rst order condition with respect
to Li;1 gives the standard demand for loans equations. The demand for aggregate loans is determined by
banks equating the marginal cost of loans to the marginal benet of loans (which here is simply the marginal
benet of capital since Kt = Lt):
 A (L1)
 1
= Rl1 (2.2.5)
The rst order condition with respect to Li;1 can be re-written as
Li;1 = L1
"
Rli;1
Rl1
# 
(2.2.6)
which determines the demand for bank specic loans and is standard in models with monopolistic competi-
tion. The interest rate on aggregate loans is given by
Rl1 =
"
nX
i=1
1
n
 
Rli;1
(1 )# 1(1 )
(2.2.7)
Given that the problem is static, the period zero problem of the entrepreneur is given by
max
Li;0
H

AH (L0)
   Rl0L0

+ HD1 (sH) + LD1 (sL) +D0
where I assume for simplicity that the entrepreneur has no net worth in period zero and K 1 = 0. The
model will be parametrized in such a way that there is always rm default in the low state. As a result, due
to limited liability, entrepreneurs maximize only their prots in the non-default state since they lose their
output in the case of default. Entrepreneurs will take period zero and period one dividend payments as given,
which, in equilibrium, will be equal to zero. The rst order conditions are very similar to the ones in period
t = 1; with the only di¤erence being that the aggregate demand for loans is given by AH (L0)
 1
= Rl0.
The equations for Li;0 and Rl0 are identical but for the time subscript.
What is important to note is that the demand schedule for loans will be downward sloping and the
imperfectly competitive banking sector will internalize that. This result, combined with the fact that if
there is no default by the rm bankers can seize only a fraction of the output of the rm, will generate the
standard underinvestment channel due to imperfect competition.12
12 It will be important that the fraction of the output that the banker will seize in equilibrium in the high state in t = 1 is
exactly equal to the marginal product of capital.
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2.2.2 Banker i0s Optimization Problem
In this section I solve the optimization problem of banker i. There are n banks and they provide loans
that are imperfect substitutes: The banking sector is monopolistically competitive. It is important that this
model allows us to separate the bank concentration e¤ect, proxied by n; from the imperfect competition
e¤ect, proxied by .
I solve the problem of banker i backwards. In period t = 1; banker i maximizes his net worth in t = 2;
which is also equal to the dividends paid to the entrepreneurs, Ni;2 = Di;2:13 Since all the uncertainty is
resolved in t = 1; there will be no default in t = 2: Banker i takes the rst order conditions of the entrepreneur
and the actions of the other bankers, Lj;1; as given, where j 6= i. Given Ni;1; the optimization problem of
banker i in t = 1 becomes
max
Li;1
Rli;1 (Li;1)Li;1  Rf1 [Li;1  Ni;1]
subject to a net worth constrain which states that at least a fraction  of the loans that bank i issues have
to be nanced using the banks own net worth
Ni;1  Li;1 [i;1] : (2.2.8)
i;1 is the Lagrangian of the borrowing constraint and it represents the marginal value of an extra dollar of
net worth in period one as perceived by the banker. Aghion, Banerjee, and Piketty (1999) provide one way
to microfound the functional form of the net worth constraint that I specify in equation 2.2.8. Instead of a
net worth constraint, one could use a borrowing constraint as an alternative friction, which is used by the
literature on pecuniary externalities. The borrowing constraint can be expressed using a similar functional
form as equation 2.2.8 with the main di¤erence being that  would be endogenous and time varying. The
rest of the analysis would be similar.
Notice that banker i takes into account that his actions a¤ect the return that he receives, Rli;1 (Li;1) : The
state variable is the period one net worth, Ni;1; which is a function of the realized state. If the rms default
in t = 1; the period one net worth of banker i is given by
Ni;1 (sL) = AL (L0)
 Li;0
L^0
 Rf0 [Li;0  Ni;0]
13Banker i will optimally choose not to pay dividends prior to t = 2 since entrepreneurs are assumed to always consume
them, which implies that the marginal value of dividends is one. The marginal value of the banks net worth will be always
greater than or equal to one. Notice that all the results will go through if bankers and entrepreneurs are treated as separate
agents and then the assumption that dividends have to be consumed when paid out can be relaxed.
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and if the rms do not default, the period one net worth of banker i is
Ni;1 (sH) = Ri;0Li;0  Rf0 [Li;0  Ni;0]
If the net worth constraint does not bind (1 = 0); and after imposing a symmetric equilibrium; the rst
order condition with respect to Li;1 becomes
Rl1 = |{z}
mark up
Rf1|{z}
MC
where Rf1  1 is the period one risk free world interest rate which is also the marginal cost (MC) of an extra
dollar of loans provided by banker i. The mark-up is constant and is given by the following equation
 =
1
1  1
 
1  1n
  (1  ) 1n  1 (2.2.9)
The key result to notice is that if the net worth constraint is not binding, the rst order condition is not a
function of period zero variables and
L1 =
"
 A
Rf1
# 1
1 
Let us consider the mark-up. Since

1  1

n >

1    1

; it will be the case that 0 < 1  1:
The mark-up is a function of the number of banks, n; the degree of substitution between loans, ; and the
productivity of capital captured by : Notice that the larger  is (the more competitive the banking sector
is), the lower the mark up is @@ < 0: Whether the mark-up decreases or increases as n increases depends on
whether 1    > 1 : If 1    > 1 , more banks implies lower mark-up @@n < 0: Finally, the higher  is, the
smaller the mark up is, @@ < 0: The latter result is intuitive since the larger  is, the larger the fraction of
output that accrues to the banker is (which is clear from equation 2.2.5), and the smaller the incentive to
underinvest: If  ! 1 and if n = 1 (the banker fully internalizes his e¤ect on output), then  = 1: If both
!1 and n!1; the banking sector is perfectly competitive; in which case the equilibrium interest rate
charged converges to the world risk free rate Rl1 = R
f
1 and  = 1: If n!1; the mark up converges to the
standard monopolistic competition mark-up with a continuum of banks given by  =  1 : If n = 1;  =
1

which coincides with the monopolistic case.
If the net worth constraint binds (1 > 0); and after imposing a symmetric equilibrium; the amount of
period one loans is determined by the net worth constraint
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L1 =
1

N1
where
1 =
1


1

Rl1  Rf1

and Rl1 =  A (L1)
 1
: The marginal value of an extra dollar of bank net worth, 1; as perceived by the
banker, is larger, the smaller the mark-up, ; is. The banker will value his net worth more, the more
competitive the economy is (the smaller the mark up is). The marginal value of an extra dollar of bank
net worth will be important when I discuss how the decentralized equilibrium compares to the constrained
Central Planners allocation and also how the competitive decentralized equilibrium compares to the non-
competitive one. In order to make the problem interesting, throughout the rest of the paper, I assume that
the period one net worth constraint never binds in the high state in t = 1.
Next I solve for the optimal lending of banker i at t = 0. Banker i takes as given his optimal actions
in both states of nature in t = 1. He also takes the actions of the other bankers in the economy as given:
Banker i maximizes his expected dividend payment in the last period
max
Li;0
E0Ni;2 + i;0 [Ni;0   Li;0] = max
Li;0
E0
h
Rli;1 (Li;0) Rf1
i
Li;1 (Li;0)
+Rf1

H R
l
i;0 (Li;0) + (1  H)ALL0
1
L^0
 Rf0

Li;0 +R
f
1R
f
0Ni;0 + i;0 [Ni;0   Li;0]
where Rli;1 (Li;0) implies that R
l
i;1 is a function of Li;0 and so are Li;1 (Li;0) and R
l
i;0 (Li;0) : One way to
interpret the objective function of the bank in t = 0 is the following. The net worth in t = 2 is the sum of the
expected prots in periods t = 1 and t = 2 plus the return on the starting net worth of banker i. Consider
parametrization where the net worth constraint does not bind in t = 1 in the high state, 1 (sH) = 0:14 I
proved that Li;0 does not a¤ect the optimal Li;1 if the net worth constraint is not binding in t = 1, which
will be the case in the high state in t = 1. I also assume that the economy starts in normal times where the
net worth constraint does not bind in t = 0; 0 = 0. Assuming no default by banker i in the high state,
after imposing a symmetric equilibrium, the rst order condition with respect to Li;0 can be summarized as
(for details see Appendix, Section B.1.2)
14The most interesting case will be when the constraint binds in the crisis state 1 (sL) > 0 as well, which will generate a
recession and a credit crunch, but for now the equations presented are more general.
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MC (L0) =   (1  H)1 (sL) @Ni;1 (sL)
@Li;0
= Rf1E0
@Ni;1 (s1)
@Li;0
= MB (L0) (2.2.10)
where
@Ni;1 (sL)
@Li;0
= ALL
 1
0

1  1
n
(1  )

 Rf0 < 0 (2.2.11)
@Ni;1 (sH)
@Li;0
= AHL
 1
0
1

 Rf0 > 0 (2.2.12)
and if 1 (sL) > 0
1 (sL) =
1

@Ni;2 (sL)
@Li;1 (sL)
=
1


 A (L1 (sL))
 1 1

 Rf1

> 0 (2.2.13)
L0 is determined by equating the expected marginal prot of an extra dollar of L0; MB (L0) 15 ; to the
marginal cost of an extra dollar of L0; MC (L0) : If the banker lends one extra dollar in t = 0 to the
entrepreneur, the marginal benet is the increase of expected period one prots, Rf1E0
@Ni;1(s1)
@Li;0
: However,
there is a cost associated with lending more in t = 0 if the net worth constraint binds in the low state in
t = 1. An extra dollar lent in t = 0 implies that in the low state, when the entrepreneur defaults, the
net worth of the bank will decrease by  @Ni;1(sL)@Li;0 : If the net worth constraint binds in the low state in
t = 1, the marginal value of an extra dollar of net worth in the low state is measured by the Lagrangian
of the borrowing constraint in the low state 1 (sL) : Hence, the marginal cost associated with lending one
more dollar in t = 0 is   (1  H)1 (sL) @Ni;1(sL)@Li;0 which is the cost of making the borrowing constraint
tighter. Notice that depending on the degree of monopolistic competition, ; and the degree of banking
sector concentration, n; the equilibrium L0 will be di¤erent. Denote the decentralized equilibrium with a
star:
Denition 2.2.1 The non-competitive decentralized symmetric equilibrium is dened as a vector of quanti-
ties fC1 (s1) ; C2 (s1) ;K0 ;K1 (s1) ; L0; L1 (s1)gs12fsL;sHg and prices

Rl0;
Rl1 (s1)
	
s12fsL;sHg such that
 The markets for loans, capital and the consumption good clear
 Banker i chooses Li;t to maximize his expected net worth in t = 2 taking into account the demand
schedules for loans of the entrepreneurs, the net worth constraint and taking as given the actions of the
other bankers Lj;t where j 6= i
15Note that the marginal benet is net of the interest rate payment to foreigners.
54
 The representative entrepreneur chooses fC1 (s1) ; C2 (s1) ;K0 ;K1 (s1) ; L0; L1 (s1)gs12fsL;sHg, in order
to maximize the prots of the rm taking as given the loan interest rates

Rl0;
Rl1 (s1)
	
s12fsL;sHg
 Foreign investors inelastically supply risk free loans to the domestic banking sector at the exogenous
world interest rate Rft
Next, I prove existence and uniqueness and compare how the optimal investment varies with the degree
of banking sector competition.
Proposition 2.2.2 (i) If the parametrization is such that there is a crisis in the low state in t = 1 and no
crisis in the high state in t = 1 and in t = 0; 1 (sL) > 0; 1 (sH) = 0; 0 = 0; the equilibrium is unique
and exists. (ii) Countries with a more competitive banking sector will borrow and invest more than countries
with a less competitive banking sector, @L

0
@ > 0; if
  (1  H) @Ni;1 (sL)
@Li;0
@i;1 (sL)
@| {z }
=
MC(;L0)
@ >0
< Rf1H
@2Ni;1 (sH)
@Li;0@| {z }
=
MB(;L0)
@ >0
(Assumption 2.1)
and @L

0
@ < 0 if Assumption 2.1 is not satised.
Proof of Proposition 2.2.2: See Appendix, Section B.1.5.
What is surprising about the result in Proposition 2.2.2 is that if Assumption 2.1 is not satised, countries
with more competitive banking sectors (higher ) borrow and invest less (not more) than countries with less
competitive banking sectors. The reason why one would expect less competitive banking sectors to invest
less is that lower competition (smaller ) strengthens the standard underinvestment channel.
A less competitive banking sector would optimally want to underinvest in the current period (t = 0) and
the future period (t = 1) relative to a more competitive banking sector. The current period underinvestment
leads to the expected perceived period one prots to be lower for less competitive banking sectors, which is
captured by the term @MB(;L

0)
@ > 0: However, the combination of future desire to underinvest and a binding
net worth constraint in the crisis state in the future leads to an overinvestment force in t = 0 relative to
the more competitive case: The intuition is the following. A less competitive banking sectors wants to also
underinvest in the future, in period one. As a result, an extra dollar in the crisis state in the future becomes
less valuable for the less competitive banking sector, given that the perceived marginal value of an extra
dollar of net worth is lower (@i;1(sL)@ > 0): Therefore, the perceived marginal cost of Li;0 is actually smaller,
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the less competitive the banking sector is, where an extra Li;0 is costly because it depletes the net worth
of the bank in the crisis state

@Ni;1(sL)
@Li;0
< 0

. This latter overinvestment channel is captured by the term
MC(;L0)
@ > 0:
In summary, there are two forces in play when comparing a less competitive banking sector to a more
competitive banking sector. The rst force is a standard current period (t = 0) underinvestment force. The
second one is an overinvestment force due to the combination of the future underinvestment force (period
t = 1) and a binding net worth constraint in the crisis state in the future. Therefore, the answer to the
question whether a more or a less competitive banking sector experiences a larger investment boom ex-ante
(prior to a crisis) will depend crucially on the interaction of the two e¤ects. This result is in contrast to the
franchise value literature, which argues that less competitive banking sectors are less prone to overinvestment
since banks are concerned about preserving their franchise value. While the model in this paper endogenously
produces no bank default, the overinvestment force that I identify here (which is present even in the case of
a single bank) will be a countervailing force to the franchise value argument.
2.2.3 Constrained Central Planners Problem
In order to determine the source of the ine¢ ciencies in this economy, in this section I solve the constrained
Central Planners (CPs) problem. The CP faces the same constraints as the banker in the decentralized
equilibrium. He has to take into account the same net worth constraints that the bankers face and also the
rst order conditions of the entrepreneurs.16 The CP chooses the amount of loans provided by every banker,
taking into account that the equilibrium played is symmetric. There are two sources of ine¢ ciency. The rst
source is pecuniary externalities, which will lead to overinvestment. The strength of the pecuniary exter-
nalities will vary with the number of banks, n: The second ine¢ ciency is due to monopolistic competition,
which will lead to underinvestment. The strength of the underinvestment will vary with the degree of loan
substitution , , and the number of banks, n:
Solving the problem of the CP backwards, in t = 1; the CP maximizes the total welfare of the entre-
preneurs, who also own the banks, subject to the bankers net worth constraint. The problem simplies to
maximizing total output since the entrepreneurs, who are the only agents consuming in the economy, are
risk neutral. (See Appendix, Section B.1.3 for detailed derivations of the CPs problem.)
16 In this specic model, it does not make a di¤erence whether the CP takes the rst order conditions of the entrepreneurs as
an additional constraint or not. However, this assumption is important for other models with a third agent, such as a consumer,
in order to prevent transfer of resources from consumers to constrained bankers.
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max
L1
AL1  Rf1 [L1  N1] + CP1 [N1   L1]
The rst order condition with respect to L1 is given by
 AL 11  Rf1   CP1  = 0
If the net worth constraint does not bind (CP1 = 0); the entrepreneur will invest up to the point where
the marginal cost of an extra dollar of loans equals the marginal benet of an extra dollar of loans from the
Central Planners point of view,  AL 11 = R
f
1 =
Rl1. If the constraint binds (
CP
1 > 0); then
L1 =
1

N1
where N1 (sL) = ALL0   Rf0 (L0  N0) and N1 (sH) = AHL0   Rf0 (L0  N0) : The marginal value of an
extra dollar of net worth when the constraint is binding in period one is given by the Lagrangian CP1 =
1


 AL 11  Rf1

: The optimization problem in t = 0 is to maximize the sum of expected period one and
period two output.
max
L0
(1  H)

A (L1 (sL))
  Rf1L1(sL)

+ H

A (L1 (sH))
  Rf1L1(sH)

+Rf1

E0A1L

0  Rf0L0

+Rf1R
f
0N0 + 
CP
0 [N0   L0]
Considering only parametrization where CP0 = 0; 
CP
1 (sL)  0 and CP1 (sH) = 0; the rst order condition
with respect to L0, is given by17
MCCP (L0) =   (1  H)CP1 (sL)
@N1 (sL)
@L0
= Rf1

E0A1 (L0)
 1  Rf0

= MBCP (L0) (2.2.14)
where @N1(sL)@L0 =

AL (L0)
 1  Rf0

< 0. If the bank net worth constraint in period one is binding,
CP1 (sL) > 0;
CP1 (sL) =
h
 A (L1 (sL))
 1  Rf1
i 1

> 0
The way to interpret the rst order condition is the following. An extra dollar invested in period zero
17 In the Appendix, Section B.1.3 I prove existence and uniqueness.
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will increase expected period one output, net of foreign debt payment, byMBCP : However, there is an extra
cost associated with an extra dollar invested in t = 0: In the low state in t = 1; an extra dollar invested in
t = 0 will decrease the net worth of the banker by  @N1(sL)@L0 and the value of an extra dollar of net worth in
the low state as perceived by the CP is given by CP1 (sL) : Throughout the rest of the paper, the superscript
CP will denote the optimal allocation of the Central Planner.
2.3 Central Planners Allocation vs Decentralized Equilibrium
In this section I compare the CPs allocation against the decentralized equilibrium. I show that there are
two sources of ine¢ ciency in this environment  pecuniary externalities, which lead to overinvestment
relative to the constrained CPs allocation, and imperfect competition of the banking sector, which leads to
underinvestment relative to the constrained CPs allocation.
To preview the results in this section, there will be two di¤erent channels through which the pecuniary
externalities will generate overinvestment in this model. The intuition behind the rst channel is that each
banker does not fully internalize the fact that the more he invests in period zero, the more he decreases the
marginal return of all other bankers when the representative entrepreneur defaults in period one. I will call
this type of pecuniary externalities "bankruptcy" pecuniary externality. It will lead to overinvestment even
if there is no binding net worth constraint in the future. In addition, if the bankers net worth constraint
is binding in the crisis state in the future, the pecuniary externalities will lead to overinvestment through
a second channel. The more each banker invests in period zero, the lower the return and the net worth of
all other bankers is in the crisis state, which will tighten the net worth constraints of all other bankers. I
will call this second type of pecuniary externalities "net worth constraint" pecuniary externality. Since the
Central Planner maximizes total output, he internalizes both of those externalities. The reason why I refer
to these externalities as pecuniary externalities, is because one can think of the return each banker receives if
the entrepreneur defaults as a price which, in equilibrium, is equal to the output of the entrepreneur divided
by total loans. Since this price depends on the total output of the rm and the rm borrows from many
di¤erent banks in order to invest (an assumption implicit in the monopolistic competition environment), the
banker realizes that his actions only partially a¤ect this price. Each banker perceives his e¤ect on the rate
of return during a crisis to be larger, the smaller n is. Therefore, a more concentrated banking sector implies
weaker pecuniary externalities.
The second source of ine¢ ciency in this model is due to the imperfect competition of the banking sector
combined with the fact that the banker appropriates only part of the rms output. The banker maximizes
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only his own net worth/dividend payments and does not internalize the fact that the more he lends to the
rm, the higher the prots of the entrepreneur are in the state of nature where the entrepreneur does not
default.
Finally, I show that even if there are no pecuniary externalities, n = 1 (or they are weaker  n is small),
a monopolistic bank might still overinvest relative to the CP as a result of the interaction between the desire
to underinvest in the future in the crisis state and a binding net worth constraint during a crisis. The
intuition why this is the case is the following. Given that the banker wants to underinvests in the future, he
does not value an extra dollar of net worth in the crisis state as much as the CP does. Therefore, an extra
dollar of loans provided in period zero, which decreases the net worth of the banker in a crisis, is perceived
to be less costly. Whether the monopolistic bank ends up lending too much relative to the constrained CP
depends on how this overinvestment force compares to the classic underinvestment force in period zero.
2.3.1 Bank Net Worth Constraint Never Binds
First, I examine the case where the net worth constraint does not bind either for the CP or the banker in
the decentralized equilibrium in any period or state of nature.
Proposition 2.3.1 If the net worth constraint does not bind for 8 t and in any state of nature for either
the CP or the banker in the decentralized equilibrium, the decentralized equilibrium exhibits underinvestment
relative to the constrained CPs allocation, LCP0 > L

0; if
LAL

1
n
[  1] + 1

+ HAH
1

< E0A1 (Assumption 2.2)
and overinvestment, LCP0 < L

0; if Assumption 2.2 is violated. In the monopolistic case (n = 1); L
CP
0 > L

0
and in the perfectly competitive case, (n ! 1 and  ! 1); LCP0 < LCE0 ; where CE stands for competitive
equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.1. One can simplify the rst order conditions of the CP and the banker when
the net worth constraint never binds and write them as
MB (L0) = R
f
1

LALL
 1
0

1
n
[  1] + 1

+ HAHL
 1
0
1

 Rf0

= 0 (2.3.1)
MBCP (L0) = R
f
1

E0A1 (L0)
 1  Rf0

= 0
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where  = 1
(1  1 (1  1n ) (1 ) 1n )
: Since both MB0 (L0) < 0 and MBCP 0 (L0) < 0 (For proof see Appendix,
Proof of Proposition 2.2.2 and Section B.1.3), there will be underinvestment if MBCP (L0) > MB (L0) ;
which will be true if Assumption 2.2 is satised. If n = 1; then  = 1 and Assumption 2.2 will be always
satised. If n!1 and !1;Assumption 2.2 is violated:
If n = 1; the banker will underinvest relative to the CP as a result of a standard underinvestment
channel where in the high state only a fraction of the output accrues to the entrepreneur. Since, the banker
optimizes only his own prots and does not internalize the fact that higher investment increases the prots
of the entrepreneur as well, he will underinvest relative to the constrained CP, who maximizes total output.
It is surprising that in the perfectly competitive case, n ! 1 and  ! 1; the banker overinvests relative
to the Central Planner even when the net worth constraint is not binding in any t and state of nature. The
intuition for this result is the following. When the entrepreneur defaults in the low state, bankers appropriate
all of the output. In the perfectly competitive case, every banker takes the return received in the crisis state
as given.18 As a result, every banker does not internalize the fact that the more he lends, the more he
decreases the marginal rate of return of the other bankers (due to the concavity of the production technology
of the rm) when the entrepreneur defaults.19 This is why this model will exhibit pecuniary externalities
which lead to overinvestment even if the net worth constraint does not bind. I call this type of pecuniary
externalities "bankruptcy" pecuniary externality.
For any other combination of n and ; whether there is over-or-underinvestment depends on whether As-
sumption 2.2 is satised, which determines whether the underinvestment force dominates the overinvestment
force. Notice that the less competitive the banking sector is (small ); the more likely it is that Assumption
2.2 is satised since 0 () < 0 and hence the more likely it is that the economy exhibits underinvestment.
2.3.2 Binding Bank Net Worth Constraint In a Crisis
In this subsection I compare the decentralized equilibrium and the constrained Central Planners allocation
assuming that the net worth constraint binds in the low state in t = 1 but does not bind in the high state
18 In terms of the actual math, due to the assumption about constant elasticity of substitution (CES) of loans, which is
required in order to model monopolistic competition, every entrepreneur borrows from all bankers in order to invest. Therefore,
the return in the crisis state is a function of aggregate variables which the bankers are too small to a¤ect.
19 In the perfectly competitive case, the banker also does not internalize the fact that he a¤ects the return received by the
other bankers in the high state where there is no default. However, in the high state, in equilibrium, the return the banker
receives equals the marginal product of capital (and not the whole output as in the default state). Therefore, the overinvestment
force is exactly o¤est by the underinvestment force due to the fact that the banker maximizes only a fraction of output in the
high state while the CPs objective function is to maximize the whole output in the high state. The intuition is similar as to
why in a standard model with no default where the banker receives the marginal product of capital in every state of nature the
CPs allocation coincides with the CE.
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in t = 1 and in t = 0: Essentially, this case maps to starting the economy in normal times where with some
probability next period there will be a credit crunch crisis due to a binding bank net worth constraint; which
would be the most interesting case to consider.
Perfectly Competitive Case, n!1; !1
In the perfectly competitive case, given the assumptions made above, I show that bankers always overinvest
relative to the CP due to two sources of pecuniary externalities. The rst one was described in Section
2.3.1 and is present even if the net worth constraint in the low state is not binding. The second source of
overinvestment occurs due to the binding net worth constraint in the crisis state.
Proposition 2.3.2 If n!1; !1 and the net worth constraint binds only in the low state in t = 1 for
both the CP and the banks in the decentralized equilibrium, then LCP0 < L
CE
0 .
Proof of Proposition 2.3.2. When n ! 1 and  ! 1;the only di¤erence between the rst order
conditions of the CP and the banker in the competitive equilibrium is that

@N1(sL)
@L0
CP
<

@N1(sL)
@L0
CE
:
This inequality implies that MBCP (L0) < MBCE (L0) and MCCP (L0) > MCCE (L0) which combined
with MC 0 (L0) > 0 and MB0 (L0) < 0 is su¢ cient to prove that for any parametrization that leads to the
borrowing constraint binding for both the CP and the banker in the low state in t = 1, the banker will end
up overinvesting relative to the CP.20
On the one hand, the banker overinvests because he does not internalizes the fact that by investing too
much in period zero he will decrease the marginal return the other bankers receive when the entrepreneur
defaults (captured by MBCP (L0) < MBCE (L0)): This is the same source of overinvestment as in the case
where the net worth constraint does not bind and is what I refer to as "bankruptcy" pecuniary externality.
The intuition behind the second source of the pecuniary externality is due to the binding net worth
constraint in the crisis state and is captured byMCCP (L0) > MCCE (L0). Every banker does not internalize
the fact that the more he invests in period zero, the lower the return of all other bankers is when the rm
defaults. This leads to lower net worth and tighter net worth constraints of the other bankers. The CP
internalizes this externality. I refer to this second type of pecuniary externality as "net worth constraint"
pecuniary externalities.
20Note that there will be still overinvestment even if the constraint does not bind in the future for the CP but binds in the
crisis state for the banker from the CE.
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Monopolistic Bank, n = 1
It is informative to consider the monopolistic case; since n = 1 implies that the pecuniary externalities are
turned o¤  the banker internalizes fully his impact on the return of the loans. The standard monopolistic
force pushes towards underinvestment in both t = 0 and t = 1: However, the binding net worth constraint
in the crisis state introduces a dynamic aspect to the problem of the monopolist. The interaction between
the binding net worth constraint in the crisis state (low state in t = 1) and the underinvestment force in the
crisis state can lead to overinvestment in t = 0 relative to the CPs allocation even when n = 1. The result
is formally stated in Proposition 2.3.3 below.
Proposition 2.3.3 If n = 1 and the net worth constraint binds only in the low state in t = 1 for both the
CP and the monopolistic bank, then LCP0 > L

0 (n = 1) if
Rf1 (1  )HAHL 10| {z }
>0
+ (1  H) 1


AL (L

0)
 1  Rf0

[1  ] A (L1 (sL)) 1| {z }
<0
> 0 (Assumption 2.3)
where L1 =
1


AL (L

0)
  Rf1 [L0  N0]

: If Assumption 2.3 is violated, the monopolist overinvests relative
to the Central Planner LCP0 < L

0 (n = 1) :
Proof of Proposition 2.3.3. See Appendix, Section B.1.5.
The intuition why it is possible for the monopolist to overinvest relative to the CP is very similar as
to why the monopolist might end up investing more in t = 0 than a perfectly competitive banking sector,
which I discussed in Section 2.2.2. On the one hand, there is the standard underinvestment force which
pushes the monopolist to want to underinvest relative to the CP in both periods zero and one. However,
when the period one underinvestment force is combined with a binding net worth constraint in the crisis
state, an overinvestment force emerges. The banker, unlike the CP, does not value an extra dollar of net
worth in the crisis state as much as the CP since he wants to underinvest relative to the CP in the crisis
state. Hence, he perceives the marginal cost of an extra dollar of L0 to be smaller than the CP does,
MC (L0(n = 1)) < MC
CP (L0) ; which is why there is an overinvestment force. Whether the monopolist
ends up overinvesting or not depends on the relative strength of the two forces. For example, as H ! 1; then
the overinvestment force vanishes since the crisis state disappears and Assumption 2.3 is always satised. In
contrast as  ! 0; which captures the degree of nancial development (since lower  implies that bankers
can nance a larger fraction of loans using foreign loans rather than internal equity), the overinvestment
force dominates. Therefore, in the limit, as it becomes very easy to nance domestic lending using bank
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debt, the overinvestment force dominates. Notice that these are only limiting results since L is a function
of  and H as well.
General Case
Having gained a better understanding of the externalities present in this model and whether they push
towards over-or-underinvestment relative to the constrained CPs allocation, next lets consider the general
case for any n and . In the general case, whether LCP0 < L

0 or not will be determined by the relative
strength of the overinvestment and the underinvestment forces. The overinvestment forces are due to the
pecuniary externalities both the "bankruptcy" and the "net worth constraint" pecuniary externality 
and the combination of future desire to underinvest in the crisis state plus a binding net worth constraint in
the crisis state. The underinvestment force is the standard imperfect competition underinvestment force in
period zero.
Proposition 2.3.4 For any n and  and if the net worth constraint binds only in the low state in t = 1 for
both the CP and banker in the decentralized equilibrium, then LCP0 > L

0 if
Rf1HAH

1  1


L 10| {z }
underinvestment in t=00
 Rf1 (1  H)AL (1  )

1  1
n

L 10| {z }
"bankruptcy" pecuniary externality0
+ (Assumption 2.4)
  (1  H) 1

h
 A (L1 (sL))
 1  Rf1
i
(1  )

1  1
n

ALL
 1
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"net worth constraint" pecuniary externality0
  (1  H) 1


Rf0  

1  (1  ) 1
n

ALL
 1
0

 A (L1 (sL))
 1

1  1


| {z }
underinvestment in t=10
> 0 (2.3.2)
where L1 =
1


AL (L

0)
  Rf1 [L0  N0]

: If Assumption 2.4 is violated, then the banker overinvests relative
to the Central Planner LCP0 < L

0:
Proof of Proposition 2.3.4. See Appendix, Section B.1.5.
If Assumption 2.4 is satised then the banker in the decentralized equilibrium underinvests relative to
the CP, LCP0 > L

0, and if its not, he overinvests, L
CP
0 < L

0. The monopolistic competition pushes towards
underinvestment in period t = 0: However, while the period zero underinvestment force makes it more
likely for the banker to want to underinvest, the period one underinvestment force actually pushes towards
overinvestment as is apparent in the formula for Assumption 2.4 presented above. The intuition is similar
to the n = 1 case  the fact that bankers want to underinvest in t = 1 in the crisis state relative to the CP
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implies that they value an extra dollar of net worth by less than the CP. Hence an extra dollar of bank loans
provided in period zero, which leads to lower net worth in the crisis state, is less costly from the perspective
of the banker. From the formula for Assumption 2.4 one can also see the two pecuniary externalities forces
both of which push towards overinvestment.
2.4 Decentralize the Constrained Central Planners Allocation
In this section I consider how the CPs allocation can be decentralized. There are many di¤erent ways to do
that. Two policy instruments that are often used in practice are loan subsidies to rms/entrepreneurs and
also capital account controls which limit the inow of funds into the country. The latter can be implemented
using a tax on the return paid on foreign loans, which is the approach that I follow in this paper. I will
assume that the only instruments available to the policy maker are subsidies on entrepreneurs borrowing
rates, si;t; a tax on the interest rate paid to foreigners, 
cc
i;t and lump sum transfers (taxes if negative), Ti;t;
to the bankers, where i stands for banker i. To be more precise, when the rm is borrowing from bank
i; the e¤ective interest rate it faces is given by
 
1  si;t

Rli;t and when banker i borrows from foreigners,
the e¤ective rate of return he has to pay is
 
1 +  cci;t

Rft . I assume commitment, which implies that all
instruments,

si;t; 
cc
i;t; Ti;t+1
	
t=0;1
; are determined in the beginning of period t = 0; before entrepreneurs
and bankers make any decisions. Hence, they take these instruments as given. The government will balance
its budget every period, which will be achieved via the lump sum transfers to the bankers. In period t+ 1;
if the entrepreneur does not default, he will receive from the government the e¤ective subsidy on the loans
he took in period t. Similarly, the government will receive the tax from previous period loans of the bankers
from the foreigners. The lump sum transfer to banker i in t+ 1; if there is no default by the representative
entrepreneur, is given by Ti;t+1 =  cci;tR
f
t [Li;t  Ni;t]  si;t Rli;tLi;t where Li;t  Ni;t is the amount borrowed
by banker i from foreigners. If the entrepreneur defaults, then the banker seizes all the output of the rm
and the rm cannot even pay the subsidized interest rate payments. In that case Ti;t+1 =  cci;tR
f
t [Li;t  Ni;t] :
The subsidy has to be paid only conditional on the loan being repaid and, hence, will be paid only in the
high state.21 For detailed derivation of the Ramsey Problem, see Section B.1.4 in the Appendix.
In this model,  cct and 
s
t are not uniquely pinned down, which is intuitive since the banker will either
underinvest or overinvest relative to the CP. As a result, only one of those instruments in every period and
state of nature will be su¢ cient to replicate the constrained CPs allocation. However, for every t and state
of nature, there are many possible combinations of  cct > 0 and 
s
t > 0 which implement the CPs allocation.
21The exact specication is not crucial for the results.
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If one observes both subsidies and capital account controls in practice, it does not mean that the policies
are necessarily sub-optimal.
One can make the argument that there are political and monetary costs to providing subsidies and
collecting taxes. In this paper, I will not solve for the policy problem that would minimize those costs,
but will consider one possible implementation, instead, that provides interesting intuition and meets the
following criteria. First, at every point in time and in every state of nature, the policy maker can use only
one instrument  either a subsidy or capital account controls. Also I assume that if there is no uncertainty
in the future and the banking sector is imperfectly competitive, the policy maker always uses a subsidy. I
would like to emphasize that this is only one way to implement the constrained CPs allocation. Given the
assumptions made, Proposition 2.4.1 species the optimal policy.
Proposition 2.4.1 Assuming the policy maker can commit and the net worth constraint binds in the crisis
state, the CPs allocation can be decentralized using a lump sum transfer to entrepreneurs, Tt; subsidy on
entrepreneurs borrowing rates, st  0; and a capital account control in the form of a tax on bankers
borrowing rates from foreigners,  cct  0: One possible implementation of the constrained Central Planners
allocation is given by: s1 = 1  1 ;  cc1 = 0: If ~ cc0 (s0 = 0) > 0; then  cc0 = ~ cc0 (s0) and s0 = 0: If ~ cc0 (s0 = 0) <
0; then  cc0 = 0 and 
s
0 > 0; where 
s
0 is pinned down by ~
cc
0 (
s
0) = 0 and
~ cc0 (
s
0) =  Rf1HAH

1  1
 (1  s0)

| {z }
period 0 underinvestment
+ Rf1 (1  H)AL (1  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
1  1
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
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"bankruptcy" pecuniary externality0
+ (1  H)
h
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 
LCP1 (sL)
 1  Rf1i 1AL (1  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1  1
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(LCP0 )
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Rf0
h
Rf1+(1 H)
h
 A(LCP1 (sL))
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1

i > 0 and CP stands for the optimal allocation of the CP.
Proof of 2.4.1. See Appendix, Section B.1.5.
In order to understand the optimal policy, it is worth discussing how to interpret the three period model,
t = 0; 1; 2, where all the uncertainty is resolved in t = 1. As a reminder, the structure of the model allows
me to study the following sequence of events:
1) In period t = 0; agents face an uncertain period one output. For example, the presence of uncertainty
can be justied by the discovery of a new technology in t = 0 the returns of which are unknown.
2) In t = 1; the uncertainty is realized and the economy can end up in a crisis state with probability
1 H if the technology was not very productive or in a non-crisis state with probability H . If in the crisis
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state, the entrepreneur defaults and the bankersnet worth is depleted to the point where their net worth
constraints are binding. This environment proxies an economy with high aggregate default rates and a credit
crunch.
3) In t = 2; the economy converges to a steady state where there is no future uncertainty regarding the
productivity of the technology and the probability of default in t = 2 goes to zero.22 This latter assumption
is fairly realistic when we think about the aggregate economy in normal times.
Lets analyze the optimal policy backwards. In t = 1 given that there is no future uncertainty and no
future default or binding net worth constraints, all overinvestment forces are shut down. The only externality
is the underinvestment force which is present only if the banking sector is imperfectly competitive and the
optimal subsidy in period one is equal to s1 = 1  1 : If the banking sector is perfectly competitive, then no
intervention is required since  = 1.23
The interesting question is what should be the optimal policy when there is a signicant uncertainty re-
garding the productivity of the new technology and with some probability it can turn out to be unproductive,
leading to large aggregate default and binding net worth constraints in the future. This is the environment
that the policy maker and the agents face in t = 0.In t = 0; there will be overinvestment forces due to
the pecuniary externalities and an underinvestment force if the banking sector is imperfectly competitive:
(Notice that the third source of overinvestment will be no longer present in t = 0 since it was a result of
the interaction between the future binding net worth constraint and the desire of bankers to underinvest in
t = 1: However, by imposing a subsidy in the crisis state equal to s1 = 1  1 ; the period one underinvestment
force was shut down.) Whether the policy maker will use capital account controls or subsidies in period zero
depends on whether the underinvestment or the overinvestment force dominates which will be determined
by whether ~ cc0 (
s
0) is positive of negative.
First, notice that it is also possible that no regulation is required in t = 0 if the overinvestment and
underinvestment forces exactly o¤set each other and ~ cc0 (
s
0 = 0) = 0: This result is formally stated in the
following Corollary 1.
Corollary 2.4.2 For every country, where the net worth constraint binds in the crisis state for both the
CP and the banker in the decentralized equilibrium, there exists n (), such that no period zero regulation is
22Also the denition of a steady state would imply no binding net worth constraints in t > 2 if more periods were to be
included.
23Note that if the net worth constraint is binding for both the CP and the banker in t = 1 in the crisis state no policy
intervention would be required. This would be an alternative way to decentralize the constrained CPs allocation. Introducing
a subsidy in t = 1 in the low state if the banking sector is imperfectly competitive, even if not required, will change the period
zero problem in an interesting way, which is why I choose to take this approach.
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necessary,  cc0 = 0 and 
s
0 = 0:
The n; which one can solve for using the equation ~ cc0 (
s
0 = 0) = 0; is given by
n () = 1 +
Rf1HAH (1  )
Rf1 +
h
 A
 
LCP1 (sL)
 1  Rf1i 1 (1  H)AL (1  ) Rf1HAH 1
where LCP1 =
1


AL
 
LCP0
  Rf1 LCP0  N0 : LCP0 and LCP1 are not a function of either n or  since the
structure of the banking sector does not a¤ect the CPs problem: Also notice that the degree of monopolistic
competition,  = 1
(1  1 (1  1n ) (1 ) 1n )
, is governed by two key parameters  and n: Therefore, even if the
loans are perfect substitutes; !1; as long as n <1; the banking sector is still imperfectly competitive 
 > 1:24 The larger the degree of substitution between loans, the smaller is the number of banks for which
no period zero regulation will be required, n0 () < 0. The intuition for this result is that larger  weakens
the underinvestment force while smaller n strengthens the underinvestment force and weakens the pecuniary
externality.
From equation A.1.36, one can see that the smaller n is, the more likely it is that in period zero the
optimal policy is to have subsidy since smaller n makes the underinvestment force stronger and also weakens
the pecuniary externalities. Similarly, the smaller  is, the stronger the underinvestment force is and the
more likely it is that a subsidy will be required. In addition to comparative statics with respect to  and
n, one can consider the limiting cases of  ! 1 and  ! 0:  ! 1 a¤ects the concavity of the production
technology, which in turn a¤ects the pecuniary externalities of this problem. The pecuniary externalities
work through the fact that a single banker, if small, does not internalize the fact that the more he invests
in L0; the lower the marginal rate of return of the other bankers is in the crisis state. This leads to lower
direct returns of other bankers "bankruptcy" pecuniary externalityand if the net worth constraint binds
in the crisis state, to tighter net worth constraints for the other bankers "net worth constraint" pecuniary
externality. If the production technology approaches a linear production technology,  ! 1; then a single
bankers actions no longer a¤ect the marginal return of the other bankers and the pecuniary externalities will
disappear, i.e. ~ cc0 = 0. If  ! 0; it is easier for bankers to lever and the "net worth constraint" pecuniary
externality is stronger. As a result, ~ cc0 !1:
Next I provide the explicit formulas for subsidies and capital account taxes. Conditional on correcting for
future underinvestment using a subsidy in t = 1; if a country has only a few banks and/or a small degree of
24 If !1; then this environment maps to a model where the banking sector faces Cournot competition.
67
substitution between loans, in t = 0; the policy maker should use a subsidy and not capital account controls.
The formula for the optimal period zero subsidy conditional on ~ cc0 (
s
0) < 0 is given by
s0 = 1 
1
R
f
1HAH
Rf1HAH   (1  H)AL (1  )
 
1  1n
 h
Rf1 +
h
 A
 
LCP1 (sL)
 1  Rf1i 1 i (2.4.1)
One can show that s00 () < 0 and 
s0
0 (n) < 0. Also if n = 1; then the optimal policy in period zero
is a subsidy given by s0 = 1    and also a subsidy in t = 1; s1 = 1   : What is interesting to note
about this result is that even if the monopolist wants to overinvest, due to the interaction between future
underinvestment and binding future net worth constraints, one set of optimal instruments to correct for
this overinvestment are actually subsidies in period t = 0 and in period t = 1 rather than capital account
controls.25
In contrast, if the banking sector has a lot of banks and loans are highly substitutable, then capital
account controls would be required in period zero conditional on optimal subsidies being implemented in
t = 1 and the optimal capital account tax is given by
 cc0 =  Rf1HAH

1  1


+

Rf1 +
h
 A
 
LCP1 (sL)
 1  Rf1i 1

 (1  H)AL (1  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
1  1
n

Conditional on a capital account controls being required, the tax is larger, the higher the degree of
substitution between loans is  cc00 () > 0 and the larger number of banks is 
cc0
0 (n) > 0:
2.5 Further Discussion
In practice, policy makers have an access to another instrument, in addition to the capital account controls,
that can help them control overinvestment minimum bank capital requirement. Minimum bank capital
requirements require that banks nance at least a fraction of their loans using equity. Therefore, this policy
instrument appears to be similar to the bank net worth constraint in this model, which both the bankers
and the CP take as exogenous and given. However, there is one crucial di¤erence. The bank net worth
constraint is imposed exogenously by foreign lenders to prevent the banker and the CP from diverting part
25Notice that if n = 1 and there was ex-ante overinvestment and the policy maker had chosen to use no subsidy in t = 1
in the crisis state since the net worth constraint is binding, the period zero optimal policy would have been capital account
controls. This would be an alternative way to implement the allocation to the case I examine in this paper.
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or all of the borrowed amount to be used for a project that the foreigner cannot seize, for example (see
the discussion on net worth constraints in the literature review).26 In contrast, the minimum bank capital
requirement is determined by the policy maker (CP) in order to correct for overinvestment. Therefore, those
two constraints are very di¤erent.
One might ask the question why not simply use minimum bank capital requirements to correct for the
overinvestment instead of imposing capital account controls. In the model I develop in this paper, equity is
exogenous and xed. However, if I were to allow bankers to raise costly equity, the minimum bank capital
requirement will be no longer su¢ cient to replicate the constrained Central Planners allocation. Bankers
will be tempted to raise too much costly equity in order to circumvent the minimum bank capital requirement
and lend more than the socially optimal amount. In contrast, the capital account controls if implemented as
a tax on foreign borrowing rates, as specied in this paper, will be su¢ cient to replicate the constrained CPs
allocation even if costly equity is introduced in the model. Therefore, it is not surprising that even though
emerging markets impose minimum bank capital requirements, they also rely on capital account controls.
26 I dont model explicitly the moral hazard due to the desire of the banker (and also the CP) to divert resources but the
literature on net worth constraints has given di¤erent examples of how this can be done.
69
Chapter 3
The Continuing Puzzle of Exchange
Rate Forecasting (Joint with Kenneth
Rogo¤)
3.1 Introduction
Understanding the connection between exchange rates and macroeconomic fundamentals has been one of the
central challenges in international macroeconomics since the start of the modern oating exchange rate era
in the early 1970s. Although exchange rates are indeed an asset price, and, therefore, highly volatile, they
also reect basic macroeconomic fundamentals such as interest rates, purchasing power, and trade balances.
As such, international economists have long held out hope they could explain exchange rates better than,
say, nance economists can explain the absolute level of stock prices. If so, the results would be of enormous
help to policy-makers including, for example, central bankers who might worry about the e¤ect of monetary
policy on exchange rates.
Unfortunately, in practice, the performance of structural exchange rate models has been frustratingly
disappointing. As rst shown by Meese and Rogo¤ (1983a), models that perform well in-sample seldom
do so out-of-sample. Although one can nd some forecasting power at horizons of two to four years (e.g.,
Meese and Rogo¤ (1983b), Mark (1995) or Engel, Mark, and West (2007)), attempts to forecast at more
policy-relevant horizons of one month to one year have been far less successful.1
1Further research is required to determine the robustness of the long-horizon forecastability results with respect to using
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Indeed, until recently, there had been surprisingly little progress despite hundreds of studies using a
plethora of techniques (see Cheung, Chinn, and Pascual (2005) for a survey). Lately, however, the literature
has experienced a new life. A growing number of papers have been reporting somewhat more positive
short-term forecasting results by implementing panel forecast methods, innovative estimation procedures,
more powerful out-of-sample test statistics and new structural models. These include inuential papers by
Gourinchas and Rey (2007), Engel, Mark, and West (2007) and Molodtsova and Papell (2009) along with
many other notable studies.2 This paper re-examines the new evidence and considers a number of variations
and renements.
We conclude that despite notable methodological improvements, the euphoria has been exaggerated by
misinterpretation of some newer out-of-sample test statistics for nested models, over-reliance on asymptotic
out-of-sample test statistics and failure to check for robustness to the time period sampled.
Our examination of the most popular exchange rate forecasting structural models and specications leads
us to conclude that one of the sources of the overly optimistic results is the failure to check robustness with
respect to alternative out-of-sample test statistics. In the presence of forecast bias3 , the new tests for nested
models4 cannot be always interpreted as minimum mean square forecast error tests.5 As we show, in certain
cases, this is a rst-order problem. Furthermore, while new asymptotic out-of-sample tests such as the
Clark-West are attractive due to their simplicity, bootstrapped out-of-sample tests remain more powerful
and better sized.6 Finally, even if the results remain statistically signicant if one considers alternative
out-of-sample test statistics, all of the structural models and specications we review fail to produce robust
forecasts over di¤erent sample periods, implying that in one period the random walk is a better forecaster
and in another the structural model outperforms the random walk. In such cases, even if a structural model
performs well during the most recent period of time, there is no guarantee that the relationship will be
di¤erent sub-samples. For instance, Mark (1995)s results do not hold when one updates his sample (see Kilian (1999)).
2See also Rapach and Wohar (2002), Rossi (2006), Groen (2005), Groen (2007), Cerra and Saxena (2010), Ardic, Ergin,
and Senol (2008), Molodtsova, Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy, and Papell (2008), Molodtsova, Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy, and Papell (2010) and
Sellin (2007).
3 In this paper we are concerned only with "scale" bias as opposed to "location" bias. In other words, our result refers only
to the cases where the forecast systematically over or under-predicts the observed value by a certain percent (see Holden and
Peel (1989) for a distinction between the two types of bias). For a general denition of forecast bias see Marcellino (2000), pp.
534.
4These tests include the tests developed by Clark and West (2006), Clark and West (2007), Clark and McCracken (2001)
and Clark and McCracken (2005).
5This is a problem with both the asymptotic and the bootstrapped Clark-West and Clark-McCracken
6The advance of the literature on time series bootstrapping and the increase of computational power have made the bootstrap
an increasingly attractive alternative to asymptotic inference (see Berkowitz and Kilian (2000), Kilian (1999), Mark and Sul
(2001), MacKinnon (2002), Brownstone and Valletta (2001) and Politis and White (2004)). For a detailed discussion of how
the bootstrap can provide a signicant improvement over asymptotic inference see Li and Maddala (1997).
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preserved in the future.
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 3.2 sets out our criteria for what constitutes a
"good" forecast  a forecast with a mean-square forecast error smaller than the mean-square forecast error
of the driftless random walk, and with robust out-of-sample test statistics over di¤erent forecast windows.7
In Section 3.3, we introduce the out-of-sample tests we consider  the asymptotic Clark-West and the
bootstrapped Diebold-Mariano/West, Theils U, Clark-West and Clark-McCracken test statistics. We discuss
the di¤erences between the alternative test statistics, the most important of which is that in cases of forecast
bias, the new nested model tests should be interpreted as testing against the null hypothesis that the true
model is a random walk, rather than as asking whether a random walk has a lower mean-square forecast
error than the structural model (which is what the older Theils U and Diebold-Mariano/West statistics
test). These turn out to be quite di¤erent questions, although we also show that the newer nested model
statistics can point to cases where it may be possible to improve on the random walk forecast by using it in
combination with the structural model forecast. Nevertheless, nding an endogenous optimal combination
may be a signicant obstacle.
Section 3.4 tests the robustness of the apparent best results of the literature on short-horizon forecasting
with respect to using alternative out-of-sample test statistics. The main studies reviewed are Gourinchas
and Rey (2007)  an external balance model; Molodtsova and Papell (2009)  a heterogeneous symmetric
Taylor rule model with smoothing; and Engel, Mark, and West (2007)  the monetary model. We conclude
that in certain cases the popular Clark-West and Clark-McCracken test statistics are highly signicant while
the bootstrapped Theils U and Diebold-Mariano/West are not which we attribute to the presence of forecast
bias. Furthermore, in a couple of cases, the asymptotic Clark-West incorrectly chooses the structural model
forecast over the random walk forecast for a di¤erent reason the asymptotic Clark-West test seems to be
oversized. In Section 3.5, we explore the robustness of the results of these same studies with respect to
di¤erent forecast windows using a graphic approach which illustrates how the signicance of the results is
a¤ected by perturbing the sample. We nd that even those results that are robust to alternative out-of-
sample test statistics are not robust when the forecaster considers alternative samples, with the external
balance model of Gourinchas and Rey (2007) performing somewhat better than the rest of the specications
considered. This point strongly reinforces our conclusion from Section 3.4 that the results of the new models
and specications are not very robust.
Therefore, we attempt to improve upon existing panel specications in Section 3.6 by taking into account
7"Forecast window" refers to the part of the sample for which forecasts are calculated. For example, if we have a sample of
120 quarters and the rst forecast is based on 30 quarters, then the forecast window is 90 quarters.
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persistent cross-country shocks using purchasing power parity as a fundamental. Similarly to the results
in Section 3.4, our results point to a discrepancy between the old out-of-sample test statistics and the new
out-of-sample tests for nested models. In Section 3.7 we present empirical evidence of how one can improve
upon our results from Section 3.6 by correctly interpreting the new nested model tests and combining the
structural model forecast and the random walk forecast. At rst look, our results are not worse than the
most prominent results of other existing short-horizon forecasting studies. Nevertheless, the fact that so
much of the forecasting power comes from simply using a di¤erent time dummy e¤ect forecast gives us pause
in attributing too much of the success to macroeconomic models. Finally, we subject our pooled forecast
specication to a robustness check with respect to alternative forecast windows and conclude that even
our preferred forecasting procedure cannot consistently outperform the driftless random walk over di¤erent
forecast windows.
3.2 Denition of a "Good" Exchange Rate Forecast
There are various criteria for identifying a "good" forecast.8 One of the most widely used measures, popu-
larized in the exchange rate literature by Meese and Rogo¤ (1983a), is the minimum mean-square forecast
error (MSFE) approach, also known as the MSFE dominance approach.9 The goal of this approach is to
obtain a model whose MSFE is signicantly smaller than that of the random walk model. As Clements and
Hendry (2001) suggest, minimum MSFE has become the standard measure of forecast accuracy due to its
intuitive interpretation and broad applicability (pp. 9). Another more stringent criterion, introduced by
Chong and Hendry (1986), Clements and Hendry (1993), and Harvey, Leybourne, and Newbold (1998) is
MSFE encompassing for nested models, which tests whether the structural model encompasses the random
walk model. If it does not, then the information provided by the additional explanatory variables does not
improve the forecast. MSFE encompassing is more stringent than MSFE dominance, since the latter is a
8We use the terms "forecast" and "out-of-sample forecast" interchangeably. In order for a forecast to be an out-of-sample
forecast, a forecast in period t needs to be a function only of information available in period t   k where the k is the forecast
horizon. (For example, if k = 1 then we are forecasting one period ahead.)
When evaluating the performance of a structural model out-of-sample, we need to be able to compare the forecast produced
by the model to the actual realized value of the series we want to forecast. As a result, we split the sample in two  in-
sample portion and out-of-sample portion. We run a regression using the in-sample portion and calculate a forecast using the
parameters from this regression. We can calculate the forecasts using a recursive or a rolling specication.
The recursive method adds one more observation to the in-sample portion for each additional period forecast. For example,
if the rst forecast is based on the rst R observations, then the second forecast is based on the rst R+1 observations, etc.
In contrast, the rolling specication method preserves the original sample size throughout; hence, the rst forecast is based on
observations from 1 to R, the second on observations from 2 to R+1, and so on.
9Another less popular technique, which our paper does not address, uses the "direction of change" criterion. This criterion,
of course, can end up selecting a model which performs well in predicting small changes but poorly at predicting major ones.
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necessary but not su¢ cient condition for the former. MSFE encompassing also ensures that pooling the
competing forecasts cannot produce a forecast with a smaller MSFE than the two nested models considered.
A third criterion, robustness over di¤erent forecast windows, measures how consistently the structural model
outperforms the random walk during di¤erent periods of time.
In what follows, we focus rst on the minimum MSFE criterion, and afterwards look at robustness over
di¤erent forecast windows.10
3.3 Minimum Mean-Square Forecast Error Tests: Theils U (TU),
DieboldMariano/West (DMW), Clark West (CW), Clark
McCracken (ENC-NEW)
Before we address the performance of the structural models, we need to revisit the most widely used test
statistics in the literature. Until Clark and West (2006), Clark and West (2007), Clark and McCracken
(2001) and Clark and McCracken (2005) introduced their tests for nested models, the Theils U and the
Diebold-Mariano/West test statistics were the preferred minimum MSFE out-of-sample test statistics used
in the exchange rate forecasting literature. In this paper, we consider the bootstrapped11 version of both
the new and old out-of-sample test statistics (DMW, TU, CW and ENC-NEW) and the asymptotic version
10We choose not to consider the encompassing criterion for a number of reasons. First, forecast encompassing, dened as
the structural model encompassing the random walk, is not widely used in the exchange rate forecasting literature. Second,
it is considered a more stringent criterion than MSFE dominance. Third, as Marcellino (2000) points out, the standard
encompassing tests may not imply MSFE dominance in the presence of forecast bias. This point is somewhat related to our
theoretical argument that the Clark-West and Clark-McCracken out-of-sample tests cannot be always interpreted as minimum
MSFE tests in the presence of forecast bias (See Appendix and Section 3.3 for details).
11All of the empirical results presented in the following sections are based on a bootstrap similar to the one used by Mark and
Sul (2001). The main di¤erence between our bootstrap and Mark and Sul (2001)s bootstrap is that we use a "semi-parametric"
while they use a "parametric" bootstrap and we estimate the error-correction equations using country-specic OLS-regressions
rather than seemingly unrelated regressions (SURs) (Note that the "semi-parametric" bootstrap we use is closer in its nature
to the "parametric" rather than the "non-parametric" bootstrap. For details on the bootstrap see Appendix).
We choose to use a "semi-parametric" rather than "non-parametric" bootstrap as our preferred bootstrap for a number of
reasons. First, based on simulations, Berkowitz and Kilian (2000) argue in their paper "Recent Developments in Bootstrapping
Time Series" that when bootstrapping time series, the "parametric" and "semi-parametric" bootstrap outperforms "non-
parametric" bootstrap procedures.
Second, the exchange rate forecasting literature provides prolic evidence of the importance of preserving the cointegration
between the fundamental and the exchange rate when estimating the exchange rate forecast equation (for example see Kilian
(1999) and Mark and Sul (2001)). And as Berkowitz and Kilian (2000) point out
"While nonparametric bootstrap methods can easily deal with I(1) processes, there are no theoretical results to show that
nonparametric resampling preserves cointegration relationships in the data. In fact, cointegration itself may be viewed as a
parametric notion. Thus, if the data are known to be cointegrated, parametric methods are preferable (pp. 28)."
For further discussion of cointegration and bootstrapping see Li and Maddala (1997) and G. S. Maddala (1998) (pp. 333-336).
For completeness sake, we try a number of non-parametric bootstraps such as the wild bootstrap and the block bootstrap but,
not surprisingly, their performance is fairly weak and obvious mis-specication problems are present.
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of the CW. (For a detailed description of how we calculate each test statistic and how we test statistical
signicance see Appendix.)
Among the asymptotic test statistics, we focus only on the CW because it has become one of the most
popular out-of-sample test statistics for nested models.12 Furthermore, as we point in the Appendix, the
asymptotic versions of the DMW, TU and ENC-NEW have signicant shortcomings or are non-tractable.
One of the main reasons for the popularity of the asymptotic CW is that the alternative  the use of a
bootstrap is still considered by some researchers computationally cumbersome and di¢ cult to implement.
In this paper we argue that while using the asymptotic CW might seem appealing due to its straightforward
application, it is important that one checks the robustness of the results using either the bootstrapped DMW
or the bootstrapped TU. The rationale follows.
3.3.1 CW/ENC-NEW Not Always Minimum MSFE Tests
One of the main problems related to using the new tests for nested models (CW and ENC-NEW) as the
main and only out-of-sample test statistics relates to the fact that they cannot be always interpreted as
minimum MSFE tests such as the TU and the DMW. In the Appendix we prove that in the presence of
forecast bias13 the CW/ENC-NEW and the DMW do not necessarily test the same null hypothesis; the CW
and ENC-NEW test whether the exchange rate is a random walk, whereas TU and DMW test whether the
random walk model and the structural model have equal MSFEs. These questions are not equivalent; if the
true model is something other than a random walk, one can still perfectly well ask if the random walk model
produces a lower mean-square forecast error.14 However, a signicant CW/ENC-NEW and an insignicant
bootstrapped TU/DMW can still provide potentially useful information as we show in sections 3.6 and 3.7. It
implies that, in theory, one can pool the forecasts of the structural model and the random walk to produce a
combined forecast that outperforms the random walk in terms of MSFE (See Appendix for proof). However,
12The list of studies which test statistical signicance using the asymptotic CW includes Engel, Mark, and West (2007),
Gourinchas and Rey (2007), Molodtsova and Papell (2009), Molodtsova, Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy, and Papell (2008), Molodtsova,
Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy, and Papell (2010), Rapach, Strauss, and Wohar (2007), Sellin (2007), Alquist and Chinn (2008), Cerra
and Saxena (2010), Sellin (2007), Groen (2007), Giacomini and Rossi (2010), Ardic, Ergin, and Senol (2008).
13Note that by forecast bias we imply only "scale" bias (see footnote 3 for details).
14 If one tests the explanatory power of the structural model in-sample using an ordinary least square (OLS) regression, testing
whether the exchange rate is a random walk (testing whether the coe¢ cient in front of the structural model fundamental, b,
equals zero) is equivalent to testing whether the random walk has mean square error (MSE) smaller than the MSE of the
structural model because OLS minimizes the MSE. However, as the proof of Proposition C.1.1 in the Appendix shows, in the
out-of-sample case, due to potential forecast bias resulting from forecast uncertainty, testing whether b equals zero is not the
same as testing whether the MSFE of the random walk is smaller than the MSFE of the structural model.
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nding an endogenous way of determining this optimal weight has proven to be a challenge (See Section 3.7
for further discussion).
3.3.2 The Asymptotics of CW Are Well Dened Only in the Rolling Case
Another problem related to the popular Clark-West out-of-sample test statistic is that the asymptotics of
CW are well-dened only when we use the test statistic in a rolling framework, where the size of the in-sample
portion of the series is kept xed. For the recursive case (which comprises the majority of exchange rate
forecast specications in the literature), where the in-sample size varies, one has to use simulated critical
values based on Brownian motion approximation of the limiting distribution of the CW test statistic.15
Throughout the paper, the term "asymptotic CW" refers to both the rolling and the recursive case. However,
one should keep in mind that in the recursive case the asymptotic distribution of CW is approximated.
3.3.3 Bootstrapped Tests Are Relatively Better Sized and More Powerful
Finally, assuming that the bootstrap has been specied correctly, in most specications, the bootstrapped
DMW and TU out-of-sample tests are more powerful and better sized than the asymptotic CW.16 Moreover,
new research on time series bootstrapping (see for example Li and Maddala (1997), Berkowitz and Kilian
(2000), Kilian (1999) and Mark and Sul (2001)) and signicant improvements in computational power have
made the bootstrap an attractive alternative to asymptotic inference.17
15As the authors emphasize, no formal proof is presented that the critical values suggested are appropriate for all forecast
specications (Clark and West (2007), pp. 298).
16See the "Not for Publication Appendices" of Clark and West (2006) and Clark and West (2007) that can be found on
Kenneth Wests website. (Note that in the 2006 Appendix both DGP 1 and 2 are relevant for exchange rate forecasting while
in the 2007 Appendix only DGP 1 is of interest.) Regarding comparison between the bootstrapped TU and DMW, see Clark
and McCracken (2005).
The concepts of size and power are key to understanding the di¤erences between the alternative out-of-sample test statistics.
They are properties of both the asymptotic and bootstrapped tests. The size of a test statistic is dened as the tests probability
of rejecting the null hypothesis if the null is true. If the researcher chooses to use a signicance level of 10%, an under-sized(over-
sized) test statistic would tend to reject the null hypothesis in less(more) than 10% of the cases. If a test statistic is over-sized, it
might incorrectly detect statistical signicance if such does not exist and if it is under-sized incorrectly reject the alternative.
The power of a test statistic is dened as the tests probability of correctly rejecting the null hypothesis for a given level of
statistical signicance. The size and power of a test statistic are inversely related.
In the Appendix of Clark and West (2006), it is not immediately obvious why the bootstrapped DMW has greater power
than the asymptotic CW because the authors report size-adjusted power rather than raw power. The main di¤erence between
the two is that only raw power is of any practical importance since in order to adjust for size distortions, the size-adjusted
power is based on a CW test statistic which uses data specic critical values obtained via Monte Carlo simulation. Since few, if
any, researchers would choose this alternative, the raw power is what one is mainly interested in. Given that the size-adjusted
power of CW is similar to that of the bootstrapped DMW, the raw power of CW will be smaller than the raw power of the
bootstrapped DMW. This is the case because the CW is somewhat undersized while the bootstrapped DMW seems adequately
sized and as we already explained the size and power of a test statistic are inversely related.
Finally, according to the simulation evidence in Clark and McCracken (2005), we would expect the bootstrapped TU to be
more powerful than the bootstrapped DMW. (Note that in their paper the authors discuss the power of the MSE-F rather than
the TU but the two tests are very similar). Since the bootstrapped DWM is more powerful than the asymptotic CW, we would
expect that the bootstrapped TU is more powerful than the asymptotic CW as well.
17See Appendix for further discussion on time series bootstrapping.
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As a result, we treat the bootstrapped DMW and TU in this paper as our preferred out-of-sample test
statistics. In what follows, rst we test the robustness of the results of the most popular exchange rate
forecasting models and specications with respect to alternative out-of-sample tests. Second, we concentrate
on the robustness of these same specications with respect to using di¤erent sub-samples.
3.4 Robustness With Respect to Alternative Test Statistics
In this section, we evaluate the robustness of the best results of Gourinchas and Rey (2007), Molodtsova and
Papell (2009) and Engel, Mark, and West (2007) with respect to alternative test statistics (bootstrapped
CW, ENC-NEW, DMW and TU). These studies all feature the asymptotic CW as their main out-of-sample
test statistic and conclude that for a number of countries, structural models outperform the driftless random
walk for forecasts one period ahead. While Engel, Mark, and West (2007) attribute their success to the
power of panel models, Molodtsova and Papell (2009) and Gourinchas and Rey (2007) nd success using
new structural models. While we concentrate our attention on these three prominent studies with fairly
positive results, we believe that the implications of our ndings are generalizable to the rest of the new
literature on short-horizon exchange rate forecasting.
We conclude that forecast bias is a serious problem which in certain specications leads to a signicant
discrepancy between the CW/ENC-NEW and DMW/TU. Furthermore, in a couple of cases, the asymptotic
CW is oversized. As a result of both of these issues, some of the results of the literature are overly optimistic
and potentially misleading.
3.4.1 Engel, Mark and West (2007)  The Monetary Model
The implementation of a panel forecast specication is one of the key additions to the exchange rate fore-
casting literature which allows Engel, Mark, and West (2007) to nd limited forecastability of the exchange
rate change one quarter ahead.18 The study nds that for 5 out of 18 currencies, the monetary model out-
performs the driftless random walk. While recognizing this success as modest, the authors note that their
results appear notably more positive than the norm in the literature.19
18The study of Engel, Mark, and West (2007) builds on Engel and West (2005).
19The majority of the recent panel specication papers nd strong support for the forecasting power of the monetary model
in both long and short horizons (see Mark and Sul (2001), Rapach and Wohar (2002), Engel, Mark, and West (2007) and
Groen (2005)). However, at the same time, the theoretical validity of the monetary specication has been widely criticized.
The criticism of the monetary model centers around its assumptions that both purchasing power parity and uncovered interest
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The forecasting specication Engel, Mark, andWest (2007) apply is straightforward. The forecast variable
is the nominal exchange rate change, where st is the natural log of the exchange rate measured in foreign
currency per one unit of the base currency (in this case US dollars). Dene si;t+1 = si;t+1   si;t and the
forecast is one period ahead. Then the panel forecast equation can be expressed as
si;t+1 = i + t + zi;t + "i;t+1: (3.4.1)
where, in this case, zi;t stands for the deviation of the exchange rate from an equilibrium value. zi;t is
determined by the monetary model fundamental
zi;t = mi;t  mt   '(yi;t   yt )  si;t: (3.4.2)
Above, i is a country-specic index, i stands for country-specic e¤ects, t - for time specic e¤ects and
"i;t+1 is the innovation term. The () represents the base country ( the US), (mi;t   mt ) is the relative
money supply, (yi;t  yt ) is the relative income level and ' is assumed to be one. Note that all the variables
are in natural logs. We use the driftless random walk, expressed as si;t+1 = i;t+1 (where i;t+1 is the
innovation term of the driftless random walk model) as a benchmark which would ensure that the structural
model is compared to the best known alternative.20
Engel, Mark, and West (2007) estimate equation (3.4.1) using recursive OLS regressions. They calculate
the exchange rate change forecast using the following equations.
Structural Model : s^i;t+1 = ^i + ^t+1 + ^zi;t+1
Driftless Random Walk Model : s^i;t+1 = 0
where the time dummy for period t + 1 is calculated as ^t+1 = 1t
Pt
j=1 ^j . Engel, Mark, and West (2007)
sample extends Mark and Sul (2001)s data set up to 2005Q4. The exchange rates of the Eurozone countries
post 1999 are normalized in a way that they di¤er from each other only by a constant.21 This implies that
parity hold. However, these assumptions are not unequivocally supported by empirical evidence (Engel (1996)). Furthermore,
there is a debate on how one denes the money supply, the stability of the money equation (Friedman and Kuttner (1992)) and
whether money has any relevance for economic decision making such as monetary policy.
20Engel, Mark, and West (2007) compare the forecasts of the monetary model to both the random walk with drift and
without drift. However, they note that the driftless random walk outperforms the random walk with drift. All of the studies
we are aware of that compare the driftless random walk to the random walk with drift, nd the driftless random walk to be a
better forecaster (see Engel and Hamilton (1990) and Engel, Mark, and West (2007)).
21For example, the normalization for France post 1999 will be simply franc/euro times euro/dollar where the franc/euro is
the peg used to x the French franc to the euro in 1999.
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post 1999, Engel, Mark, and West (2007) specication is essentially forecasting the same exchange rate - the
Euro - using di¤erent country specic monetary fundamentals. For further details on the specication and
for data set sources refer to Engel, Mark, and West (2007).22
We test the robustness of their results with respect to di¤erent test statistics. In Table 3.4.1, we reproduce
the monetary model results but rather than just report the asymptotic CW test statistic, we also report
the bootstrapped p-values of the DMW, TU, CW and ENC-NEW. If we test statistical signicance via
the bootstrapped DMW and TU test statistics, the p-value is less than 10% for only 4 out of 18 cases.23
These results are conrmed by the bootstrapped CW. However, Greece stands out as an example where the
asymptotic CW is statistically signicant while the bootstrapped CW is not, suggesting that the asymptotic
CW is oversized.24
22We use Engel, Mark, and West (2007)s data except for exchange rates which are from the IFS data set. The bootstrap
procedure is similar to Mark and Sul (2001) and assume no unit root of the monetary fundamental. (For details on the bootstrap
used see Appendix.)
23Another way of testing for robustness, which we do not pursue in this paper, is by estimating to what extent the positive
results could be attributed to the large number of specications tested. For instance, the test statistic introduced by McCracken
and Sapp (2005) tests whether the number of successful forecasts can be attributed solely to the large number of specications
and models estimated by the researcher. If we were to calculate McCracken and Sapp (2005)s test statistic, the results might
have been even less favorable for the structural models.
24 In the case of Greece, the asymptotic CW performs so poorly because the DMW is largely oversized and, as a result, the
asymptotic CW is even more over-sized (see Appendix for clarication on the di¤erence between CW and DMW). The mean
of the bootstrapped DMW histogram is 1.3 (and it should have been 0 if no size problem was present). As is apparent from
the results in Table 3.4.1, in outlier cases like Greece, the asymptotics fail while the bootstrap, if properly specied, seems to
be still reliable.
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Table 3.4.1
CW^ CW
	P-
value TU P-value DMW P-value
ENC-
NEW
P-
value
UK 0.684 0.624 0.25 1.001 0.262 -0.063 0.254 0.739 0.251
Austria 1.966 1.854 0.04 0.984 0.040 1.315 0.015 2.164 0.110
Belgium 1.199 0.972 0.13 1.001 0.327 -0.041 0.292 1.653 0.034
Denmark 0.259 0.178 0.372 1.009 0.657 -0.553 0.459 0.257 0.340
France 0.706 0.545 0.23 1.001 0.228 -0.050 0.225 0.543 0.237
Germany 1.855 1.711 0.056 0.986 0.048 0.924 0.065 2.408 0.080
Netherlands 1.651 1.400 0.084 0.990 0.071 0.922 0.060 1.375 0.144
Canada -0.942 -0.936 0.881 1.161 0.970 -2.348 0.906 -4.240 0.988
Japan 1.094 0.671 0.439 0.999 0.366 0.038 0.364 0.873 0.425
Finland 0.648 0.696 0.262 1.004 0.420 -0.156 0.339 1.463 0.154
Greece 2.509 2.501 0.704 1.004 0.906 -0.085 0.899 #### 0.450
Spain 0.711 0.699 0.592 1.027 0.916 -0.806 0.799 2.091 0.343
Australia 0.787 0.727 0.343 1.026 0.555 -0.914 0.479 1.869 0.303
Italy 0.733 0.557 0.519 1.015 0.764 -0.487 0.575 1.525 0.401
Switzerland 1.965 1.985 0.06 0.986 0.082 1.409 0.019 1.912 0.197
Korea 0.853 0.847 0.385 0.997 0.252 0.118 0.306 1.972 0.188
Norway 0.645 0.271 0.327 1.005 0.426 -0.402 0.358 0.296 0.317
Sweden 1.100 1.030 0.225 0.993 0.163 0.466 0.174 1.372 0.212
The	benchmark	is	a	random	walk	without	drift;	Quarterly	data	ranging	from	1973Q1	to	2005Q4;	First	Forecast:	1983Q1;	The	p-value	is	the	bootstrapped	version	of	the	respective	test	statistic.	Bootstrap	based	on	1000	iterations;	Bold	p-values	imply	statistical	significance	of	10%	or	less;	Bold	Theil's	U	values	represent	Theil's	U	<=	1;	Bold	CW	values	represent	statistical	significance	of	10%	(above	1.282)	using	Clark	and	West's	(2007)	simulated	critical	values.																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																			
Reproduced	Results
Monetary	Model	Vs	Random	Walk	with	No	Drift;	One	Quarter	Ahead
Mark,	Engel	and	West	(2007)
^Results	provided	by	Charles	Engel	using	a	corrected	data	set
3.4.2 Molodtsova and Papell (2009)  Heterogeneous Symmetric Taylor Rule
with Smoothing
In addition to the improvements produced by the panel specication, the introduction of the Taylor rule as
a structural fundamental has also seemed to yield improved forecasts. The specication which produces best
forecasting results estimates country specic coe¢ cients on both ination and the output gap. Furthermore,
Molodtsova and Papell (2009) assume that interest rates adjust only partially to its target and, as a result,
lagged interest rates are included in the specication which represent the so-called smoothing e¤ect. Using
only single-country equations and the asymptotic CW test statistic, Molodtsova and Papell (2009) conclude
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that the Taylor rule outperforms the driftless random walk for 10 out of 12 currencies for forecasts one period
ahead. Molodtsova and Papell (2009) specify the fundamental, zt, as
zt = 1t + 2

t + 3y
gap
t + 4y
gap
t + 5it 1 + 6i

t 1 (3.4.3)
where  is the ination rate, i is the interest rate and ygap is the output gap dened as the deviation of
an industrial production index from a linear trend. We substitute equation (3.4.3) in equation (3.4.1) and
estimate equation (3.4.1) in a single equation framework using monthly data.25 Molodtsova and Papell
(2009) refer to specication (3.4.3) as the heterogeneous symmetric Taylor rule with smoothing.26 More
information regarding the specication and data sources is provided in Molodtsova and Papell (2009).
Similarly to the monetary model specication of Engel, Mark, and West (2007), we replicate Molodtsova
and Papell (2009)s results and compute not only the asymptotic CW, but also the bootstrapped TU, DMW,
CW and ENC-NEW.27 Table 3.4.2 reports Molodtsova and Papell (2009) results as presented in their paper
and our attempt to replicate them using their methodology and data set.
There is a striking di¤erence between both the bootstrapped and asymptotic CW and the bootstrapped
ENC-NEW, on the one hand, and the bootstrapped TU and DMW on the other hand. While CW and
ENC-NEW are signicant in as many as 10 out of 12 cases, the TU is not signicant for any of the countries
and DMW is signicant only for Canada. We explain this discrepancy with the presence of severe forecast
bias in which case the CW and ENC-NEW cannot be interpreted as minimum MSFE tests and they do
not test the same null hypothesis as TU and DMW.28 In the case of Switzerland, the bootstrapped CW is
insignicant while the asymptotic CW is signicant, again, suggesting that the asymptotic CW might be
oversized in certain cases.
25Single-equation framework implies that there are no time dummy e¤ects.
26The estimation method is a rolling regression specication with a rolling window of 120 months.
27The data set was provided to us by the authors and it is also available on David Papells website. For the bootstrap,
similarly to the bootstrap used to replicate the results of Engel, Mark, and West (2007)s study, we use similar to Mark and
Sul (2001)s procedure. We assume that the ination rates, the interest rates and the output gaps do not have unit roots. (For
details on the bootstrap used see Appendix.)
28A regression of the observed exchange rate change on the forecast series and no constant produces a coe¢ cient less than or
close to 0.5 for all 10 countries where CW and ENC-NEW are signicant. (If no "scale" forecast bias was present, the coe¢ cient
should have been close to 1.) This is what we would expect in cases of severe "scale" forecast bias which can lead to CW and
ENC-NEW not testing the same null as TU and DMW.
81
Table 3.4.2
CW	P-
value	
asympto
CW	P-
value	
asymptot
CW	P-
value	
bootstrap TU
P-
value DMW
P-
value
ENC-
NEW
P-
value
UK 0.020 0.027 0.027 1.051 1.000 -1.740 0.678 14.662 0.001
Denmark 0.069 0.067 0.045 1.025 0.992 -1.231 0.397 8.067 0.013
France 0.024 0.019 0.007 1.040 0.998 -1.260 0.557 11.312 0.001
Germany 0.066 0.066 0.077 1.036 0.997 -1.130 0.548 8.458 0.016
Netherlands 0.036 0.035 0.040 1.040 1.000 -1.304 0.613 9.604 0.012
Canada 0.008 0.008 0.008 1.006 0.174 -0.261 0.078 15.025 0.003
Japan 0.019 0.019 0.071 1.018 0.912 -0.723 0.367 14.152 0.008
Australia 0.015 0.013 0.039 1.024 0.972 -0.895 0.360 15.130 0.004
Italy 0.002 0.002 0.039 0.995 0.264 0.168 0.327 18.240 0.003
Switzerland 0.094 0.094 0.153 1.068 1.000 -2.198 0.910 9.151 0.021
Sweden 0.678 0.674 0.667 1.098 1.000 -1.261 0.494 -5.897 1.000
Portugal 0.985 0.985 0.985 1.127 1.000 -3.329 0.999 -4.464 1.000
^	Results	as	reported	in	Molodtsova	and	Papell	(2008)	
Heterogeneous	Symmetric	Taylor	Rule	with	Smoothing	Vs	Random	Walk	with	No	
Drift;	One	Month	Ahead
Molodtsova	and	Papell	(2008)
Single	equation,	monthly	data.	Since	Molodtsova	and	Papell	(2008)		use	rolling	regressions,		the	asymptotic	CW	p-values	are	calculated	under	the	assuming	of	normality;	The	TU,	ENC-NEW	and	DMW	p-values	and	the	CW		bootstrap	p-value	are	based	on	a	bootstrap	(1000	iterations);	Bold	Theil's	U	values	represent	Theil's	U	<=	1;	
3.4.3 Gourinchas and Rey (2007)  External Balance Model
Another important study that claims to successfully forecast exchange rates one period ahead is Gourinchas
and Rey (2007). The authors introduce a new external balance model which isolates long- term e¤ects by
dening an external balance variable as a function of de-trended foreign assets and liabilities, exports and
imports. Gourinchas and Rey (2007) nd that their external balance measure is superior to those previously
used in the literature on external balance specications since it takes into account capital gains and losses on
the net foreign asset position, in addition to the trade balance. Gourinchas and Rey (2007) argue that their
external balance variable successfully forecasts both the trade and FDI-weighted dollar one quarter ahead.
We can write Gourinchas and Rey (2007)s external balance fundamental as
zt = jat jat   jltjlt + jxt jxt   jmt jmt (3.4.4)
where at ; 
l
t; 
x
t and 
m
t are time-varying weights a function of the Hodrick-Prescott-ltered trends of assets,
liabilities, exports and imports  while at ; 
l
t; 
x
t and 
m
t represent the log deviation of assets, liabilities,
exports and imports from Hodrick-Prescott-ltered trends. Equation (3.4.4) is substituted into equation
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(3.4.1) and the authors estimate equation (3.4.1) for the trade-weighted and the FDI-weighted exchange
rate separately in a single equation framework.29 Gourinchas and Rey (2007) assume that the time-varying
weights converge asymptotically and use xed weights for the calculation of their forecasts. Further details
on the specication and the data set used are provided in Gourinchas and Rey (2007). In Table 3.4.3, we
reproduce their results using their data set and similar methodology.30 One can observe highly signicant
asymptotic CW, bootstrapped TU, DMW, CW and ENC-NEW test statistics. However, the seemingly
strong result is overturned, to an extent, when checking for robustness with respect to alternative time
periods in the following section.
Table 3.4.3
Reported	
by	G&R
CW CW P-value TU P-value DMW
P-
value
ENC-
NEW P-value
Trade	
Weighted	
Exch	Rate 2.690 2.684 0.005 0.974 0.003 0.657 0.013 11.774 0.001
0.006 5.780 0.002
The	p-value	is	the	bootstrapped	version	of	the	respective	test	statistic.	Bootstrap	based	on	1000	iterations;	Bold	p-values	imply	statistical	significance	of	10%	or	less;	Bold	Theil's	U	values	represent	Theil's	U	<=	1;	Bold	CW	values	represent	statistical	significance	of	10%	(above	1.282)	using	Clark	and	West's	(2007)	simulated	critical	values.																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																			
External	Balance	Model	Vs	Random	Walk	with	No	Drift;	One	Quarter	Ahead
Gourinchas	and	Rey	(2007)
FDI	Weighted	
Exch	Rate 2.196 2.191 0.980 0.005 0.821
Reproduced	Results
FDI	-	Weighted	exch	rate	-	rolling	regression	where	the	rolling	window	is	105	quarters;	first	forecast:	1978	Q3Trade	-	Weighted	exch	rate	-	recursive	regression;	first	forecast:	1978	Q2
0.019
Summary of Test Statistic Robustness
We looked at each one of the three major studies which nd forecastability one period ahead and concluded
that when one considers the robustness of the results with respect to alternative test statistics, the results
of Molodtsova and Papell (2009) uctuate signicantly due to the presence of forecast bias. The results of
Engel, Mark, and West (2007) are somewhat less spectacular as a result of one outlier where the asymptotic
CW is severely oversized. Finally, we conclude that the results of Gourinchas and Rey (2007) remain robust
to the test statistic considered. Now we turn to our second main issue which of the results are robust over
29Note that the authors claim to be using a 105 quarter rolling window. However, a closer look at their code shows that they
use 105 quarter rolling window for the forecasts of the FDI-traded dollar and a recursive specication for the trade-weighted
dollar. We calculate the forecast both ways in a recursive and rolling framework and the results do not change substantially.
30We are grateful to the authors for providing us with their code and data set. Note that in Table 3.4.3 we report the CW
test statistic which is calculated as CW = P
0:5d^p

d^
where d^ is dened in equation (C.1.1) in Appendix, while Gourinchas and Rey
(2007) report d^ in their paper.
As before, we use a bootstrap procedure similar to Mark and Sul (2001) and assume no unit root of the external balance
variable. (For details on the bootstrap used see Appendix.)
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di¤erent periods of time.
3.5 Robustness with Respect to Di¤erent Forecast Windows
In addition to testing the robustness of the results with respect to di¤erent out-of-sample test statistics,
we also test the robustness of the results of Molodtsova and Papell (2009), Engel, Mark, and West (2007)
and Gourinchas and Rey (2007)via varying the forecast window. This is another important test of how
consistently reliable the forecast is.31
We nd that the structural models do not produce consistently better forecasts than the driftless random
walk over di¤erent sample periods for the three studies reviewed. However, it seems that the monetary model
and the Taylor rule model forecast the exchange rate better than the random walk during the 1980s while
Gourinchas and Rey (2007)s external balance model consistently outperforms the driftless random walk in
the 1990s and the 2000s.
3.5.1 Engel, Mark and West (2007)
Figure 3.5.1 illustrates an approach to testing robustness to di¤erent sample periods in the context of Engel,
Mark, and West (2007)s monetary model. Figure 3.5.1 plots the bootstrapped TU (Theils U) p-value on the
y-axis and the starting date of the recursion on the x-axis (the rst date for which a forecast is calculated).
We plot only the bilateral exchange rates for which we nd forecastability for a large number of forecast
windows in order to make the graph legible. For similar reasons, we report only the results for Germany as
a proxy for the Eurozone countries.
The way Figure 3.5.1 should be interpreted is the following. For example, the TU p-value associated
with 1984Q4 for a given country implies that the TU p-value is calculated using the forecast window from
1984Q4 to 2005Q4 (the end of the sample). If the TU p-value is below 0.1, we consider the result statistically
signicant at 10 percent. In order for a result to be considered robust, we would expect that the TU p-value
is below 0.1 for almost all of the plotted forecast windows. The graph shows that the monetary model
31Giacomini and Rossi (2010) is one of the few studies which attempts to formalize the issue of robustness over di¤erent
forecast windows by developing appropriate test statistics.
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is a relatively good forecaster of the Swiss franc and, to a lesser extent, of the Deutsche mark/euro.32 It
is interesting to note that overall (when one considers the other current Eurozone countries as well), the
monetary model performs relatively well in the 1980s and its performance deteriorates in the 1990s.
Figure 3.5.1
In conclusion, while at rst look (considering one forecast window only), Engel, Mark, and West (2007)s
results seem encouraging, if one considers the robustness of the results over di¤erent forecast windows, they
are less so.33
3.5.2 Molodtsova and Papell (2009)
In a similar fashion, we evaluate Molodtsova and Papell (2009)s heterogeneous symmetric Taylor rule results
with smoothing for consistency over di¤erent forecast windows. Figure 3.5.2 depicts the robustness of
Molodtsova and Papell (2009)s results with respect to starting the rolling regression at a di¤erent date.
32Keeping in mind that post-1999 the Deutsche mark transitions into the Euro, the fact that the TU test statistic for
Germany becomes insignicant when we restrict the forecast window post year 2000 implies that while the monetary model
was a relatively good forecaster of the Deutsche mark, this might not be the case for the Euro. However, with more euro data
the result could change.
33The results remain non-robust when one reproduces Figure 3.5.1 plotting the bootstrapped ENC-NEW/CW test statistic
rather the bootstrapped TU p-value.
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Only the countries for which the bootstrapped CW are signicant are reported (nine out of twelve). Figure
3.5.2 clearly shows that the results are somewhat robust only for Canada the only country for which the
TU is below 0.1 for most of the forecast windows.34
Figure 3.5.2
3.5.3 Gourinchas and Rey (2007)
Finally, in order to test to what extent the results of Gourinchas and Rey (2007)s external balance model
are robust to changing the forecast window, we report the p-value of the bootstrapped TU test statistic for
di¤erent forecast windows in Figure 3.5.3. The forecasts are estimated using a recursive specication.35 We
report two approaches of estimating the external balance variable. The solid lines in Figure 3.5.3 represent
34While interesting, the result for Canada is perhaps not that surprising given that Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004) classify
Canada as a limited exibility exchange rate.
Even though, in Molodtsova and Papell (2009)s specication, one cannot interpret the CW and ENC-NEW as minimum
MSFE tests due to the presence of severe forecast bias, for completeness, we reproduce Figure 3.5.2 using the bootstrapped
CW. The bootstrapped CW is signicant in the early 1980s for the majority of the countries but not signicant for the rest of
the period (the only exceptions are Australia, Canada, Italy and Japan for which the bootstrapped CW is signicant for the
majority of forecast windows).
35 If we calculate the forecasts using a rolling window of 105 quarters (the rolling window Gourinchas and Rey (2007) state
they use) rather than recursive regressions, the results do not change substantially. However, using recursive regressions allows
us to check the robustness of the trade-weighted dollar for di¤erent forecast windows given the shorter range of the series.
We also calculate time varying weights rather than impose constant weights which also seems to a¤ect the nal results only
negligibly.
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Gourinchas and Rey (2007)s approach which estimates the external balance variable as a function of a
discount constant, , which is assumed to be 0.95 (a long-term value obtained using the entire sample). In
order to test the robustness of Gourinchas and Rey (2007)s results to alternative values of , we calculate a
time-varying discount rate (as a opposed to a long-run value) using only the in-sample portion of the data.
This approach is presented with dashed blue and red lines in Figure 3.5.3.
As before, we consider TU signicant at 10 percent when the bootstrapped p-value is below the dashed
black line. It is interesting to note that the FDI-weighted exchange rate performs relatively well for most
of the periods with the exception of the late 1980s. The performance of the trade-weighted series is less
impressive (especially when one considers the time-varying  approach which calculates the discount rate
using only in-sample information). However, no matter whether one considers the trade-weighted or the
FDI-weighted series, the external balance variable outperforms the driftless random walk in the 1990s and
2000s.36
Figure 3.5.3
Summary of Robutness to Perturbation in Sample
After examining the performance of the monetary model, the external balance model and the heterogenous
Taylor rule with smoothing over di¤erent periods of time, we conclude that Engel, Mark, and West (2007)s
36The results are similar if we consider the rest of the out-of-sample test statistics.
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monetary model specication performs well in the 1980s but poorly in the more recent period. Molodtsova
and Papell (2009)s Taylor rule results, which were not robust to the use of the bootstrapped TU and DMW
in Section 3.4, are also highly non-signicant for all the periods considered. It seems that the performance
of Gourinchas and Rey (2007)s external balance variable is potentially more encouraging for the most
recent period. However, one should be cautious in comparing the performance of structural models which
forecast bilateral exchange rates with those which forecast weighted exchange rates, as the latter tend to be
signicantly less volatile.
3.6 Can One Do Better? The Importance of Common Cross-
Country Shocks
In this section we try to improve upon the panel forecast specication applied by Mark and Sul (2001)
and Engel, Mark, and West (2007) by incorporating persistent common cross-country shocks in the fore-
casts. These might include technology shocks, commodity price shocks, or factors related to the pace of
globalization.
The basic forecast specication we use is the same as the one dened in equation (3.4.1). However, we
dene zi;t, the deviation of the exchange rate from an equilibrium value, using the purchasing power parity
model (PPP) rather than the monetary model.37
zi;t = pi;t   pt   si;t (3.6.1)
Above, p is the natural log of the CPI and, as before, the () represents the US. We substitute equation
(3.6.1) into equation (3.4.1) and estimate equation (3.4.1) using recursive OLS panel regressions. The way
we take into account potential persistent cross-country shocks is by forecasting the time dummy e¤ect for
period t + 1 di¤erently from previous panel studies. Rather than forecast it simply as the average of the
time-dummy coe¢ cients for all the previous periods, as Engel, Mark, and West (2007) did, we forecast it as
37The PPP specication is known to perform well at long horizons, but has been much less explored in looking at short-
horizon nominal exchange rate forecasts. Engel, Mark, and West (2007) is the only study, we are aware of, which has explored
the forecasting power of the PPP model at short horizons in a panel framework where the benchmark is the driftless random
walk. Engel, Mark, and West (2007) nd that for forecasts one period ahead, the PPP forecast is signicantly better than the
driftless random walk forecast only in 3 out of 18 cases.
We also perform the same type of forecasting exercise as in sections 3.4 and 3.5 using the monetary model, the Taylor rule
and a new structural model based on the Backus - Smith optimal risk sharing condition model. Out of all the models we try,
the PPP specication performs the best.
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a simple average of the last 4 estimated time-dummy coe¢ cients. Mathematically, the time dummy forecast
can be dened as
t+1 =
1
q
tX
j=t q+1
j
where q = 4 when the data is quarterly.
Table 3.6 reports the results of the specication dened above.38
Table 3.6
CW
P-
value
ENC-
NEW
P-
value
Theil'
s	U
P-
value DMW
P-
value
UK 0.423 0.326 1.343 0.242 1.072 0.991 -1.879 0.810
Denmark 1.469 0.072 3.884 0.040 1.008 0.268 -0.285 0.226
Germany 1.662 0.075 5.655 0.034 0.999 0.145 0.035 0.147
Canada 2.724 0.004 21.411 0.000 1.056 0.444 -0.665 0.142
Japan 1.809 0.090 5.592 0.056 1.004 0.280 -0.118 0.265
Australia 2.435 0.021 11.391 0.003 0.958 0.006 0.959 0.026
Switzerland 1.239 0.230 4.184 0.106 1.008 0.445 -0.250 0.385
Korea 1.870 0.059 6.634 0.015 0.975 0.007 0.712 0.056
Norway 0.944 0.155 2.363 0.115 1.033 0.741 -1.232 0.534
Sweden 2.215 0.030 5.398 0.035 0.999 0.155 0.028 0.157Recursive	specification;	quarterly	data;	country	and	time	dummies	included;	time	dummy	effect	forecasted	as	the	simple	avg	of	estimated	time	dummies	over	last	4	quarters;	first	forecast		1983Q1;	last	forecast	2007Q1	(PPP);	The	p-value	is	the	bootstrapped	version	of	the	respective	test	statistic.	Bootstrap	based	on	1000	iterations;	Bold	p-values	imply	statistical	significance	of	10%	or	less;	Bold	Theil's	U	values	represent	Theil's	U	<=	1;	Bold	CW	values	represent	statistical	significance	of	10%	(above	1.282)	using	Clark	and	West's	(2007)	simulated	critical	values.																																																										
PPP	Specification;	One	Quarter	Ahead;	Forecasts	Incorporate	Common	Cross-
Country	Shocks	
The results of Table 3.6 are very similar to the results in Molodtsova and Papell (2009) presented in Table
3.4.2. If we concentrate our attention only on the statistical signicance of the bootstrapped TU and DMW
test statistics, we notice that the results are signicant only for Australia and Korea. However, when one
calculates the CW and ENC-NEW out-of-sample test statistics, CW and ENC-NEW are signicant for 7 out
38The data source is the International Financial Statistics (IMF) (Data available upon request). Our data set consists of
eleven countries: US, UK, Denmark, Germany, Canada, Japan, Australia, Switzerland, Korea, Norway and Sweden. We choose
to proxy the Euro using the Deutsche mark series up to 1999 and the euro post 1999. The bootstrap specication is similar to
Mark and Sul (2001) and the same as the bootstrap used in the literature review section (see Appendix for details).
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of 10 countries. Note that the bootstrapped CW behaves similarly to the asymptotic CW. In combination
with the fact that Clark and McCracken (2005), Clark and West (2006)and Clark and West (2007) conclude
that the bootstrapped DMW and TU tend to be more powerful than the asymptotic CW and adequately
sized, this implies that the discrepancy between the CW/ENC-NEW and TU/DMW cannot be attributed
to di¤erent power and size. Furthermore, an investigation of the results indicates the presence of forecast
bias.39 As a result, the only explanation left for the discrepancy is that the two types of test statistics test
di¤erent null hypotheses and cannot be used interchangeably a point we prove and discuss further in the
Appendix.
3.7 Forecast Pooling Empirical Example
However, a signicant CW/ENC-NEW still provides useful information when the bootstrapped TU/DMW
is insignicant which is what one observes in Table 3.6 (For proof see Appendix). In this section we provide
an empirical example of how in such cases one can improve upon the structural model forecast by pooling
the structural model forecast and the random walk forecast.
3.7.1 Endogenous vs Exogenous Weights
The question emerges how one can calculate a weight which will produce a forecast with MSFE smaller
than the MSFE of the random walk. One can either use endogenous time-varying methods of nding the
optimal weight (see Clements and Hendry (1998) pp. 229), or one can impose a xed weight exogenously.
It is conventional wisdom in the literature on forecast pooling that simple averages tend to outperform
endogenous weights (See Stock and Watson (2003), Clark and McCracken (2005) and Clements and Hendry
(2004)). Clements and Hendry (2004) explain this phenomena with the fact that all endogenous procedures
of nding an optimal weight would be biased in the presence of structural breaks (which might be one
explanation of the lack of robustness of the models over di¤erent forecast windows).40 In contrast, having
39Substantial "scale" forecast bias is present in all of the cases where we observe a discrepancy between the TU/DMW and
CW/ENC-NEW.
40Since endogenous weights are estimated on the basis of data prior to the forecast, a structural break in the recent past
or in the near future will lead to biased weights. It is possible that prior to the break, a certain model performs better than
the alternative but performs poorly after the structural break. As a result, endogenously determined weights would lead to the
forecaster weighting more heavily the model which performed better prior to the break but poorly after it.
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a constant weight can serve as an insurance against structural breaks and perform overall better than a
time-varying endogenous weight.41
We test which pooling procedure produces better results imposing exogenous xed weights or calculating
endogenous weights using the regression method presented in Clements and Hendry (1998) (pp. 229). As
expected, our results conrm the conclusion of the literature on forecast pooling that simple means and xed
weights perform better than endogenously calculated optimal weights. As a result, we choose to impose a
xed weight of 0:2 on the structural model forecast and 0:8 on the random walk forecast (which is essentially
zero).42
3.7.2 Results After Pooling
Table 3.7.2 presents the "pooled" forecast results where we combine the forecast of the PPP model which
incorporates persistent cross-country shocks and the driftless random walk model.
41Potential structural breaks a¤ect also the degree to which the information provided by the CW and the ENC-NEW is
valuable. In the presence of structural breaks, pooling can be appropriate even if the CW and the ENC-NEW are not statistically
signicant (and of course the bootstrapped TU and DMW are not statistically signicant) (see Clements and Hendry (2004)).
The reason why this is the case is that the forecaster does not know in advance whether the CW/ENC-NEW will be signicant
or not if the test statistic is calculated using data from the next regime.
42The results are relatively robust to using a simple average.
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Table 3.7.2
Theil'
s	U
P-
value DMW
P-
value
UK 1.000 0.452 -0.058 0.433
Denmark 0.994 0.050 1.127 0.090
Germany 0.991 0.046 1.355 0.090
Canada 0.962 0.000 2.092 0.005
Japan 0.991 0.071 1.441 0.121
Australia 0.981 0.000 2.151 0.009
Switzerland 0.993 0.123 0.955 0.239
Korea 0.989 0.014 1.645 0.047
Norway 0.997 0.145 0.511 0.189
Sweden 0.991 0.043 1.794 0.044
"Pooled"	Forecast;	PPP	Specification;	One	
Quarter	Ahead;	Forecasts	Incorporate	
Common	Cross-Country	Shocks	
Forecasts	are	calculated	as	0.2	times	the	forecast	of	the	Structural	PPP	Model	which	incorporates	common	cross-country	shocks	
Exploring the results of Table 3.7.2, it is interesting to note that when the forecasts are pooled, the
bootstrapped TU becomes statistically signicant for the same 7 out of 10 countries for which CW was
signicant prior to pooling (Table 3.6).43 Therefore, by simply pooling the forecasts (a decision we choose to
make after observing the signicance of the bootstrapped CW and the ENC-NEW), we are able to outperform
the driftless random walk in as many as 7 out of 10 cases. As a result, we would suggest that forecasters
interested in nding the forecast which produces the smallest MSFE should not ignore the bootstrapped CW
and ENC-NEW test statistics. They should explore the potential of improving their forecast by weighting if
the bootstrapped TU and DMW are not statistically signicant but the bootstrapped CW and ENC-NEW
are signicant. However, one should note that while exogenously imposed weights tend to perform relatively
well, assigning xed weights is an ad hoc and sub-optimal process. As a result, it does not guarantee that
the same weight will continue performing well after a potential future structural break for example.
43The bootstrapped DMW test statistic is signicant in 6 out of 10 cases.
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3.7.3 Robustness of the Pooled Forecast with Respect to Di¤erent Forecast
Windows - Is Pooling Enough?
Finally, we test whether our combined forecasts which incorporate the information presented by the boot-
strapped CW and ENC-NEW test statistics are robust over di¤erent periods of time. As before, we test
the robustness of the results by graphing the bootstrapped TU p-value for di¤erent forecast windows. Only
those countries for which we have signicant results for a number of di¤erent forecast windows are included.
The "pooled" PPP specication seems to perform exceptionally well in the early-to mid 1980s and relatively
well in the early to mid-1990s.
Figure 3.7.3
Nevertheless, the only two countries for which there is robust evidence for forecastability are the com-
modity exporters Canada and Australia since the bootstrapped TU p-value for these countries is always
below 0.1 regardless of the forecast window considered.44 It is interesting to note that the forecasting suc-
cess we observe for Australia and Canada is a result of the way we specify the time dummy e¤ect forecast
44There is no guarantee that the relationship for Australia and Canada will be preserved in the future. As a result, one
should be careful when interpreting the results. Furthermore, we do not observe similar success when we use the same approach
to forecast the exchange rates of other commodity producers such as New Zealand and South Africa. Note also that the results
are somewhat robust for Sweden as well.
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and not so much of the economic fundamental we use. Even a specication with no structural fundamental
(only time and country dummies) produces relatively robust results for Australia and Canada. While these
results might be of interest to forecasters, they would most likely be of lesser value to policy makers who are
interested in the relationship between structural models and fundamentals.45
Overview and Summary of PPP Model (with Common Cross-Country Shocks)
To summarize, panel forecast techniques should improve our ability to forecast exchange rates by increas-
ing the sample size and by allowing for cross-country interactions. We argue that, to an extent, forecasters
can exploit cross-country interactions even further via specifying the time dummy e¤ect forecast in a way
which captures world economic trends. However, while allowing for the incorporation of cross-country infor-
mation produces slight improvement over simple panel specications, it fails to produce robust results for
the majority of the countries considered. The only exceptions are the commodity producers Canada and
Australia but we caution the reader that further investigation of these "success" cases is required. Last
but not least, while alternative ways to forecast the time dummy or pooling the structural model coe¢ cient
across countries may potentially improve our ability to forecast exchange rates for some countries, one should
be cautious when interpreting the results.46 If our ability to forecast exchange rates can be attributed solely
to "ad hoc" procedures that take into account unknown cross-country shocks and common relationships,
we still have not improved signicantly our knowledge of the relationship between structural models and
exchange rates.
3.8 Conclusion
In this paper we attempt to answer the question "Are structural models getting closer to being able to forecast
exchange rates at short horizons?" and the answer is "A little." However, over-reliance on asymptotic test
statistics in out-of-sample comparisons, misinterpretation of some tests, and failure to su¢ ciently check
robustness to alternative time windows has led many studies to overstate even the relatively thin positive
results that have been found. We nd that by allowing for common shocks in our panel specication, we
45For example, while our results suggest that common cross-country shocks seem to forecast the exchange rates of Australia
and Canada relatively well, this result does not help policy makers determine the cause of these shocks or determine the
relationship between structural variables and the exchange rate. A recent paper by Chen, Rogo¤, and Rossi (2010) is an example
of the di¢ culty of forecasting the exchange rates of commodity producers solely using fundamentals such as commodity prices
even when one takes into account structural breaks.
46For example, Rapach and Wohar (2004) provide empirical evidence against pooling the monetary model coe¢ cient across
countries.
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are able to generate some improvement, but even that improvement is not entirely robust to the forecast
window, and much of the gain appears to come from non-structural rather than structural factors.
We explore the application of popular new out of sample test statistics such as the Clark and West
(2006), Clark and West (2007) and Clark and McCracken (2001) out-of-sample test statistics. We argue
that they have been widely misinterpreted as minimum mean square forecast error test statistics and that,
in addition, popular simple asymptotic versions may su¤er from size distortions. In other words, signicant
Clark-West and Clark-McCracken test statistics do not always imply that the forecast of the structural
model outperforms the forecast of the random walk in terms of mean square forecast error. For this question,
statistics such as the bootstrapped Theils U or Diebold-Mariano/West may be more appropriate (especially
given the advances in time series bootstrapping); at the very least, researchers should test the robustness of
their results with respect to alternative test statistics.
We note that some researchers may be specically interested in whether one can reject the null hypothesis
that the true model is the random walk model in favor a particular structural model. But we would argue
that in the vast majority of applications, policy-makers and practitioners treat the random walk model only
as a straw man, and simply want to know whether the structural model can deliver a better forecast and
what that forecast is.
We do note that, in principle, a positive CW statistic implies that there does exist some linear combination
of the driftless random walk and the structural model that outperforms the naive random walk as measured
by relative mean square forecast error. Finding a stable linear combination, however, is tricky and potentially
opens up a whole new range of problems. Endogenous methods for nding optimal weights tend to fail due to
the presence of structural instability. In practice, xed exogenous weights tend to perform better, although
here too stability is a challenge.
In addition to misinterpretation of the new out-of-sample tests for nested models, some of the excess
optimism in the literature can be attributed to the failure to check for robustness over di¤erent forecast
windows. Regardless of whether one uses new or old structural models, single equation or panel specications,
one of the main problems related to the forecastability of the majority of exchange rates remains - lack of
robustness over di¤erent time periods. Whether the lack of robustness is due to non-linear functional forms,
structural breaks or simply heterogenous market sentiments over time47 , the literature on exchange rate
47One way of explaining the lack of robustness is with the existence of structural breaks which are identied as one of the
main problems related to out-of-sample forecasting (see Clements and Hendry (2006), Rossi (2006), Stock and Watson (1996)
and Stock and Watson (2003)). Potential model mis-specication could be an alternative explanation. Empirical evidence
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forecasting has not been able to develop the tools to produce robust forecasts for the majority of exchange
rates. Innovative approaches of overcoming these problems are required in order for the forecasts of structural
models to outperform the forecasts of the driftless random walk at short-horizons. Until then, we would call
the glass ninety-ve percent empty rather than ve percent full.
suggest that the relationship between fundamentals and exchange rates can be better represented by non-linear rather than
linear functional forms (see Taylor and Peel (2000), Meese and Rose (1991) and Kilian and Taylor (2003)). However, even when
forecasters try to account for non-linear functional forms directly (Meese and Rose (1991) and Kilian and Taylor (2003)), or
estimate a regime switching model (Marsh (2000) and Dacco and Satchell (1999)), results remain non-robust.
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Appendix A
Supplement to Chapter 1
A.1 Appendix
The functional forms used for the simulations are:
The functional form of the consumer production technology in t = 1 is given by
F
 
kT1s

=
8><>:
(1 )
   (1 )e
 kT
 + k
T > 0 if kT1s > 0
kT1s if k
T
1s = 0
where kT1s = min f0; k0   k1sg ; 0 <  is a parameter that controls the concavity of the production technology
and 0 <  < 1 is the renancing cost. The larger  is, the smaller q1l is, for a given kT . This functional
form guarantees that the assumptions made regarding F () are satised.
q1l = F
0  kT  = (1  ) e kT +  > 0 where 1 >   0
F 00
 
kT

=   (1  ) e kT < 0
F 000
 
kT

= 2 (1  ) e kT > 0
F (0) = 0;F 0 (0) = 1; lim
kT!1
F 0
 
kT

= 
F (kT1s) and F
0(kT1s) are continuos on 2 [0;1); F (kT1s) is at least three times di¤erentiable on kT1s 2 (0;1);
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F (0) = 0,F 0 (0) = 1; F 00 (0) = F 000 (0) = 0; F 00
 
kT1s

< 0 on kT1s 2 (0;1) and limkT1s!1 F 0
 
kT1s
  : The
functional form for the deadweight loss from the bail-out is  (Bl; ) = 1B

l where  > 1:
A.1.1 The Problem of the Consumer
The endowment of the consumer is given by e and the consumer receives it in every period t and state s: I solve
the problem of the consumer backwards. In period 2 the consumer maximizesmaxkT2s
 
kT2s   q2skT2s + d2s + e

taking q2s and the state variable, d2s; as given. The rst order condition implies that q2s = 1: In period
1; state s; the consumer chooses the amount to invest in the production technology, kT1s where the price of
capital is q1s: He also chooses how much of the period 2 state s asset to buy,d2s; where the price of this asset
is p2s and it pays one unit of the consumption good in t = 2; state s. Since each consumer is small, he takes
all the prices as given. In t = 1; state s; the representative consumer maximizes (taking into account the
fact that q2s = 1)
max
kT1s;d2s

2e+ d1s   p2sd2s + d2s + F
 
kT1s
  q1skT1s
where d1s is a state variable which is the amount the banker promised to pay the consumer in t = 1 state s:
The rst order condition with respect to kT1s pins down the equilibrium price of capital in t = 1 as a function
of the amount of "re-sold" capital, q1s = F 0
 
kT1s

: The rst order condition with respect to d2s is an Euler
equation which implies p2s = 1 since the representative consumer is risk neutral and his marginal utility of
consumption is 1: Also the inter-temporal discount rate is 1.
After plugging in for the consumers rst order conditions in t = 1 and t = 2; the t = 0 optimization
problem of the consumer is given by
max
d1s
"
3e 
X
s
sp1sd1s +
X
s
s
 
d1s + F
 
kT1s
  q1skT1s 
#
The consumer chooses the amount of state contingent asset, d1s; to purchase where he takes the price
of the asset sp1s as given and the asset pays one unit of the consumption good in state s which occurs
with probability s. The rst order condition with respect to d1s implies p1s = 1: Notice that since the
representative consumer is risk neutral, he will be indi¤erent how much of the state contingent asset to
purchase in period 1 and 2.
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A.1.2 N Banks No Commitment
In this section of the Appendix, I solve the optimization problem of banker i where the policy maker
provides an optimal bail-out in t = 1: Also the policy maker has an access to two ex-ante (period zero)
policy instruments. The rst ex-ante policy instrument is a minimum bank capital requirement dened as
iki0  n where i is the minimum capital ratio. The second ex-ante policy instrument is a limit on the
payment banker i pledges in the low state to the consumer,i; (i.e. a limit on the amount of put options
banker i can sell) di1l  i: In order to remain close to reality, I assume that no commitment instruments
are available to the policy maker. As a result, the optimal targeted bail-out, Bil ; will be determined in t = 1
and banker i will internalize the fact that his actions in period t = 0 will a¤ect Bil : In contrast, 
i and i
are predetermined in the beginning of period t = 0; before banker i makes any decisions. Also I assume that
banker i takes into account the rst order conditions of the consumers which pin down prices p1s = p2s = 0:
q0 = q2s = 1 and q1s = F 0
 
kT1s

:
The actions in reverse order are the following. In t = 2; all bankers produce and pay out all the prots
as dividends to the consumers. At the end of t = 1; banker i maximizes the dividend payment in the last
period by choosing

ki1s; d
i
2s
	
and taking as given the state variables

Bil ; k
i
0; d
i
1s
	
and the policy instruments
predetermined in t = 0;

i; i
	
: I also solve out for the price vector using the rst order conditions of the
consumer. At the end of t = 1; banker i maximizes
max
ki1s;d
i
2s
(A+ 1  ) ki1s   di2s
subject to the collateral constraint in t = 1
di2s   (1  ) ki1s

i2s

where the Lagrangians are given in square brackets. Banker i also takes into account the period one budget
constraint
ki1sF
0  kT1s+ di1s   F 0  kT1s+ a1s    ki0 +Bis + di2s hzi;11s i
From now on till the rest of this subsection I set Bih = 0 since I assumed bail-outs are prohibitively costly
if there is no re sale (no crisis) and in Proposition 1.3.1 I prove that given Assumptions 1.1-1.6, q1h = 1
and q1l < 1 and, hence, there is no re sale in the crisis state.1 From the rst order conditions and the
1The implicit assumption is that there is a large xed cost of providing a transfer of money from the consumers to bankers
if there is no re sale (no crisis). This assumption can be relaxed and all the results remain.
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constraints one can solve for

ki1s; d
i
2s
	
as a function of the state variables and prices.
First order condition with respect to ki1s :
zi;11s =
A+ 1   + i2s (1  )
F 0
 
kT1s

+ 1N F
00  kT1s ki;T1s  > 1
The fact that zi;11s > 1 comes from the assumptions that F
0  kT1s  1; 1N F 00  kT1s ki;T1s < 0 and A   > 0
and from the fact that i2s  0:
First order condition with respect to di2s :
 1  i2s + zi;11s = 0
Next I prove that i2s > 0: Since z
i;1
1s > 1; then 
i
2s = z
i;1
1s   1 > 0 which implies that the period one
collateral constraint always binds and di2s =  (1  ) ki1s:
zi;11s =
A+ (1  ) (1  )
F 0
 
kT1s

+ 1N F
00  kT1s ki;T1s    (1  )
At the beginning of t = 1; rst, banker i repays the promised debt di1s to the consumers: After that,
if the low state is realized, the policy maker chooses Bil given the state variables

ki0; d
i
1s
	
and the policy
instruments predetermined in t = 0;

i; i
	
. He also takes into account that the rst order conditions of
banker i at the end of t = 1 which are a function of Bil . Assuming that the Central Planner places equal
weight on all all consumers who are risk neutral, the objective function of the policy maker in t = 1 in the
low state is to maximize period 2 total output (i.e. the consumption of the consumers who also own the
banks). The optimization problem of the policy maker in the beginning of t = 1 in the low state is
max
ki1l;B
i
l
2e+ F
 
kT1l
  F 0  kT1l kT1l    (Bl) + d1l   p2ld2l + d2l
+
NX
i=1
1
N
264 (A+ 1  ) ki1l   di2l  Bil+
zi;1;P1l
  
F 0
 
kT1l

+ a1l   

ki0 +B
i
l + d
i
2s   ki1lF 0
 
kT1l
  di1l
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where zi;1;P1l is the Lagrangian on the period one budget constraint in the low state which pins down k
i
1l
chosen by banker i at the end of t = 1: (A+ 1  ) ki1l di2l are the dividends paid by banker i to the equity
owners (consumers) in t = 2 in the low state, F
 
kT1l
   F 0  kT1l kT1l are the prots of the consumers from
operating their production technology if a re sale is present. d1l+d2l are the period one and two payments
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by all bankers to the consumers and p2ld2l is the amount lent to the bankers in t = 1 by the consumers:
 (Bl) +Bl is the cost of the bail out the direct cost plus the deadweight loss from taxing). I assume that
the endowment of the consumer, e; is large enough so that Bl < e+ d1l   p2ld2l:
Taking into account the fact that i2s > 0; and that p2s = 1; the optimization problem can be re-written
as
max
ki1l;B
i
l
2e+ F
 
kT1l
  F 0  kT1l kT1l    (Bl) + d1l
+
NX
i=1
1
N
264 (A+ (1  ) (1  )) ki1s  Bil+
zi;1;P1l
  
F 0
 
kT1l

+ a1l   

ki0 +B
i
l +  (1  ) ki1s   ki1lF 0
 
kT1l
  di1l
375
First order condition with respect to ki1l :
 
F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l +A+ (1  ) (1  )

+ zi;1;P1l
 
 (1  )  F 0  kT1l = F 00  kT1l NX
j=1
1
N
zj;1;P1l k
j;T
1l (A.1.1)
Since equation A.1.1 holds for every i, zi;1;P1l is the same for every i and one can simplify equation A.1.1
as
zi;1;P1l = z
1;P
1l =
F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l +A+ (1  ) (1  )
F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l + F
0  kT1l   (1  ) > 1 (A.1.2)
where z1;P1l > 1 come from the assumptions F
0  kT1s  1; 1N F 00  kT1s ki;T1s < 0 and A   > 0:
The rst order condition with respect to Bil is
1 + 0 (Bl) = z
1;P
1l
 
kT1l

(A.1.3)
The policy maker is indi¤erent whom to give the bail-out to. He wants to control the size of the re sale
given the cost of the marginal bail-out but he is indi¤erent whether he gives all the money to a single bank
or splits it equally among all banks. I will assume a symmetric equilibrium in order to solve the model, i.e.
Bil = Bl:
At the end of period t = 0; banker i chooses

ki0; d
i
1s
	
; taking as given

i; i
	
and internalizing his
e¤ect on Bil and on his own future actions. I plug in for d
i
2s and take into account that k
i
1s is pinned down
by the period one budget constraint while Bil is pinned down by the rst order condition of the policy maker
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with respect to Bil ;equation A.1.3, in the beginning of period t = 1: At the end of period t = 0; banker i
optimizes the expected value of period two dividends given by
max
ki0;d
i
1s;k
i
1s
X
s2fl;hg
s (A+ (1  ) (1  )) ki1s
subject to the period one budget constraint
ki1s
 
F 0
 
kT1s
   (1  )+ di1s   F 0  kT1s+ a1s    ki0 +Bis hszi;01s i (A.1.4)
the period zero budget constraint
ki0   n 
X
s
sd
i
1s

zi0

the period zero borrowing constraint
di1s  
 
F 0
 
kT1s
   ki0 si1s
the minimum bank capital requirement
iki0  n

i

and nally subject to the limit on put options sold by banker i (i.e. the promised payment in the crisis state
by banker i)
di1l  i

l'
i

First order condition with respect to ki0 :
X
s
sz
i;0
1s

F 0
 
kT1s

+ a1s    + 1
N
F 00
 
kT1s

ki;T1s +
@Bis
@ki0

(A.1.5)
 zi0   ii +
X
s
s
i
1s

F 0
 
kT1s
   + 1
N
F 00
 
kT1s

ki0

= 0
First order condition with respect to ki1s :
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A+ (1  ) (1  ) + zi;01s

  1
N
F 00
 
kT1s

ki;T1s +
@Bis
@ki1s
   F 0  kT1s   (1  ) (A.1.6)
+i1s

  1
N
F 00
 
kT1s

ki0

= 0
First order condition with respect to di1l :
 zi;01l + zi0   i1l   'i = 0
First order condition with respect to di1h :
 zi;01h + zi0   i1h = 0
where using equation A.1.3 one can show that @B
i
l
@ki0
= 1
00(Bil)N
@z1;P1l
@kT1l
;
@Bil
@ki1l
=   1
00(Bil)N
@z1;P1l
@kT1l
:
A.1.3 Constrained Central Planners Problem No Commitment
Since I assume no commitment, I solve the problem backwards: In period one the Central Planner maximizes
the welfare of the consumers (who are also the bank owners), which in this environment with risk neutral
consumers, coincides with maximizing aggregate output.
max
k1s;Bs;d2s
2e  ( (Bs) +Bs) + F
 
kT1s
  F 0  kT1s kT1s + d1s + (A+ 1  ) k1s   d2s
The optimization problem is subject to the collateral constraint in t = 2
d2s   (1  ) k1s
h
CP2s
i
:
The optimization problem in t = 1 is also subject to the period one budget constraint
k1sF
0  kT1s+ d1s   F 0  kT1s+ a1s    k0 +Bs + d2s hz1;CP1s i
From the rst order condition with respect to k1s
z1;CP1s =
F 00
 
kT1s

kT1s +A+ 1   + CP2s  (1  )
F 0
 
kT1s

+ F 00
 
kT1s

kT1s
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The rst order condition with respect to d2s is
z1;CP1s = 1 + 
1;CP
2s  1 (A.1.7)
First order condition with respect to Bs
z1;CP1s = 1 + 
0 (Bs)
First I prove that 1;CP2s > 0: Since q1s  1 and A + 1    + 1;CP2s  (1  ) > 1 then z1;CP1s > 1:
From equation A.1.7 1;CP2s = z
1;CP
1s   1 > 0 which completes the proof that 1;CP2s > 0. Hence, d2s =
 (1  ) k1s:Re-writing the rst order condition with respect to k1s using the fact that 1;CP2s = z1;CP1s   1
z1;CP1s =
F 00
 
kT1s

kT1s +A+ (1  ) (1  )
F 0
 
kT1s

+ F 00
 
kT1s

kT1s    (1  )
(A.1.8)
The Central Planners optimization problem in t = 0 becomes (taking into account that in equilibrium
p2s = 1 and p1s = 1)
max
k0;fk1s;d1sgs=l;h
3e 
X
1sd1s +
X
s
264 d1s   d2s + d2s + F  kT1s
 F 0  kT1s kT1s  Bs    (Bs) + (A+ 1  ) k1s   d2s
375
Using the fact that d2s =  (1  ) k1s
max
k0;fk1s;d1sgs=l;h
3e+
X
s

F
 
kT1s
  F 0  kT1s kT1s  Bs    (Bs) + (A+ (1  ) (1  )) k1s
The optimization problem is subject to the following constraints. The budget constraint in t = 1
k1s
 
F 0
 
kT1s
   (1  )+ d1s   F 0  kT1s+ a1s    k0 +Bs hsz0;CP1s i
the budget constraint in period zero
k0  n+
X
s
sd1s

zCP0

and the period one collateral constraint
d1s  
 
F 0
 
kT1s
   k0 hsCP1s i (A.1.9)
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First order condition with respect to k0 :
X
s
0BBBB@
 F 00  kT1s kT1s   @Bs@k0  1 + 0 (Bs)+
z0;CP1s

F 0
 
kT1s

+ a1s    + F 00
 
kT1s

kT1s +
@Bs
@k0

+CP1s 

F 0
 
kT1s
   + F 00  kT1s k0
1CCCCA = zCP0 (A.1.10)
where @Bs@k0 =
1
00(Bs)
@z1;CP1s
@kT1s
:First order condition with respect to k1s :
F 00
 
kT1s

kT1s  
@Bs
@k1s
 
1 + 0 (Bs)

+A+ (1  ) (1  ) (A.1.11a)
+z0;CP1s

 F 00  kT1s kT1s + @Bs@k1s    F 0  kT1s   (1  )

  CP1s  ~F 00
 
kT1s

k0 = 0
where @Bs@k1s =   100(Bs)
@z1;CP1s
@kT1s
: First order condition with respect to d1s :
zCP0   z0;CP1s   CP1s = 0
A.1.4 Proofs
Proposition 1.3.1
Proposition 1.3.1: Given Assumptions 1.1-1.7 and the Assumptions made on the functional forms of F ()
and  (), considering a symmetric equilibrium with an ex-post optimal bail-out and no ex-ante regulation:
(i) There is no re sale in the high state, q1h = 1 and there is a re sale in the low state, q1l < 1: (ii) Given
the additional Assumption 1.8 (required only for the N <1 case);
Assumption 1.8

1
N
+ 1

F 00
 
kT1l
  F 00  kT1l

1  2z1;P1l
 
kT1l

 
F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l + F
0  kT1l   (1  )2
F 00
 
kT1l

00 (Bl)N
"
4 +
000 (Bl) 
00 (Bl)
2 1  2z1;P1l 
#
< 0
and F 000
 
kT1l

= 0; the equilibrium is unique and exists and is one of the following types: Type 1) z0 =
z1l > z

1h; (

1l = 0; 

1h > 0) (interior equilibrium) Type 2) z

0 > z

1s; (

1s = 0) (corner equilibrium where
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the banker borrows to the maximum in t = 0) where
z0 =
X
s
s
264 z1s

F 0
 
kT1s

+ a1s    + 1N F 00
 
kT1s

kT1s +
1
00(Bs)N
@z1;P1s
@kT1s

+1s
 
F 0
 
kT1s
   + 1N F 00  kT1s k0
375 (A.1.12)
z1s =
A+ (1  ) (1  )  1s 1N F 00
 
kT1s

k0
1
N F
00  kT1s kT1s + 100(Bs)N @z1;P1s@kT1s + F 0  kT1s   (1  ) (A.1.13)
and z1s = z
0;
1s . The optimal bail-out is pinned down by
1 + 0 (Bl) = z
1;P
1l =
F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l +A+ (1  ) (1  )
F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l + F
0  kT1l   (1  ) (A.1.14)
where @B
i
s
@ki0
=   @Bis
@ki1s
= 100(Bs)N
@z1;P1s
@kT1s
; and the rst order conditions with respect to d2s and d1s imply
2s > 0; 

1s = z

0   z1s  0:
Before I prove Proposition 1.3.1 I prove Lemmas A.1.1 and A.1.2.
Lemma A.1.1 Conditional on Assumptions 1.1-1.6 and conditional on a re sale in the low state, kT1l > 0;
then
@Bl(kT1l)
@kT1l
> 0 and @z
1;P
1l
@kT1l
> 0:
Proof of Lemma A.1.1. From the rst order condition of the policy maker in the beginning of
t = 1 given by equations A.1.2 and A.1.3,
1 + 0 (Bl) = z
1;P
1l
 
kT1l

=
F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l +A+ (1  ) (1  )
F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l + F
0  kT1l   (1  ) > 1
Since z1;P1l > 1 (see Section A.1.2.), F
00  kT1l < 0 and also from Assumption 1.4
@z1;P1l
@kT1l
=
 
F 00
 
kT1l

+ F 000
 
kT1l

kT1l
 
1  z1;P1l
 
kT1l
  z1;P1l  kT1lF 00  kT1l
F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l + F
0  kT1l   (1  ) > 0 (A.1.15)
Since @z
1;P
1l
@kT1l
> 0 and the deadweight loss function from the bail-out is convex with respect to Bl, 
00 (Bl) > 0;
one can show that larger re sale leads to a larger optimal bail-out
@Bl
 
kT1l

@kT1l
=
1
00 (Bl)
@z1;P1l
@kT1l
> 0
Lemma A.1.2 Given Assumptions 1.1-1.7 and considering a symmetric equilibrium; there is never a re
sale in the high state, q1h = 1 and there is a re sale in the low state, q1l < 1:
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Proof of Lemma A.1.2. First, I show that assuming a symmetric equilibrium, then q1h = 1: In
Section A.1.2., I proved that the period one borrowing constraint is binding in both states of nature 2s > 0.
Therefore, taking into account that d2s =  (1  ) k1s, I can re-write the budget constraint in t = 1 and
state s as
(k1s   k0) (q1s    (1  ))  (a1s    +  (1  )) k0 +Bs   d1s
Also using the fact that the maximum promised payment in t = 1 in the high state is pinned down by the
binding borrowing constraint, d1h =  (q1h   ) k0 and also from Assumption 1.5, a1h >  then
(k1h   k0) (q1h    (1  )) = (a1h    +  (1  )) k0 +Bh   d1h  (a1h    +  (1  q1h)) k0 +Bh > 0
Since k1h   k0 > 0, there is no re sale in the high state, q1h = 1:
The proof that q1l < 1 proceeds in two steps. Step 1) First, I show that, given Assumption 1.2, if there
is no re sale in t = 1; in the low state, q1l = 1; the only possible equilibrium is the corner one where the
bankers borrow to the maximum in t = 0 (Type 2 equilibrium): This implies that if the equilibrium is not
the corner equilibrium of Type 2, then there must be a re sale in the low state. Also since k0 = 0 implies
no re sale in equilibrium (no borrowing in period zero and only lending to the maximum), proving the rst
step automatically implies that the corner solution k0 = 0 is impossible as well justifying why I ignored the
k0  0 constraint when solving for the bankers problem. Step 2) The second step is to show that given
Assumption 1.6, even if the Type 2 equilibrium is the optimal one, there will be always a re sale in t = 1 in
the low state. Steps one and two are su¢ cient to prove that there is always a re sale in equilibrium in the
crisis state given the assumptions made. Finally, via simulations I prove that the set of parameters for which
the Type 1 equilibrium is the optimal one is non-empty. Assumption 1.6 is the most general assumption
which guarantees the presence of a re sale in the crisis state.
Step 1) I will prove that conditional on Assumption 1.2 being satised, given that I proved that q1h = 1;
and if I assume that q1l = 1; then z0 > z

1s: This will imply that the only possible equilibrium if there are no
re sales is of Type 2 (the corner equilibrium): Since q1s = 1; then
@Bis
@ki1s
= 0 and F 00
 
kT1s

= 0; and one can
re-write the rst order condition with respect to k0 as
P
s s [z

1s (1 + a1s   ) + 1s (1  )] = z0 : Lets
consider all the possible cases based on all the possible combinations of 1h and 1l: Case 1) 1s = 0: If
1s = 0; then z1s = z

0 which is impossible since if Assumption 1.2 was satised then z

1s
P
s s (1 + a1s   ) =
z0 > z

1s. Case 2) 1l = 0 and 1h > 0: This case is impossible since it implies that z

0 = z

1l > z

1h = z

0 1h:
However, from the rst order condition with respect to k1s; z1l = z

1h which is a contradiction. Case 3) 1h = 0
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and 1l > 0: Similarly, the case 1h = 0 and 1l > 0 is impossible due to the same argument as to why Case
3 is impossible. Case 4) 1s > 0: This is the case where banker i borrows to the maximum in t = 0 (Type 2
equilibrium). From the rst order condition with respect to d1s; z1s + 

1s = z

0 > z

1s: One can re-write z

0
as
z0 = z

1s
P
s s [(1  ) (1  ) + a1s]
(1   (1  )) (A.1.16)
z0 > z

1s implies
P
s s [(1  ) (1  ) + a1s]
(1   (1  )) > 1 (A.1.17)
One can show that the condition z0 > z

1s is satised as long as Assumption 1.2 is satised which
completes the proof that as long as Assumption 1.2 is satised and there is no re sale, the banker always
optimally borrows to the maximum in t = 0 (the equilibrium is of Type 2):
Step 2) Next, I prove that given Assumption 1.6 and if the banker borrows to the maximum in t = 0
(the equilibrium is of Type 2), there is always a re sale in t = 1 in the low state. To do that, I show that if
the banker borrows to the maximum, there exists an unique kT;max1l and k
T;max
1l > 0:
To solve for kmax0 as a function of k
T;max
1l I use the period zero budget constraint k
max
0 =
P
s s (q1s   ) kmax0 +
n (imposing the condition that the period zero borrowing constraints are binding):
kmax0 =
n
1  h (1  )  l
 
F 0
 
kT1l
   (A.1.18)
First, I prove by contradiction that if kT1l exists, then k
T
1l > 0. Assume that k
T
1l = 0; and banker i borrows
to the maximum in t = 0: Re-writing the budget constraint in the low state in t = 1
k1l (1   (1  )) = (a1l + (1  ) (1  ))n
1   (1  ) +
 
0
 1 A  
1   (1  )

=
(a1l   )n
1   (1  ) + ( + (1  ) (1  )) k
max
0 +
 
0
 1 A  
1   (1  )

Given Assumption 1.6,
(k1l   kmax0 ) (1   (1  )) =
(a1l   )n
1   (1  ) +
 
0
 1 A  
1   (1  )

< 0
which implies that k1l  kmax0 =  kT1l < 0: This contradicts the assumption that kT1l = 0: Therefore, if kT1l
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exists and the banker borrows to the maximum in t = 0; then kT1l > 0:
Next I prove existence and uniqueness of kT;max1l = k
T
1l (k
max
0 ). Due to Part 1) I can focus only on the
range kT1l 2 (0; kmax0 ]. Using the fact that d1s =  (1  ) kmax1s and d2s =  (q1s   ) kmax0 and from the
period one budget constraint in the low state
H
 
kT1l; k0 = k
max
0

=
 
a1l    +  (1  )  
 
F 0
 
kT1l
   kmax0 +Bl  kT1l+  F 0  kT1l   (1  ) kT1l
(A.1.19)
Next, I prove that H

kT;max1l = k
max
0 ; k0 = k
max
0

> 0, H
 
kT1l = 0; k0 = k
max
0

< 0 and
@H(kT1l)
@kT1l
> 0: This
guarantees that there exists an unique kT;max1l > 0:
H
 
kT1l = k
max
0 ; k0 = k
max
0

= (a1l + (F
0 (kmax0 )  ) (1  )) kmax0 +Bl (kmax0 ) > 0
Given Assumption 1.6
H
 
kT1l = 0; k0 = k
max
0

=
(a1l   )n
1   (1  ) +
 
0
 1 A  
1   (1  )

< 0 (A.1.20)
Since F 00
 
kT1l

< 0; B0l
 
kT1l

> 0 (derived in Lemma A.1.1) ; from Assumption 1.4, and since Assumption
1.3 implies 
 
1  F 0  kT1l <  (1  ) <    a1l; then one can show that
@H
 
kT1l

@kT1l
=  F 00  kT1l kmax0 +  a1l    +   1  F 0  kT1l @kmax0  kT1l@kT1l
+B0l
 
kT1l

+ F 0
 
kT1l
   (1  ) + F 00  kT1l kT1l > 0
where after di¤erentiating equation A.1.18
@kmax0
 
kT1l

@kT1l
=
lF
00  kT1l kmax0
1  h (1  )  l
 
F 0
 
kT1l
   < 0 if kT1l > 0
The re sale that will emerge in equilibrium if the bank borrows to the maximum in t = 0 is pinned down
by H
 
kT1l; k0 = k
max
0

= 0: This completes the proof that given Assumptions 1.1-1.6 there exists an unique
equilibrium kT;max1l and k
T;max
1l > 0 (i.e. q1l (k
max
0 ) < 1).
Proof of Proposition 1.3.1.
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PART 1) First, I prove that the only two types of equilibria that can emerge are of Type 1 and Type 2.
In order to characterize the equilibrium, I consider all four possible combinations of whether the La-
grangians on the period one borrowing constraint, 1h and 1l; are greater than or equal to zero (given that
I already proved that the period 2 borrowing constraints are always binding 2s > 0). First lets consider the
case 1s = 0 (z

1h = z

0 = z

1l) and prove that given Assumption 1.2 this case will never be an equilibrium. If
the policy maker does not have an access to ex-ante regulatory instruments, one can re-write the rst order
conditions of the banker with respect to k1s and k0 as
From the rst order condition with respect to k0
z1l =
A+ (1  ) (1  )
1
N F
00  kT1l kT1l + 100(Bl)N @z1;P1l@kT1l + F 0  kT1l   (1  ) =
A+ (1  ) (1  )
1   (1  ) = z

1h (A.1.21)
1  F 0  kT1l = 1N
"
F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l +
1
00
 
Bil
 @z1;P1l
@kT1l
#
From the rst order condition with respect to k1s
A+ (1  ) (1  ) + z0
X
s
s ( (1  ) + a1s   ) = z0 (A.1.22)
Plugging z1h = z

1l = z

0 =
A+(1 )(1 )
1 (1 ) in equation A.1.22 and simplifying implies 1 =
P
s s (1 + a1s   ) :
However, given Assumption 1.2, the equation above will not be satised and hence 1s = 0 will not be
an equilibrium given the assumptions made.
Finally, I show that the case 1h = 0; 

1l > 0 (z

1h = z

0 > z

1l) is impossible. 

1l = z

0   z1l and
z1h =
A+(1 )(1 )
1 (1 ) and
z1l =
A+ (1  ) (1  )  z1h 1N F 00
 
kT1l

k0
$
 
kT1l
 (A.1.23)
where $
 
kT1l

=
h
1
N F
00  kT1l kT1l + 100(Bl)N @z1;P1l@kT1l + F 0  kT1l   (1  )   1N F 00  kT1l k0i > 0:
In order for z1h > z

1l; it will have to be the case z

1h >
A+(1 )(1 )
$(kT1l)
which implies
1
N
F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l +
1
00 (Bl)N
@z1;P1l
@kT1l
+ F 0
 
kT1l
  1 > 0 (A.1.24)
Re-writing the rst order condition with respect to k0 and using the fact that z1h = z

0
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z0 =
lz

1l
 
$
 
kT1l

+ 
 
1  F 0  kT1l+ a1l   
1  l
 
F 0
 
kT1l
   + 1N F 00  kT1l k0  h (1 + a1h   ) (A.1.25)
where z1l is given by
z1l =
A+ (1  ) (1  )  z0 1N F 00
 
kT1s

k0
$
 
kT1l
 (A.1.26)
Combining equations A.1.25 and A.1.26 one can solve for z0
z0 =
l [A+ (1  ) (1  )]

1 +
[(1 F 0(kT1l))+a1l ]
$(kT1l)


1  l
 
F 0
 
kT1l
    h (1 + a1h   ) + l 1N F 00  kT1s k0 [(1 F 0(kT1l))+a1l ]$(kT1l)
 (A.1.27)
Next I prove that given Assumption 1.2 and Assumption 1.3 the inequality A.1.24, it will be impossible
that z0 = z

1h =
A+(1 )(1 )
1 (1 ) where z

0 is given by equation A.1.27. Equating z

0 = z

1h and simplifying one
gets
0 < LHS =
"X
s
s (1 + a1s   )
#
  1 =0B@ 1N F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l +
1
00(Bl)N
@z1;P1l
@kT1l
+ F 0
 
kT1l
  1
$
 
kT1l

1CAl   1  F 0  kT1l+ a1l    = RHS < 0
where


 
1  F 0  kT1l+ a1l    < [ (1  ) + a1l   ] < 0: Since it is impossible for both LHS > 0 and
RHS < 0; the case 1h = 0; 

1l > 0 will never be an equilibrium outcome. Next, I consider the remaining
two cases which can occur in equilibrium.
Type 1 equilibrium: 1h > 0; 

1l = 0 (z

1l = z

0 > z

1h) Using the fact that 

1h = z

0 z1h and rewriting
equations A.1.5 and A.1.6; one can show that z1h =
A+(1 )(1 )
1 (1 ) ,
z0 =
hz

1h [(1  ) (1  ) + a1h] + l (A+ (1  ) (1  )) + l (a1l +  (1  )  ) z1l
[1  h (1  )] (A.1.28)
and
z1l =
A+ (1  ) (1  )
1
N F
00  kT1l kT1l + 100(Bl)N @z1;P1l@kT1l + F 0  kT1l   (1  ) : (A.1.29)
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Using the equations above, one can solve for kT1l : In order for z

1l > z

1h; it has to be the case that
z1l >
A+(1 )(1 )
1 (1 ) which implies
1
N
F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l +
1
00 (Bl)N
@z1;P1l
@kT1l
+ F 0
 
kT1l
  1 < 0 (A.1.30)
The rest of the endogenous variables are given by the following system of equations.
k0 =
lBl + n+

F 0
 
kT1l
   (1  ) kT1ll
(1  h (1  ) + (   a1l    (1  ))l) (A.1.31)
k1l = k0   kT1l (A.1.32)
k1h =
((1  ) (1  ) + a1h) k0
[1   (1  )] (A.1.33)
d2s =  (1  ) k1s; d1l = 1
l
[(k0   n)  h (1  ) k0] (A.1.34)
d1h =  (1  ) k0 (A.1.35)
and Bl =
 
0
 1 
z1;P1l
 
kT1l
  1 : Finally p1s = p2s = 1 and q1h = 1; q1l = F 0  kT1l :
Type 2 equilibrium: 1s > 0 (z

0 > z

1s)
It will be the case that 1s = z

0   z1s and using the rst order conditions with respect to k0 and k1s;
equations A.1.5 and A.1.6, one can solve for z1s and z

0 as a function of k
T
1l: The rest of the endogenous
variables d2s; d1s; k1l; k1h and Bl are pinned down by the falling system of equations: k
T;max
1l is determined
by the solution to the equation H

kT;max1l ; k0 = k
max
0

= 0 where H () is given by equation A.1.19. kmax0
is given by equation A.1.18. Also d1s =  (q1s   ) k0; d2s =  (1  ) k1s and
k1l =
  
F 0
 
kT1l
   (1  ) + a1l k0 +Bl
F 0
 
kT1l
   (1  )
k1h =
((1  ) (1  ) + a1h) k0
[1   (1  )]
and Bl =
 
0
 1 
z1;P1l
 
kT1l
  1 : Finally p1s = p2s = 1 and q1h = 1; q1l = F 0  kT1l :
PART 2) Existence and Uniqueness
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The proof of existence and uniqueness proceeds in two steps.
Step 1) One can solve for the equilibrium by solving for k0. First, I show that for every k0 2 [0; kmax0 ]
there exists an unique kT1l: I will consider two regions for k0 separately. If the equilibrium k0 is such that
k0 2 [0; k^0] then there will be no re sale, kT1l = 0; where I will derive k^0 as a function of exogenous variables.
If the equilibrium k0 is such that k0 2 (k^0; kmax0 ] then there will be a re sale kT1l > 0 and kT1l is unique. Also
I prove that @k
T
1l(k0)
@k0
> 0:
Step 2) Prove existence and uniqueness using Step 1.
Step 1) Since I proved that the only possible case is 1h > 0; 2s > 0 (which encompasses the Type 1
and 2 equilibria), from the period zero budget constraint and the period zero borrowing constraint
d1l
 
kT1l; k0

= min

1
l
[k0 [1  h (1  )]  n] ; 
 
F 0
 
kT1l
   k0
From the budget constraint in the low state in t = 1, dene
H
 
kT1l; k0

= (a1l    +  (1  )) k0 +
 
F 0
 
kT1l
   (1  ) kT1l +Bl  kT1l  d1l  kT1l; k0
where Bl
 
kT1l

implies that the bail-out is a function of the re sale in the low state. Next, consider how
the function H
 
kT1l; k0

behaves in the range kT1l 2 [0; k0] : First I show that H
 
kT1l = k0; k0

> 0 for every
k0
H
 
kT1l = k0; k0

= (a1l    + F 0 (k0)) k0 +Bl (k0)  d1l (k0; k0)
 (a1l + (F 0 (k0)  ) (1  )) k0 +Bl (k0) > 0
where for the rst inequality I used the fact that d1l
 
kT1l; k0
   (q1l   ) k0:Next I show thatH  kT1l = 0; k0 >
0 if k0 2 [0; k^0] and H
 
kT1l = 0; k0

< 0 if k0 2 (k^0; kmax0 ]:
Since I already showed that if k0 = kmax0 ; H
 
kT1l = 0; k0 = k
max
0

< 0 (inequality A.1.20), here consider
only the case k0 2 [0; kmax0 ); which implies that d1l
 
kT1l; k0

= 1l [k0 [1  h (1  )]  n]
H
 
kT1l = 0; k0

= (a1l    +  (1  )) k0 +Bl (0)  1
l
[k0 [1  h (1  )]  n]
=
1
l
[f(a1l   )l   [1   (1  )]g k0 + n] +
 
0
 1 A  
1   (1  )

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Since (a1l   )l   [1   (1  )] < 0; @H(k
T
1l=0;k0)
@k0
< 0. One can show that
H
 
kT1l = 0; k0
8><>: > 0 if k0  k^0< 0 if k0 > k^0
where
k^0 =
n+ l
 
0
 1  A 
1 (1 )

[1   (1  )] + (   a1l)l (A.1.36)
I prove that H
 
kT1l; k0

is continuous in kT1l and
@H(kT1l;k0)
@kT1l
> 0: The continuity of H
 
kT1l; k0

follows from
Bl
 
kT1l

and F 0
 
kT1l

being continuous with respect to kT1l: From Assumption 1.4 and Lemma A.1.1,
@H
 
kT1l; k0

@kT1l
=
8><>: F
0  kT1l   (1  ) + F 00  kT1l kT1l + @Bl(kT1l)@kT1l > 0 if kT1l > 0
0 if kT1l = 0
Since In the region k0 2 [0; k^0]; H
 
kT1l = 0; k0

> 0 and H
 
kT1l = k0; k0

> 0 and since
@H(kT1l;k0)
@kT1l
 0; it
follows that kT1l (k0) = 0 if k0 2 [0; k^0]: In the region k0 2 (k^0; kmax0 ], H
 
kT1l = 0; k0

< 0, H
 
kT1l = k0; k0

>
0,
@H(kT1l;k0)
@kT1l
> 0 and H
 
kT1l; k0

is continuous: As a result, there exists an unique kT1l (k0) > 0 if k0 2
(k^0; k
max
0 ]: This completes the proof that for every k0 2 [0; kmax0 ] there exists an unique kT1l  0:
I totally di¤erentiateH (k0) = 0 with respect to k0 to solve for
@kT1l(k0)
@k0
in the relevant range k0 2 (k^0; kmax0 ]
where there is a re sale:(This is the only relevant range since I already proved that given the assumptions
made, there is a re sale in the low state in t = 1:) In that range, for a given k0; kT1l is pinned down by
setting H
 
kT1l; k0

= 0:
Totally di¤erentiate H
 
kT1l; k0

= 0 with respect to k0: From Lemma A.1.1 and also from Assumption
1.3 and Assumption 1.4
@kT1l (k0)
@k0
=
8><>:
1
l
[1 h(1 )] (a1l +(1 ))
F 0(kT1l) (1 )+F 00(kT1l)kT1l+B0l(kT1l)
> 0 if k0 2 (k^0; kmax0 ]
0 if k0 2 [0; k^0]
Step 2) I already proved that given the assumptions made, the only two types of equilibria are an
equilibrium of Type 1 (interior equilibrium) and Type 2 (corner equilibrium). In order to prove existence
and uniqueness I dene the following function
  (k0) = z1l
 
kT0
  z0 (k0)
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where z1l
 
kT0

and z0 (k0) are the marginal value of wealth in the crisis state and in period zero as perceived
by the banker and as dened in the equilibrium of Type 1 (equations A.1.29 and A.1.28).
I will prove that   (k0) is strictly increasing and crosses the zero line at most once. Lets start with the
proof that   (k0) is strictly increasing and crosses the zero line at most once. In Step 1, I proved that there
is a one-to-one mapping from kT1l to k0 and one can solve for k0 as a function of k
T
1l using equation A.1.31
if the equilibrium is of Type 1. Also if there is a re sale in the crisis sate, which is the relevant region,
@kT1l(k0)
@k0
> 0: Since both z1l and z

0 are functions only of k
T
1l which, in turn, is a function of k0; I can re-write
 
 
kT1l (k0)

as
 
 
kT1l (k0)

= z1l
 
kT1l (k0)
  z0  kT1l (k0)
Dene
M
 
kT1l

=
1
N
F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l +
1
00 (Bl)N
@z1;P1l
@kT1l
+ F 0
 
kT1l
  1
Inequality A.1.30 implies that if the equilibrium is of Type 1, then M
 
kT1l

< 0: In order to derive the
support of the  
 
kT1l (k0)

function, lets investigate the properties of M
 
kT1l

in the range kT1l 2 [0; kT;max1l ]
so that we can derive for what values of kT1l; M
 
kT1l

< 0.2 First I show that given Assumption 1.7M 0
 
kT1l

<
0:3
2kT;max1l is pinned down by setting equation A.1.19 equal to zero (I already proved that k
T;max
1l exists and is unique)
3
M 0

kT1l

=

1
N
+ 1

F 00

kT1l

+
1
N
F 000

kT1l

kT1l +
"
1
00 (Bl)N
@z1;P1l
@kT1l@k
T
1l
  
000 (Bl)
(00 (Bl))
2N
@Bl
@kT1l
@z1;P1l
@kT1l
#
=

1
N
+ 1

F 00

kT1l

 
F 00
 
kT1l
 
1  2z1;P1l
 
kT1l

 
F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l + F
0  kT1l   (1  )2
F 00
 
kT1l

00 (Bl)N
"
4 +
000 (Bl)
(00 (Bl))
2

1  2z1;P1l
#
< 0
where
@z1;P1l
@kT1l
=
F 00
 
kT1l
 
1  2z1;P1l
 
kT1l

F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l + F
0  kT1l   (1  ) > 0
@z1;P1l
@kT1l@k
T
1l
=
 4F 00  kT1l
F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l + F
0  kT1l   (1  )
@z1;P1l
@kT1l
@Bl
 
kT1l

@kT1l
=
1
00 (Bl)
@z1;P1l
@kT1l
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M 0
 
kT1l

=

1
N
+ 1

F 00
 
kT1l

+
1
N
F 000
 
kT1l

kT1l +
"
1
00 (Bl)N
@z1;P1l
@kT1l@k
T
1l
  
000 (Bl) 
00 (Bl)
2
N
@Bl
@kT1l
@z1;P1l
@kT1l
#
=

1
N
+ 1

F 00
 
kT1l
  F 00  kT1l

1  2z1;P1l
 
kT1l
 F 00(kT1l)
00(Bl)N
h
4 + 
000(Bl)
(00(Bl))2

1  2z1;P1l
i
 
F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l + F
0  kT1l   (1  )2 < 0
where
@z1;P1l
@kT1l
=
F 00
 
kT1l
 
1  2z1;P1l
 
kT1l

F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l + F
0  kT1l   (1  ) > 0
@z1;P1l
@kT1l@k
T
1l
=
 4F 00  kT1l
F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l + F
0  kT1l   (1  ) @z
1;P
1l
@kT1l
> 0
@Bl
 
kT1l

@kT1l
=
1
00 (Bl)
@z1;P1l
@kT1l
> 0
If M () < 0 for every kT1l 2
h
0; kT;max1l
i
then ~kT1l = 0: If M () > 0 for every kT1l 2
h
0; kT;max1l
i
then
~kT1l = k
T;max
1l : Otherwise ~k
T
1l is pinned down byM

~kT1l

= 0. ~kT1l is unique sinceM
0  kT1l is strictly decreasing
due to Assumption 1.7 and the assumption that F 000
 
kT1l

= 0.4
Therefore the relevant range we need to consider for the  
 
kT1l (k0)

function is kT1l 2 [~k0; kmax0 ] where
~k0 = k0

~kT1l

if 0 < ~kT1l < k
T;max
1l ;
~k0 = 0 if ~kT1l = 0 and ~k0 = k
max
0 if ~k
T
1l = k
T;max
1l : Also k
max
0 is given by
equation A.1.18. Notice that in the case of a continuum of banks, N !1; ~k0 = 0:
 
 
kT1l (k0)

= z1l
 
kT1l (k0)
  z0  kT1l (k0) if kT1l 2 [~k0; kmax0 ]
 
 
kT1l (k0)

=
z1l [1   (1  )  l (a1l   )]  z1h [h [(1  ) (1  ) + a1h] + l (1   (1  ))]
[1  h (1  )]
(A.1.37)
Given Assumption 1.7 which implies
@
 
1
N F
00(kT1l)k
T
1l+
1
00(Bl)N
@z
1;P
1l
@kT
1l
+F 0(kT1l)
!
@kT1l
< 0, I can di¤erentiate equa-
tion A.1.29
4The assumption F 000
 
kT1l

= 0 can be relaxed. It would be su¢ cient that F 000
 
kT1l

is fairly small.
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@z1l (k0)
@k0
=
 
@
 
1
N F
00(kT1l)k
T
1l+
1
00(Bl)N
@z
1;P
1l
@kT
1l
+F 0(kT1l)
!
@kT1l
@kT1l(k0)
@k0
z1l (k0)h
1
N F
00  kT1l kT1l + 100(Bl)N @z1;P1l@kT1l + F 0  kT1l   (1  )i > 0
Combining equations A.1.29 and A.1.28
@ 
 
kT1l (k0)

@k0
=
@z1l (k0)
@k0
  @z

0 (k0)
@k0
=
@z1l (k0)
@k0

1   (1  ) + l (   a1l)
[1  h (1  )]

> 0
Next, evaluate  
 
kT1l

at kT1l = ~k
T
1l and k
T
1l = k
T;max
1l which is the relevant range for the Type 1 equilibrium:
If kT1l = ~k
T
1l; then z

1l

~kT1l

= A+(1 )(1 )1 (1 ) : Given Assumption 1.2
 

~kT1l

=
A+ (1  ) (1  )
1   (1  )
1 Ps s (a1s    + 1)
1  h (1  ) < 0
If  
 
kT1l

< 0 for every kT1l 2 [~kT1l; kT;max1l ]; then the equilibrium is a corner equilibrium of Type 2. If
 

kT;max1l

> 0; the equilibrium is an interior equilibrium of Type 1. This completes the proof of existence
and uniqueness.
Proposition 1.3.2
Proposition 1.3.2: (i) Given Assumptions 1.1-1.7 and the assumptions made on the functional forms
of F () and  () ; there is never a re sale in the high state, q1h = 1 and there is a re sale in the low
state, q1l < 1:(ii)The equilibrium of the constrained Central Planners problem exists and is unique and is
one of the following types: Type 1) zCP0 = z
CP
1l > z
CP
1h (interior equilibrium); Type 2) z
CP
0 > z
CP
1s (corner
equilibrium where the banker borrows to the maximum in t = 0) where zCP1s = z
0;CP
1s . The optimal bail-out
is determined by
1 + 0 (Bl) = z
1;CP
1l (A.1.38)
(iii) If also the following assumption
[h (a1h   ) + 1   (1  )] A+ (1  ) (1  )
1   (1  ) (Assumption 1.9)
<
F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l +A+ (1  ) (1  )
F 0
 
kT1l

+ F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l    (1  )
[l (   a1l) + 1   [1  ]] (A.1.39)
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is satised where kT1l = k
T;max
1l , the only possible equilibrium is the interior equilibrium of Type 1 where
X
s
  F 00  kT1s kT1s + zCP1s  F 0  kT1s+ a1s    + F 00  kT1s kT1s+ hCP1h  [1  ] = zCP0 (A.1.40)
zCP1h =
A+ (1  ) (1  )
1   (1  ) (A.1.41)
z1;CP1l = z
CP
1l =
F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l +A+ (1  ) (1  )
F 0
 
kT1l
   (1  ) + F 00  kT1l kT1l (A.1.42)
and the rst order conditions with respect to d2s and d1s imply 
CP
2s > 0; 
CP
1l = 0; 
CP
1h = z
CP
0   zCP1h  0:
Before I prove Proposition 1.3.2 I prove Lemmas A.1.3 and A.1.4.
Lemma A.1.3 Conditional on Assumptions 1.1-1.6 and conditional on a re sale in the low state,
@Bl(kT1l)
@kT1l
>
0 and @z
1;CP
1l
@kT1l
> 0:
Proof of Lemma A.1.3. The proof is identical to the proof of Lemma A.1.1 since z1;CP1l
 
kT1l

=
z1;P1l
 
kT1l

:
Lemma A.1.4 Given Assumption 1.5, considering a symmetric equilibrium; there is never a re sale in the
high state, q1h = 1: Given Assumption 1.2 and also given the additional Assumption 1.6, it is always the
case that there is a re sale in the low state, q1l < 1:
Proof of Lemma A.1.4. The proof that q1h = 1 is identical to the one in Lemma A.1.1. The proof
that q1l < 1 is very similar since one can re-write the rst order conditions of the Central Planners problem,
assuming that q1l = 1; as
X
s

 @Bs
@k0
 
1 + 0 (Bs)

+ zCP1s

1 + a1s    + @Bs
@k0

+ CP1s  [1  ]

= zCP0
since z1;CP1l
 
kT1l

= A+(1 )(1 )1 (1 ) implies that
@z1;CP1s
@kT1s
= 0; @Bs@k0 =
1
00(Bs)
@z1;CP1s
@kT1s
= 0 and @Bs@k1s =
  100(Bs)
@z1;CP1s
@kT1s
= 0: As a result,
X
s

zCP1s (1 + a1s   ) + CP1s  [1  ]

= zCP0
where A+(1 )(1 )1 (1 ) = z
CP
1s and z
CP
0   zCP1s = CP1s : The equations above coincide with the equations in the
proof of Lemma A.1.2, Step 1. The rest of the proof is identical to the proof in Lemma A.1.2.
Proof of Proposition 1.3.2:
Part 1) First I prove that the only two types of equilibria possible are of Type 1 and 2 and the proof is
similar to the proof in Proposition 1.3.1
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In order to characterize the equilibrium, I consider all four possible combinations of whether 1h and 1l
are greater than or equal to zero.
If 1h = 0; 1l = 0 then zCP1h = z
CP
1l = z
CP
0 : Plugging equation A.1.8 in equation A.1.11a one gets
zCP1s
 
kT1s

=
F 00(kT1s)k
T
1s+A+(1 )(1 )
F 00(kT1s)kT1s+F 0(kT1s) (1 )
: However, since there is a re sale only in the low state and no re
sale in the high state, then one can prove that zCP1l =
F 00(kT1l)k
T
1l+A+(1 )(1 )
F 00(kT1l)kT1l+F 0(kT1l) (1 )
> A+(1 )(1 )1 (1 ) = z
CP
1h : This
is true since
 
1  F 0  kT1l (A+ (1  ) (1  )) > (A  )F 00  kT1l kT1l: Hence it will never be the case that
1h = 0; 1l = 0:
If 1h = 0; 1l > 0, then zCP1h = z
CP
0 =
A+(1 )(1 )
1 (1 ) and z
CP
0   1l = zCP1l < zCP1h .
zCP1l =
F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l   @Bl@k1l z
1;CP
1l +A+ (1  ) (1  )  zCP0  ~F 00
 
kT1l

k0
F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l   @Bl@k1l + F 0
 
kT1s
   (1  )   ~F 00  kT1l k0 (A.1.43)
I prove by contradiction that it is impossible that zCP1l < z
CP
1h . After plugging in z
1;CP
1l given by equation
A.1.8 in equation A.1.43 and taking into account that zCP1h = z
CP
0 , one can re-write the inequality z
CP
1l < z
CP
1h
as
F 00(kT1l)k
T
1l+A+(1 )(1 )
F 0(kT1l) (1 )+F 00(kT1l)kT1l
< zCP1h =
A+(1 )(1 )
1 (1 ) which is a contradiction: As a result, it is impossible
that 1h = 0; 1l > 0:
Type 1 equilibrium: 1h > 0; 1l = 0
 
zCP0 = z
CP
1l > z
CP
1h

Notice that zCP0 = z
CP
1l = z
CP
1h + 
CP
1h > z
CP
1h and from the rst order condition with respect to k1h;
zCP1h =
A+(1 )(1 )
1 (1 )
zCP0 =
hz
CP
1h ((1  ) (1  ) + a1h) + l
 
A+ (1  ) (1  ) + zCP1l [ (1  ) + a1l   ]

(1  h [1  ]) (A.1.44)
Plugging in for z1;CP1l ; from the rst order condition with respect to k1l
z1;CP1l = z
CP
1l =
F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l +A+ (1  ) (1  )
F 0
 
kT1l
   (1  ) + F 00  kT1l kT1l (A.1.45)
The rest of the variables are determined by the same set of equations as the ones in the Type 1 equilibrium
in Proposition 1.3.1. The equilibrium of Type 1 is possible since we already proved that zCP1l > z
CP
1h :
Type 2 equilibrium: If 1h > 0; 1l > 0
 
zCP0 > z
CP
1l > z
CP
1h

Since I already proved that 2s > 0; in this type of equilibrium the banker borrows to the maximum in
t = 0.
Next I prove existence and uniqueness.
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As in the proof of Proposition 1.3.1, one can show that for every k0 2 [0; kmax0 ] there exists an unique kT1l
and if the equilibrium k0 is such that k0 2 (k^0; kmax0 ] then there will be a re sale, kT1l > 0; where k^0 is pinned
down by equation A.1.36. Also as in Proposition 1.3.1, one can prove that @k
T
1l(k0)
@k0
> 0 if k0 2 (k^0; kmax0 ]:
I take into account that it will be always the case that CPth > 0; 
CP
2l > 0: Consider the interior equilibrium
of Type 1 which implies CP1l = 0:Following the same steps as in the Proof of Proposition 1.3.1, dene the
following function which will be used to pin down the equilibrium k0
 CP (k0) = z
CP
1l (k0)  zCP0 (k0) if k0 2 [k^0; kmax0 ] (A.1.46)
where zCP0 (k0) and z
CP
1l (k0) are given by equations A.1.44 and A.1.45. If  
CP (k0) = 0; then the equilibrium
is interior and of Type 1. If for every k0 in the range [k^0; kmax0 ];  
CP (k0) < 0 then the equilibrium is a
corner equilibrium where it is optimal to borrow to the maximum in period zero against the high and the
low states. I will show that given the assumptions made, it will be never the case that  CP (k0) > 0 for all
k0 2 [k^0; kmax0 ]. Since @k
T
1l(k0)
@k0
> 0 and since zCP1l = z
1;CP
1l in the interior equilibrium.
@zCP1l (k0)
@k0
=
@kT1l (k0)
@k0
zCP1l
@kT1l
> 0
where z
CP
1l
@kT1l
=
@z1;P1l
@kT1l
> 0 and is given by equation A.1.15
 CP (k0) =
zCP1l (k0) (1   [1  ]  l [a1l   ])  hzCP1h ((1  ) (1  ) + a1h)  l (A+ (1  ) (1  ))
(1  h [1  ])
@ CP (k0)
@k0
=
@zCP1l (k0)
@k0

1   (1  ) + l (   a1l)
[1  h (1  )]

> 0
Next I show that given the assumptions made, it will be never the case that   (k0) > 0 for all k0 2
[k^0; k
max
0 ]: I already proved that
@ (k0)
@k0
> 0: As a result, its su¢ cient to prove that  

k0 = k^0

< 0: Since
by denition if k0=k^0; there will be no re sale in the low state,
 CP

k0 = k^0

=
zCP1h [1 
P
s((1 )(1 )+a1s) [1 ]]
(1 h[1 ]) < 0. As a result, the only possible equilibria are
either borrow to the maximum against both states in period zero (z0 > z

1l > z

1h) or the interior equilibrium
(z0 = z

1l > z

1h). Given that  
0 (k0) > 0 in the relevant range k0 2 [k^0; kmax0 ], the interior equilibrium exists
and is unique:
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Finally, I prove that Assumption 1.9 ensures that an equilibrium of Type 2 never occurs. Consider the
case where ts > 0 and assume that Assumption 1.6 is satised which implies that even if the equilibrium is
of Type 2 there will be a re sale in the crisis state. It is su¢ cient to show that given Assumption 1.9, it is
always the case that z0;CP1l = z
CP
1l > z
CP
0 and, as a result, equilibrium of Type 2 will never occur. One can
show that zCP1l   zCP0 > 0 by re-writing the rst order conditions of the Central Planner
zCP0 =
h
A+(1 )(1 )
1 (1 ) ((1  ) (1  ) + a1h) +
l
0B@ F 00  kT1l kT1l   @Bl@k0 z1;CP1l + z0;CP1l
0B@ F 0  kT1l+ a1l    + F 00  kT1l kT1l
+@Bl@k0   

F 0
 
kT1l
   + F 00  kT1l k0
1CA
1CA
 
1  h [1  ]  l

F 0
 
kT1l
   + F 00  kT1l k0 (A.1.47)
F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l +A+ (1  ) (1  ) (A.1.48a)
+z0;CP1l

 F 00  kT1l kT1l + @Bl@k1l    F 0  kT1l   (1  )

 

zCP0   z0;CP1l

 ~F 00
 
kT1l

k0 =
@Bl
@k1l
z1;CP1l

zCP0   z0;CP1l

=
[h (a1h   ) + 1   (1  )] A+(1 )(1 )1 (1 ) + z0;CP1l [l (a1l   )  1 +  [1  ]] 
1  h [1  ]  l

F 0
 
kT1l
   < 0
(A.1.49)
if
[h (a1h   ) + 1   (1  )] A+ (1  ) (1  )
1   (1  ) < z
0;CP
1l [l (   a1l) + 1   [1  ]]
Since z0;CP1l > z
1;CP
1l =
F 00(kT1l)k
T
1l+A+(1 )(1 )
F 0(kT1l)+F 00(kT1l)kT1l (1 )
; a su¢ cient condition is given by Assumption 1.9.
Corollary 1.4.1
Corollary 1.4.1: Conditional on Assumptions 1.1-1.7 and the assumptions made on the functional forms
of F () and  (), also conditional on an interior equilibrium for the Central Planner (Assumption 1.9 is
satised) and given Assumption 1.10, (a su¢ cient and necessary condition only for the N <1 case)
1
00 (Bl)N
@z1;P1l
@kT1l
zCP1l >

1  1
N

zCP1l   1

F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l Assumption 10
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the Central Planner values an extra dollar in the hands of the banker in the crisis state by more than the
banker in the decentralized equilibrium does, for a given k0.
zCP1l > z

1l
Proof of Corollary 1.4.1:
zCP1l =
F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l +A+ (1  ) (1  )
F 0
 
kT1l
   (1  ) + F 00  kT1l kT1l
>
A+ (1  ) (1  )
1
N F
00  kT1l kT1l + 100(Bl)N @z1;P1l@kT1l + F 0  kT1l   (1  ) = z

1l
which can be re-written as
"
1
N
  1

F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l +
1
00 (Bl)N
@z1;P1l
@kT1l
#
zCP1l >  F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l
If N !1, zCP1l > z1l is always true since zCP1l > 1: If N <1; then in order for zCP1l > z1l; Assumption
1.10 has to be satised.
If N = 2 and the country has zero scal capacity a su¢ cient condition is 2 < A+ (1  ) (1 + ) since
F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l + 2F
0  kT1l < 2 < A+ (1  ) (1 + )
Since there is a one to one mapping between k0 and kT1l; the result is true for a given k0 as well.
Proposition 1.5.1
Proposition 1.5.1: Given Assumptions 1.1-1.8, Assumption 1.10 and the assumptions made on the func-
tional forms of F () and  (), for a given exogenous minimum bank capital requirement such that  > nk0 (=0)
and considering a symmetric equilibrium, the decentralized equilibrium can be one of the following four types:
Type 1)z1l
 
kT1l ()

= z0
 
kT1l ()

> z1h if k
T
1l () 2 [~kT1l; k^T;max1l )
Type 2) z0
 
kT1l ()

> z1s
 
kT1l ()

if kT1l () = k
T;max
1l
Type 3) z1l
 
kT1l ()

= z0
 
kT1l ()

= z1h if k
T
1l () =
~kT1l
Type 4) z1h = z

0
 
kT1l ()

> z1l
 
kT1l ()

if kT1l () 2 [0; ~kT1l) where kT;max1l is determined in Section A.1.4
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in the Appendix. ~kT1l is unique and exists and if 0 < ~k
T
1l < k
T;max
1l ;
~kT1l is determined by M

~kT1l

= 0 where
M
 
kT1l

=
1
N
F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l +
1
00 (Bl)N
@z1;P1l
@kT1l
+ F 0
 
kT1l
  1:
k0 ( = 0) is the optimal period zero investment chosen by the banker if there is no minimum capital require-
ment.
Proof of Proposition 1.5.1:. The proof that ~kT1l is unique and exists is provided in the proof of
Proposition 1.3.1. Since the minimum capital requirement constraint is binding, k0 is pinned down by
k0 () =
n
 : Lets consider the di¤erent types of equilibria.
Equilibrium of Type 1: If 1h > 0; 

1l = 0 (z

1l = z

0 > z

1h)
kT1l () is pinned down from the budget constraint in the low state in t = 1
LHS = [1   (1  ) + l (   a1l)] n

  n = (A.1.50)
l

kT1l
 
F 0
 
kT1l
   (1  )+Bl  kT1l = RHS  kT1l (A.1.51)
@RHS
@kT1l
= l

F 0
 
kT1l
   (1  ) + kT1lF 00  kT1l+B0l  kT1l > 0
RHS (0) = Bl (0) =
 
0
 1 A  
1   (1  )

> 0
lim
kT!11l
RHS
 
kT1l
 ! 1
Notice that if  is such that there is a re-sale in the crisis state which are the only equilibria considered,
LHS > RHS (0) and the equilibrium will exist. The rest of the equations are:
k1l () = k0 ()  kT1l ()
d1h () =  (1  ) k0 () ; d1l () = 1
l
[k0 ()  n  h (1  ) k0 ()]
d2s () =  (1  ) k1s ()
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k1h () =
((1  ) (1  ) + a1h) k0 ()
[1   (1  )]
kT1l in the Type 1 equilibrium is determined by equation A.1.50 where the condition z

1l > z

1h has to be
satised which impliesM
 
kT1l

= 1N F
00  kT1l kT1l+ 100(Bl)N @z1;P1l@kT1l +F 0  kT1l 1 < 0 (see the proof of Proposition
1.3.1) and also the borrowing constraint in the low state needs to be not binding i.e.
d1l () =
1
l

(1  h (1  )) n

  n

< 
 
F 0
 
kT1l
   n

1  h (1  )  l
 
F 0
 
kT1l
   < 
Equilibrium of Type 2: If 1s > 0 (z

0 > z

1s)
This will be the optimal equilibrium only if  = nkmax0 : The rest of the equations are the same as the
equations in the equilibrium of Type 2 in Proposition 1.3.1.
Equilibrium of Type 3: If 1s = 0 (z

1l = z

0 = z

1h)
~kT1l is pinned down by M

~kT1l

= 0 and k1l () = n   ~kT1l
d1l () =

F 0

~kT1l

+ a1l   
 n

+Bl +
h
 (1  )  F 0

~kT1l
i
k1l ()
d1h () =
n
   n  ld1l
h
k1h () =
d1h   (1 + a1h   ) n
[ (1  )  1]
In order for the equilibrium to be of Type 3 the borrowing constraints in t = 0 against the high and low
state should not be binding. One has to check that
d1l < 

F 0

~kT1l

  

k0
d1h <  (1  ) k0
Equilibrium of Type 4: If 1h = 0; 

1l > 0 (z

1h = z

0 > z

1l)
kT1l is pinned down by the budget constraint in t = 1 in the low state
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0 =
 
a1l    + 
 
1  F 0  kT1l n +Bl  kT1l  kT1l  (1  )  F 0  kT1l
The rest of the equations are given by
d1l = 
 
F 0
 
kT1l ()
   n

d1h =
1
h

n

 
1  l
 
F 0
 
kT1l ()
    n
k1h =
(1 + a1h   ) n   d1h
1   (1  )
In order for the equilibrium to be of Type 4, the following conditions also have to be satised, z0 > z

1l
which implies M
 
kT1l

> 0 and also d1h <  (1  ) k0 which implies
n

 
1  l
 
F 0
 
kT1l ()
    h (1  )  n < 0
Corollary 1.5.2
Corollary 1.5.2: If N <1 and  > 0; bankers realize that they a¤ect the bail-out received both via ki0 and
di1l , i.e.
@Bil
@ki0
=
@Bil
@ki;T1l
@ki;T1l
@ki0
> 0 and @B
i
l
@di1l
=
@Bil
@ki;T1l
@ki;T1l
@di1l
> 0 where @B
i
l
@ki0
and @B
i
l
@di1l
are total derivatives: Also
for a given kT1l; the fewer the banks are and the larger the scal capacity is, the stronger the moral hazard is;
@2Bil
@ki0@N
< 0;
@2Bil
@ki0@
> 0 and @
2Bil
@di1l@N
< 0;
@2Bil
@di1l@
> 0.
Proof of Corollary 1.5.2.Totally di¤erentiate the budget constraint in the low state with respect to
ki0 holding d
i
1l xed to solve for
@ki1l
@ki0
@ki1l
@ki0
=
F 0
 
kT1l

+ a1l    + F 00
 
kT1l

ki;T1l
1
N +
@Bil
@ki0
F 0
 
kT1l
   (1  ) + 1N F 00  kT1l ki;T1l (A.1.52)
Totally di¤erentiate the budget constraint in the low state with respect to di1l holding k
i
0 xed to solve
for @k
i
1l
@di1l
@ki1l
@di1l
=
@Bil
@di1l
  1h
F 0
 
kT1l
   (1  ) + 1N F 00  kT1l ki;T1l i (A.1.53)
From the rst order condition with respect to Bl of the policy maker in the middle period
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@Bil
@ki0
=
1
00 (Bl)N
@z1;P1l
 
kT1l

@kT1l
@ki;T1l
@ki0
=
1
00
 
Bil

N
@z1;RP1l
 
kT1l

@kT1l

1  @k
i
1l
@ki0

(A.1.54)
@Bil
@di1l
=
1
00 (Bl)N
@z1;P1l
 
kT1l

@kT1l
@ki;T1l
@di1l
=  @k
i
1l
@di1l
1
00
 
Bil

N
@z1;RP1l
 
kT1l

@kT1l
(A.1.55)
Combining equations A.1.52 and A.1.54 , and also equations A.1.53 and A.1.55 , and also from Assumption
1.3 and Assumption 1.4.
@Bil
@ki0
=
@z1;P1l (k
T
1l)
@kT1l
[    (1  )  a1l]
00 (Bl)N

F 0
 
kT1l
   (1  ) + 1N F 00  kT1l ki;T1l + @z1;P1l (kT1l)@kT1l > 0
@Bil
@di1l
=
@z1;P1l (k
T
1l)
@kT1l
F 0
 
kT1l
   (1  ) + 1N F 00  kT1l ki;T1l  00 (Bl)N + @z1;P1l (kT1l)@kT1l > 0
Also notice that for a given kT1l; the fewer the banks are and the larger the scal capacity is, the larger
the moral hazard is @
2Bil
@ki0@N
< 0;
@2Bil
@ki0@
> 0 and @
2Bil
@di1l@N
< 0;
@2Bil
@di1l@
> 0. The comparative statics with respect
to scal capacity follows from the fact that the larger  is, the smaller 00 (Bl) is.
Proposition 1.5.3
Proposition 1.5.3: Consider parametrization where the equilibrium is of Type 1 for the constrained Central
Planner. (i) If a) N < 1 and  <  (N) or b) if N ! 1, for any ; a minimum capital requirement
(where  = n
kCP0
) is su¢ cient to replicate the constrained Central Planners allocation where  (N) is
pinned down by the system of equations M
 
kT1l

= 0 and BC1l
 
kT1l

= 0 where
M
 
kT1l

=
1
N
F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l +
1
@2(Bl;)
@Bl@Bl
N
@z1;P1l
@kT1l
+ F 0
 
kT1l
  1 = 0
BC1l
 
kT1l

= l

kT1l
 
F 0
 
kT1l
   (1  )+Bl  kT1l;   [1   (1  ) + l (   a1l)] n   n

(ii) if N < 1 and  >  (N) ; a second instrument is required in the form of a limit on the payment
pledged in the crisis state to consumers (where  = dCP1l ): Part 2) (i) a) If  > 0 and N > N
 () or b) if
 = 0; for any N; a minimum capital requirement (where  = n
kCP0
) is su¢ cient to replicate the constrained
Central Planners allocation where N () is pinned down by the system of equations M
 
kT1l

= 0 and
BC1l
 
kT1l

= 0: (ii) If  > 0 and N < N () a second instrument is required in the form of a limit on the
payment pledged in the crisis state to consumers:
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Proof of Proposition 1.5.3:
Part 1) First note that in order for the decentralized equilibrium to be of Type 1, it will have to be the
case that  is such that there is a re-sale in the crisis state and also that the banker does not optimally
borrow to the maximum in period zero. The conditions for that are given below.
[1   (1  ) + l (   a1l)] 
0
 1  A 
1 (1 )

+ n
n >  > 1  h (1  )  l
 
F 0
 
kT1l
  
Both inequalities will be satised since I consider only equilibria of Type 1 for the constrained Central
Planner (hence the second inequality is satised) where I already proved that there is always re-sale in the
crisis state given the assumptions made (hence the rst inequality is satised). The decentralized equilibrium
will be of Type 1 as long as M
 
kT1l

< 0 where kT1l is determined by BC1l
 
kT1l; 

= 0 (same as equation
A.1.50). If N ! 1 then M  kT1l < 0 for every kT1l 2 h0; kT;max1l i and, hence, the decentralized equilibrium
will be always of Type 1. If N <1; whether the equilibrium is of Type 1 depends on whether kT1l is such that
M
 
kT1l

< 0: The gure below depicts M
 
kT1l; 

and the budget constraint in the crisis state, BC1l
 
kT1l; 

for two di¤erent values of scal capacity where the equilibrium is of Type 1.5
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k
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Figure Assumption 1.9
As the scal capacity increases, BC1l
 
kT1l

shifts up and so does M
 
kT1l

:Therefore, to solve for the
maximum possible scal capacity such that Type 1 equilibrium is achieved one has to solve the following
system of two equations and two unknowns, kT1l and 
; for a given N:
5The parameters are the same as in Figure 1.5 (where N=3).
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M
 
kT1l

= 0
BC1l
 
kT1l

= 0
If  >  (N) then B1l will cross the zero line at a point that is to the left of M
 
kT1l

and hence the
requirement M
 
kT1l

< 0 will be violated and the equilibrium will not be of Type 1.
Part 2) If
"
F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l +
1
@2(Bl;)
@Bl@Bl
@z1;P1l
@kT1l
#
> 0 then
@M
 
kT1l

@N
=   1
N2
"
F 00
 
kT1l

kT1l +
1
@2(Bl;)
@Bl@Bl
@z1;P1l
@kT1l
#
< 0
while BC1l
 
kT1l

is not a function of N: Therefore, the smaller N is the more M
 
kT1l

moves up and the
minimum N () as a function of  for which the equilibrium is of Type 1 is given by solving the system of
equations, for a given  (if M
 
kT1l

< 0 for every kT1l given  then N
 () = 1)
M
 
kT1l

= 0
BC1l
 
kT1l

= 0
Proposition 1.6.1
Proposition 1.6.1: Conditional on Assumptions 1.1-1.8 and 1.10 and the assumptions made on the func-
tional forms of F () and  (), if the policy maker has an access to a su¢ cient number of instruments to
replicate the constrained Central Planners allocation and the parametrization is such that the Central Plan-
ners equilibrium is of Type 1 (Assumption 1.9 is satised), the optimal minimum bank capital ratio is higher
for more scally constrained countries, @

@ < 0:
Proof of Proposition 1.6.1: Consider an interior equilibrium for the Central Planner. By setting
 = n
kCP0
and  = dCP1l (if necessary) the policy maker can replicate the constrained Central Planners
allocation. Since I proved that @ 
CP (k0;)
@k0
> 0; it is su¢ cient to prove that holding k0 constant,
@ CP (;k0)
@ < 0
(partial derivative) in order to prove that @k
CP
0
@ > 0: Dene
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H (; k0) = lBl
 
kT1l; 

+ n+

F 0
 
kT1l
   (1  ) kT1ll (A.1.56)
 k0 (1  h (1  ) + (   a1l    (1  ))l) = 0 (A.1.57)
For a given k0, totally di¤erentiate H (; k0) = 0 with respect to  (partial derivative)
@kT1l (; k0)
@
=  @Bl
 
; kT1l

@
1
@Bl(kT1l;)
@kT1l
+ F 0
 
kT1l
   (1  ) + F 00  kT1l kT1l < 0 (A.1.58)
where
@Bl(;kT1l)
@ > 0 is the partial derivative of Bl with respect to to  holding k
T
1l constant. I can solve for
@Bl(;kT1l)
@ by totally di¤erentiating the rst order condition that pins down Bl; holding k
T
1l constant. The
derivative is given by 0 = @
2(Bl)
@Bl@Bl
@Bl(;kT1l)
@ +
@2(Bl)
@Bl@
=  (   1) 1B 2l
@Bl(;kT1l)
@   12 B 1l where @
2(Bl)
@Bl@
is
a partial derivative holding Bl constant. Since
@2(Bl)
@Bl@
< 0 and @
2(Bl)
@Bl@Bl
> 0;
@Bl(;kT1l)
@ =  @
2(Bl)
@Bl@
=@
2(Bl)
@Bl@Bl
=
Bl
( 1) > 0:
Also for a given  as shown in Lemma A.1.1
@Bl(kT1l;)
@kT1l
> 0. The fact that @k
T
1l(;k0)
@ < 0 is intuitive
and means that for a given level period zero investment, the re sale will be larger for the country with the
smaller scal capacity.
@ CP (; k0)
@
=
@zCP1l
@
  @z
CP
0
@
=

1   (1  ) + l (   a1l)
[1  h (1  )]

@kT1l (; k0)
@
@zCP1l
@kT1l
< 0
where I proved that @z
CP
1l
@kT1l
> 0 in Lemma A.1.1 since z1;P1l = z
CP
1l if the equilibrium is of Type 1. This
completes the proof.
Proposition 1.7.1
Proposition 1.7.1: Conditional on Assumptions 1.1-1.10 and on the functional forms of F () and  () ; if
the policy maker has an access to two ex-ante instruments  an ex-ante tax on period zero investment
("price" instrument), k0 ; and a limit on the payment promised in the crisis state, ; one can show that
k0 > 0: If N !1 (no moral hazard) then @k0@ = 0: If 1 < N <1 then
@k0
@ > 0: k0 and
@k0
@ are given
by
k0 =
"
zCP1l
 
kT1l

z1l
 
kT1l; 
   1# > 0
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@k0
@
=  @z

1l
 
kT1l; 

@
zCP1l
 
kT1l; 

z1l
 
kT1l; 
2   0
where  = [1 (1 )+l( a1l)]
(1  1N )
> 0:
Proof of Proposition 1.7.1: Conditional on the policy maker having an access to two ex-ante instru-
ments  an ex-ante tax on period zero investment ("price" instrument),  ik0 ; and a limit on the payment
promised in the crisis state, di1l  i, the constrained Central Planners allocation can be replicated. Con-
sider parametrization such as the equilibrium is of Type 1 for the constrained Central Planner. Given that
the policy maker has su¢ cient instruments to replicate the constrained Central Planners allocation, the
only Type of equilibrium to consider is of Type 1.
The only di¤erence between the problem of the banker where the ex-ante instrument is a "price" instru-
ment and the problem of the banker where the ex-ante instrument is a "quantity" instrument is that the
period zero budget constraints becomes
ki0
 
1 +  ik0
  n+ T ik0 X
s
sd
i
1s

zi0

(A.1.59)
where  ik0 is the tax on period zero capital. The revenues from the proportional tax are distributed equally
back to the bankers using the lump sum tax, T ik0 =  
PN
i=1
1
N k
i
0
i
k0
. Banker i chooses ki0 at the end of
t = 0; while  ik0 is determined in the beginning of t = 0 and banker i takes it as given. However, banker
i internalizes the fact that he a¤ects the lump sum tax T ik0 :Bankers i optimization problem at the end of
t = 0 is
max
ki0;d
i
1s;k
i
1s
X
s
s (A+ (1  ) (1  )) ki1s
subject to the period one budget constraint, the borrowing constraint
ki1s
 
F 0
 
kT1s
   (1  )+ di1s   F 0  kT1s+ a1s    ki0 +Bis hszi;01s i (A.1.60)
di1s  
 
F 0
 
kT1s
   ki0 si1s
and to the period zero budget constraint given by equation A.1.59. First order condition with respect to ki0
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X
s
sz
i;0
1s

F 0
 
kT1s

+ a1s    + 1
N
F 00
 
kT1s

ki;T1s +
@Bis
@ki0

(A.1.61)
 zi0

1 +  ik0

1  1
N

+
X
s
s
i
1s

F 0
 
kT1s
   + 1
N
F 00
 
kT1s

ki0

= 0
and the rest of the rst order conditions are the same as in the decentralized equilibrium with a "quantity"
ex-ante instrument. After imposing a symmetric equilibrium and using the fact that z0 = z1l > z1h,
2s > 0; 1l = 0 and 1h > 0; one can re-write the rst order condition with respect to k0 from the
decentralized problem as
z1l

1 + k0

1  1
N

  h (1  )  l ( (1  ) + a1l   )

(A.1.62)
=
(A+ (1  ) (1  ))
1   (1  ) (1   (1  ) + h (a1h   )) (A.1.63)
where z1l is given by equation A.1.29. From equation A.1.44
zCP1l (1  h [1  ]  l ( (1  ) + a1l   )) =
(A+ (1  ) (1  ))
1   (1  ) [h (a1h   ) + 1   (1  )]
(A.1.64)
Subtracting equation A.1.62 from equation A.1.64, since zCP1l
 
kT1l
   z1l  kT1l;  > 0; which I proved in
Corollary 1.4.1,
k0 =
"
zCP1l
 
kT1l

z1l
 
kT1l; 
   1# > 0
where
 =
[1   (1  ) + l (   a1l)] 
1  1N
 > 0:
Since the equilibrium kT1l does not vary with  in the Central Planner problem and z
CP
1l is a function
only of kT1l,
@zCP1l (k
T
1l)
@ = 0
@k0
@
=  @z

1l
 
kT1l; 

@
zCP1l
 
kT1l; 
h
z;N1l
 
kT1l; 
i2   0
where
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@z1l
 
kT1l; 

@
=   @Bl
@ki0@
z1l
 
kT1l; 
h
F 0
 
kT1l
   (1  ) + 1N F 00  kT1l kT1l + @Bl@ki0 i  0
where in Corollary 1.5.2 I proved @Bl
@ki0@
 0:Also I take into account that the equilibrium kT1l is not a function
of  since its determined by the rst order condition of the Central Planner.
If N !1; z1l is not a function of  because @Bl@ki0@ = 0 which implies
@k0
@ = 0. If 1 < N <1; @Bl@ki0@ > 0
and @k0@ > 0:
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Appendix B
Supplement to Chapter 2
B.1 Appendix
B.1.1 The Problem of the Entrepreneur
I solve the problem of the entrepreneur backwards. In t = 1; all the uncertainty is resolved. The entrepreneur
takes Rl1 (s1), D2 (s1) and D1 (s1) as given and optimizes
max
L1(s1)

A (L1 (s1))
   Rl1 (s1)L1 (s1) +D2 (s1)

+A1L

0  Rl1 (s1)L0 +D1 (s1)
The rst order condition with respect to L1 (s1) determines the demand for aggregate loans as a function
of Rl1 (s1)
L1 (s1) =
 Rl1 (s1)
 A
 1
 1
(B.1.1)
Alternatively the problem can be re-written as (in order to solve for Li;1)
max
Li;1
A
0@" nX
i=1
1
n
(Li;1)
( 1)=
# 
 1
1A   nX
i=1
1
n
Rli;1Li;1
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The rst order condition with respect to Li;1 is given by
Li;1 =
"
Rli;1
(L1)
 1+ 1  A
# 
= L1
"
Rli;1
Rl1
# 
(B.1.2)
where the aggregate lending rate is Rl1 =
hPn
i=1
1
n
 
Rli;1
(1 )i 1(1 )
: In t = 0 the optimization problem
simplies to
max
Li;0
H
24AH
0@" nX
i=1
1
n
(Li;0)
( 1)=
# 
 1
1A   nX
i=1
1
n
Rli;0Li;0
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After taking rst order conditions and re-arranging, the equilibrium system of period zero equations is
L0 =
 Rl0
AH
 1
 1
Li;0 =
"
Rli;0
(L0)
 1+ 1 AH
# 
= L0
"
Rli;0
Rl0
# 
Rl0 =
"
nX
i=1
1
n
 
Rli;0
(1 )# 1(1 )
(B.1.3)
B.1.2 The Problem of Banker i
I solve the problem of banker i backwards. Since all the uncertainty is resolved in the middle period t = 1;
there is no default in t = 2. All the equations are a function of the state s1 (for now the notation is
suppressed). The banker maximizes
max
Li;1
Rli;1 (Li;1)Li;1  Rf1 [Li;1  Ni;1] + i;1 [Ni;1   Li;1]
The rst order condition with respect to Li;1 is
266664 @
Rli;1 (Li;1)
@Li;1
Li;1| {z }
marginal impact on Rl1
+ Rli;1  Rf1
377775  i;1 = 0 (B.1.4)
where
@ Rli;1(Li;1)
@Li;1
is given by totally di¤erentiating the rewritten equation B.1.2
Rli;1 (Li;1) = (Li;1)
  1 (L1)
 1+ 1  A
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with respect to Li;1 and taking into account the fact @Lt@Li;t =
1
n

Lt
Li;t
 1

:
@ Rli;1
@Li;1
=  
""
Rli;1
Rl1
#
  ((  1) + 1) 1
n

L1
Li;1
 1

# 
Rli;1
L1
!
1

(B.1.5)
If the net worth constraint does not bind in t = 1 (i;1 = 0); one can re-write equation B.1.4 as (after
plugging in equation B.1.5)
Li;1
"  
Rl1
  
Rli;1
    ( (  1) + 1) 1n

L1
Li;1
 1

#
1

Rli;1
L1
= Rli;1  Rf1
Notice that if the net worth constraint is not binding, the rst order condition is not a function of period
zero variables: Since banks are symmetric, I consider the symmetric equilibrium which implies Rli;1 = R
l
1
and Li;1 = L1 and the rst order condition simplies to
Rl1 = R
f
1
where  = 1
(1  1 (1  1n ) (1 ) 1n )
is the mark-up.
If the net worth constraint binds in t = 1 (i;1 > 0); then the amount of loans in period one becomes
Li;1 =
1

Ni;1
where
i;1 =
1

"
Rli;1  Rf1   Li;1
"  
Rl1
  
Rli;1
    ( (  1) + 1) 1n

L1
Li;1
 1

#
1

Rli;1
L1
#
Ni;1 (sL) = AL (L0)
 Li;0
L^0
 Rf0 [Li;0  Ni;0]
Ni;1 (sH) = Ri;0Li;0  Rf0 [Li;0  Ni;0]
Next I solve the optimization problem of banker i in t = 0: Assuming no default by banker i in t = 1,
which in equilibrium will be true, and that the net worth constraint binds in the low state in t = 1 and does
not bind in the high state in t = 1, banker i maximizes the expected dividend payment in the last period (it
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is never optimal to pay dividends before t = 2):
max
Li;0
E0Ni;2 + i;0 [Ni;0   Li;0]
= max
Rii;0
H
h
Rli;1 (Li;0; sH) Rf1
i
Li;1(sH) + (1  H)
h
Rli;1(Li;0; sL) Rf1
i
Li;1(sL)
+Rf1

H R
l
i;0 (Li;0) + (1  H)ALL0
1
L^0
 Rf0

Li;0 +R
f
1R
f
0Ni;0 + i;0 [Ni;0   Li;0]
Since in t = 1 the problem is static in the states of nature where the net worth constraint is not binding
and I consider parametrization where it is not binding in the high state in t = 1; Li;0 will not a¤ect Li;1 (sH)
and Ri;1 (sH). With that in mind, the rst order condition with respect to Li;0 becomes
(1  H)
"
@ Rli;1(sL)
@Li;0
Li;1(sL) +

Rli;1(sL) Rfi;1
 @Li;1(sL)
@Li;0
#
+
Rfi;1

H R
l
i;0 + (1  H)ALL0
1
L^0
 Rfi;0

+
Rfi;1
 
H
@ Rli;0
@Li;0
+ (1  H)AL

L 10
@L0
@Li;0
1
L^0
  L0 L^ 20
1
n
!
Li;0   i;0 = 0
where
@ Rli;1 (sL)
@Li;0
=  
""
Rli;1 (sL)
Rl1 (sL)
#
  ((  1) + 1) 1
n

L1 (sL)
Li;1 (sL)
 1

# 
Rli;1 (sL)
L1 (sL)
!
1

1

@Ni;1 (sL)
@Li;0
@Li;1(sL)
@Li;0
=
1

@Ni;1 (sL)
@Li;0
(B.1.6)
@ Rli;0
@Li;0
=  
""
Rli;0
Rl0
#
  ((  1) + 1) 1
n

L0
Li;0
 1

# 
Rli;0
L0
!
1

(B.1.7)
@Lt
@Li;t
=
1
n

Lt
Li;t
 1

@Ni;1 (sL)
@Li;0
= ALL

0
1
L^0
+AL
1
n

L0
Li;0
 1

 (L0)
 1 Li;0
L^0
 ALL0
Li;0
L^20
1
n
 Rf0
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Ni;1 (sL) = AL (L0)
 Li;0
L^0
 Rf0 [Li;0  Ni;0]
Ni;1 (sH) = R
l
i;0Li;0  Rf0 [Li;0  Ni;0]
Assume that we start from normal times where the borrowing constraint doesnt bind in t = 0; i;0 = 0
and that the equilibrium is symmetric. One can re-write the rst order condition with respect to Li;0 as
MC (L0) =   (1  H)1 (sL) @Ni;1 (sL)
@Li;0
= Rf1E0
@Ni;1 (s1)
@Li;0
= MB (L0) (B.1.8)
where
@Ni;1 (sL)
@Li;0
= ALL
 1
0

1  1
n
(1  )

 Rf0 < 0
@Ni;1 (sH)
@Li;0
= AHL
 1
0
1

 Rf0 > 0
and if 1 (sL) > 0;
1 (sL) =
1

@Ni;2 (sL)
@Li;1 (sL)
=
1


 A (L1 (sL))
 1 1

 Rf1

> 0 (B.1.9)
Notice that the bank will never choose an allocation that leads to bank bankruptcy in t = 1 because,
given the assumptions made in this model, no bank loans would imply no investment and K1 = L1 = 0: As
a result, if L1 ! 0; then 1 (sL)!1 and MC (L0)!1 and, therefore, banker i will never choose period
zero allocation which will lead to bank default. If the entrepreneur has another source of income, then this
result can be changed and one can generalize the model to include bank default. After plugging in all the
equations for the case 1 (sL) > 0;
(1  H) 1


1  (1  ) 1
n

ALL
 1
0  Rf0
 
 A (L1 (sL))
 1 1

 Rf1

+ (B.1.10)
Rf1

H (L0)
 1
AH
1

+ (1  H)ALL 10

1  (1  ) 1
n

 Rf0

= 0
B.1.3 Constrained Central Planners Problem
The Central Planner (CP) chooses the amount of loans provided by every banker, taking into account that
the equilibrium played is symmetric. The CP also takes into account the net worth constraint and the rst
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order conditions of the entrepreneur. He internalizes his impact on the return of the bankers. The period
one optimization problem of the CP is
max
L1
AL1  Rf1 [L1  N1] + CP1 [N1   L1]
The rst order condition with respect to L1 is given by
 AL 11  Rf1   CP1  = 0:
If the net worth constraint does not bind (CP1 = 0); the bank will lend to the entrepreneur up to the point
where the marginal cost equals the marginal benet from the Central Planners point of view,  AL 11 =
Rf1 : If the net worth constraint binds

CP1 > 0

; then
L1 (sL) =
1

N1 (sL)
The optimization problem at t = 0 is given by
max
L0
(1  H)
 
A (L1 (sL))
   Rl1 (sL)L1 (sL)

+H

Rf1
 
AH (L0)
   Rl0 (L0)L0

+ A (L1 (sH))
   Rl1 (sH)L1 (sH)

+H
h
Rl1 (sH) Rf1
i
L1(sH) + (1  H)
h
Rl1 (sL) Rf1
i
L1(sL)
+Rf1

H R
l
0 + (1  H)ALL 10  Rf0

L0 +R
f
1R
f
0N0 + 0 [N0   L0]g
Re-writing the optimization problem, after plugging in for the rst order conditions of the entrepreneur and
simplifying,
max
L0
(1  H)

A (L1 (sL))
  Rf1L1(sL)

+ H

A (L1 (sH))
  Rf1L1(sH)

+Rf1E0A1L

0  Rf1Rf0L0 +Rf1Rf0N0 + 0 [N0   L0]
Since L1 (sH) is not a function of L0, the rst order condition with respect to L0 is given by
(1  H)
h
 A (L1 (sL))
 1  Rf1
i @L1 (sL)
@L0
+Rf1

E0A1 (L0)
 1  Rf0

  0 = 0
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where
@L1 (sL)
@L0
=
1

@N1 (sL)
@L0
=
1


AL (L0)
 1  Rf0

Combining all the equations, one gets
MCCP (L0) =   (1  H) 1


ALL
 1
0  Rf0
 h
 A (L1 (sL))
 1  Rf1
i
(B.1.11)
= Rf1

E1A1L
 1
0  Rf0

= MBCP (L0) (B.1.12)
Next I proof existence and uniqueness conditional on the equilibrium being such that CP0 = 0; 
CP
1 (sL) >
0 and CP1 (sH) = 0. First, I prove that MB
CP 0 (L0) MCCP 0 (L0) < 0:
MBCP 0 (L0) = R
f
1 (  1)E0A1L 20 < 0
MCCP 0 (L0) = (1  H) (1  )
8><>: ALL
 2
0
1

h
 A (L1 (sL))
 1  Rf1
i
+
h
1


ALL
 1
0  Rf0
i2
 A (L1 (sL))
 2
9>=>; > 0
Since also limL0!0

MBCP (L0) MCCP (L0)
 ! 1 and limL0!1 MBCP (L0) MCCP (L0) !  1;
this is su¢ cient to prove existence and uniqueness.
B.1.4 Ramsey Problem
First, I re-derive the problem of the entrepreneur given the presence of subsidies. As before, I solve the
model backwards. In t = 1; all the uncertainty is resolved and the optimization problem of the entrepreneur
after plugging in the budget constraint simplies to
max
L1
h
A (L1 (s1))
   ~Rl1 (s1)L1 (s1)
i
where ~Rl1 (s1)L1 (s1) =
Pn
i=1
1
n
 
1  si;1

Rli;1Li;1: Notice that the subsidy is at the individual bank interest
rate level and the aggregate interest rate, ~Rl1; is net of subsidies. The rst order condition with respect to
Lt determines the demand for aggregate loans as a function of L1 (s1)
L1 (s1) =
"
~Rl1 (s1)
 A
# 1
 1
(B.1.13)
Alternatively the problem can be re-written as
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max
Li;1
A
0@" nX
i=1
1
n
(Li;1)
( 1)=
# 
 1
1A   nX
i=1
1
n
 
1  si;1

Rli;1Li;1
The rst order condition with respect to Li;t is given by
Li;1 =
"  
1  si;1

Rli;1
(L1)
 1+ 1  A
# 
= L1
" 
1  si;1

Rli;1
~Rl1
# 
Also the aggregate lending rate is
~Rl1 =
"
nX
i=1
1
n
  
1  si;1

Rli;1
(1 )# 1(1 )
(B.1.14)
In t = 0; given that I consider parametrization where the rm defaults in the crisis state, the optimization
problem is
max
Li;0
H
24AH
0@" nX
i=1
1
n
(Li;0)
( 1)=
# 
 1
1A   nX
i=1
1
n
 
1  si;0

Rli;0Li;0
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After taking the rst order conditions and re-arranging the equilibrium system of equations is
L0 =
"
~Rl0
AH
# 1
 1
Li;0 =
"  
1  si;0

Rli;0
(L0)
 1+ 1 AH
# 
= L0
" 
1  si;0

Rli;0
~Rl0
# 
(B.1.15)
~Rl0 =
"
nX
i=1
1
n
  
1  si;0

Rli;0
(1 )# 1(1 )
(B.1.16)
Next I re-derive the bankers problem taking into account the policy instruments. Since all the uncertainty is
resolved in the middle period, t = 1; there is no rm default in t = 2. All the equations are a function of the
state s1 (for now the notation is suppressed). The banker maximizes his period two dividend payments/prots
max
Li;1
Rli;1 (Li;1)Li;1  
 
1 +  cci;1

Rf1 [Li;1  Ni;1] + Ti;2 + i;1 [Ni;1   Li;1]
where Ti;2 =  cci;1R
f
1 [Li;1  Ni;1] si;t Rli;tLi;1 is predetermined in the beginning of period zero since I assumed
that the policy maker is able to commit. Therefore, banker i takes Ti;2 as given. The policy maker also
anticipates the optimal actions of the bankers:The rst order condition with respect to Li;1 is
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266664 @
Rli;1 (Li;1)
@Li;1
Li;1| {z }+
marginal impact on Rl1
Rli;1  
 
1 +  cci;1

Rf1
377775  i;1 = 0
where
@ Rli;1(Li;1)
@Li;1
is given by totally di¤erentiating the rewritten equation Li;1 =

(1 si;1) Rli;1
(L1)
 1+ 1
  A
 
 
1  si;1

Rli;1 = (Li;1)
  1 (L1)
 1+ 1  A
with respect to Li;1 and taking into account the fact @Lt@Li;t =
1
n

Lt
Li;t
 1

:
@ Rli;1
@Li;1
=  
"
L1
Li;1
  1
n

L1
Li;1
 1

((  1) + 1)
#
1

L 11 R
l
i;1
If the net worth constraint does not bind in t = 1 (i;1 = 0); then the rst order condition with respect to
Li;1 becomes
Rli;1
 
1 
"
1  1
n

L1
Li;1
 1
 1
((  1) + 1)
#
1

!
   1 +  cci;1Rf1 = 0
If the net worth constraint is not binding, the rst order condition is not a function of period zero
variables: Since banks are symmetric, I consider the symmetric equilibrium which implies
 
1  si;1

Rli;1 =
~Rl1
and Li;1 = L1: In a symmetric equilibrium
~Rl1 =  (1  s1) (1 +  cc1 )Rf1
where  = 1
(1  1 (1  1n ) (1 ) 1n )
is the mark-up.
If the net worth constraint binds in t = 1 (i;1 > 0); the amount of loans in period one becomes
Li;1 =
1

Ni;1
where
i;1 =
1

"
Rli;1
 
1 
"
1  1
n

L1
Li;1
 1
 1
((  1) + 1)
#
1

!
   1 +  cci;1Rf1
#
Ni;1 (sL) = AL (L0)
 Li;0
L^0
   1 +  cci;0Rf0 [Li;0  Ni;0] + Ti;1 (sL)
150
Ni;1 (sH) = Ri;0Li;0  
 
1 +  cci;0

Rf0 [Li;0  Ni;0] + Ti;1 (sH)
where Ti;1 (sL) =  cci;0R
f
1 [Li;0  Ni;0] and Ti;1 (sH) =  cci;0Rf1 [Li;0  Ni;0]  si;0 Rli;0Li;0:
In a symmetric equilibrium, Rli;1 =
~Rl1
(1 s1)
= 
A(L1)
 1
(1 s1)
L1 =
1

N1 (B.1.17)
where 1 = 1

~Rl1
(1 s1)
1
   (1 +  cc1 )Rf1

:
Next, I solve the optimization problem of the banker in t = 0: Since, in equilibrium, there will be no
default by banker i in t = 1 and considering only parametrization where the net worth constraint binds in
the low state in t = 1 and does not bind in the high state in t = 1, banker i maximizes the expected dividend
payment in the last period (notice that it is never optimal to pay dividends before t = 2):
max
Li;0
E0Ni;2 + i;0 [Ni;0   Li;0]
= max
Li;0
H
h
Rli;1 (Li;0; sH) 
 
1 +  cci;1 (sH)

Rf1
i
Li;1 (Li;0; sH)
+ (1  H)
h
Rli;1(Li;0; sL) 
 
1 +  cci;1 (sL)

Rf1
i
Li;1 (Li;0; sL)
+H
 
1 +  cci;1 (sH)

Rf1
h
Ri;0  
 
1 +  cci;0

Rf0
i
Li;0
+ (1  H)
 
1 +  cci;1 (sL)

Rf1

AL (L0)
 1
L^0
   1 +  cci;0Rf0Li;0
+E0
 
1 +  cci;1 (s1)

Rf1
h 
1 +  cci;0

Rf0Ni;0 + Ti;1 (s1)
i
+ i;0 [Ni;0   Li;0]
Since in t = 1 the problem is static in the states of nature where the net worth constraint is not binding
and I consider parametrization where it is not binding in the high state in t = 1; Li;0 will not a¤ect Li;1 (sH)
and Ri;1 (sH). With that in mind, the rst order condition with respect to Li;0 becomes
(1  H)
 
@ Rli;1(sL)
@Li;0
Li;1 (sL) +

Rli;1(sL) 
 
1 +  cci;1 (sL)

Rf1
 @Li;1(sL)
@Li;0
!
+H
 
1 +  cci;1 (sH)

Rf1
 
Ri;0 +
@ Rli;0
@Li;0
Li;0
!
  E0
 
1 +  cci;1 (s1)
  
1 +  cci;0

Rf1R
f
0
+ (1  H)
 
1 +  cci;1 (sL)

Rf1
"
AL (L0)
 1
L^0
+
"
AL (L0)
 1 1
L^0
@L0
@Li;0
  1
n
AL (L0)
 1
L^20
#
Li;0
#
 i;0 = 0
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where
@ Rli;1 (sL)
@Li;0
=
@ Rli;1 (sL)
@Li;1
@Li;1
@Li;0
=  
"
L1
Li;1
  1
n

L1
Li;1
 1

((  1) + 1)
#
1

L 11 R
l
i;1
1

@Ni;1 (sL)
@Li;0
@Li;1(sL)
@Li;0
=
1

@Ni;1 (sL)
@Li;0
(B.1.18)
@ Rli;0
@Li;0
=  
"
L0
Li;0
  1
n

L0
Li;0
 1

((  1) + 1)
#
1

L 10 R
l
i;0
@Ni;1 (sL)
@Li;0
= ALL

0
1
L^0
+AL
1
n

L0
Li;0
 1

 (L0)
 1 Li;0
L^0
 ALL0
Li;0
L^20
1
n
   1 +  cci;0Rf0
Ni;1 (sL) = AL (L0)
 Li;0
L^0
   1 +  cci;0Rf0 [Li;0  Ni;0]
Ni;1 (sH) = R
l
i;0Li;0  
 
1 +  cci;0

Rf0 [Li;0  Ni;0]
Assume that i;0 = 0: In a symmetric equilibrium Lt = Li;t and (1  st ) Rli;t = ~Rlt; Rli;0 =
~Rl0
(1 s0)
=
AH(L0)
 1
(1 s0)
; Rli;1 (s1) =
~Rl1(s1)
(1 s1(s1))
= 
A(L1(s1))
 1
(1 s1(s1))
we get
MC (L0) =   (1  H)
 
1

 A (L1 (sL))
 1
(1  s1 (sL))
  (1 +  cc1 (sL))Rf1
!
1

0B@  1  1n (1  )ALL 10
  (1 +  cc0 )Rf0
1CA
(B.1.19)
= H (1 + 
cc
1 (sH))R
f
1
1

AH (L0)
 1
(1  s0)
  E0 (1 +  cc1 (s1)) (1 +  cc0 )Rf1Rf0
+ (1  H) (1 +  cc1 (sL))Rf1

1  (1  ) 1
n

AL (L0)
 1
= MB (L0) (B.1.20)
B.1.5 Proofs
Proposition 2.2.2: (i) If parametrization is such that there is a crisis in the low state in t = 1 and no
crisis in the high state in t = 1 and in t = 0; 1 (sL) > 0; 1 (sH) = 0; 0 = 0; the equilibrium is unique and
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exists. (ii) Countries with more competitive banking sector will borrow and invest more than countries with
less competitive banking sector, @L

0
@ > 0; if
  (1  H) @Ni;1 (sL)
@Li;0
@i;1 (sL)
@| {z }
=
MC(;L0)
@ >0
< Rf1H
@2Ni;1 (sH)
@Li;0@| {z }
=
MB(;L0)
@ >0
(Assumption 2.1)
and @L

0
@ < 0 if Assumption 2.1 is not satised.
Proof of Proposition 2.2.2: (i) In order to prove existence and uniqueness I will prove thatMB0 (L0) 
MC 0 (L0) < 0: From equation 2.2.10
@MB
@L0
  @MC
@L0
= Rf1E0
@N1 (s1)
@L0@L0
+
(1  H)

1 (sL)
@N1 (sL)
@L0@L0
+
@1 (sL)
@L0
@N1 (sL)
@L0

< 0
where from equations 2.2.13 and 2.2.12
@N1 (sL)
@L0@L0
= (  1)ALL 20

1
n
[  1] + 1

< 0
@N1 (sH)
@L0@L0
= (  1)AHL 20
1

< 0
@N1 (sL)
@L0
= ALL
 1
0

1
n
[  1] + 1

 Rf0
@1 (sL)
@L0
=
1

(  1) A (L1 (sL)) 2 1

1

@N1 (sL)
@L0
Notice that it will be the case that either @N1(sL)@L0 < 0 and
@1(sL)
@L0
> 0 or @N1(sL)@L0 > 0 and
@1(sL)
@L0
< 0;
which implies that in either case @MB@L0  @MC@L0 < 0: Combined with the fact that limL0!0 [MB (L0) MC (L0)]!
1 and limL0!1 [MB (L0) MC (L0)] !  1; this is su¢ cient to prove existence and uniqueness. Since
MB > 0 if 1 (sL) > 0; it will have to be the case that if the equilibrium exists, also MC > 0 which will
imply that, in equilibrium, @N1(sL)@L0 < 0:
(ii) Totally di¤erentiate MB (L0) MC (L0) = 0 with respect to 
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MB (L0) MC (L0) = Rf1E0
@Ni;1 (s1)
@Li;0
+ (1  H)1 (sL) @Ni;1 (sL)
@Li;0
= 0
@L0
@
=
 Rf1H @
2Ni;1(sH ;L

0)
@Li;0@
  (1  H) @Ni;1(sL)@Li;0
@i;1(sL;L

0)
@
@(MB(L0) MC(L0))
@L0
where @(MB(L0) MC(L0))@L0 < 0:
@L0
@ > 0 if   (1  H) @Ni;1(sL)@L0
@i;1(sL;L

0)
@ < R
f
1H
@2Ni;1(sH ;L

0)
@Li;0@
and
MB (;L0)
@
= Rf1H
@2Ni;1 (sH ;L

0)
@Li;0@
=  Rf1HL 10 AH
1
2
0 () > 0
MC (;L0)
@
=   (1  H) @Ni;1 (sL)
@L0
@i;1 (sL;L

0)
@
(B.1.21)
= (1  H) 1


1  (1  ) 1
n

ALL
 1
0  Rf0

 A (L1 (sL))
 1 1
2
0 () > 0(B.1.22)
where 0 () < 0.
Proposition 2.3.3: If n = 1 and the net worth constraint binds only in the low state in t = 1 for both
the CP and the monopolistic bank, then LCP0 > L

0 (n = 1) if
Rf1 (1  )HAHL 10 + (1  H)
1


AL (L

0)
 1  Rf0

[1  ] A (L1 (sL)) 1 > 0 (Assumption 2.3)
where L1 =
1


AL (L

0)
  Rf1 [L0  N0]

: If Assumption 2.3 is violated, then the monopolist overinvests
relative to the Central Planner LCP0 < L

0 (n = 1) :
Proof of Proposition 2.3.3: The proof is based on a local perturbation around the decentralized
equilibrium L0 which is without loss of generality given that MB
0 (L0) MC 0 (L0) < 0 and MBCP 0 (L0) 
MCCP 0 (L0) < 0: Re-writing the rst order conditions of the CP and the banker from the decentralized
equilibrium, after imposing n = 1
MB (L0) MC (L0) = Rf1

H
2AHL
 1
0 + (1  H)ALL 10  Rf0

(B.1.23)
+ (1  H) 1

h
2 A (L1 (sL))
 1  Rf1
i h
ALL
 1
0  Rf0
i
(B.1.24)
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MBCP (L0) MCCP (L0) = Rf1

E0A1 (L0)
 1  Rf0

(B.1.25)
+ (1  H)
h
 A (L1 (sL))
 1  Rf1
i 1


AL (L0)
 1  Rf0

(B.1.26)
Since MB0 (L0) MC 0 (L0) < 0 and MBCP 0 (L0) MCCP 0 (L0) < 0; then LCP0 > L0 (n = 1) if
MBCP (L0) MCCP (L0)  (MB (L0) MC (L0))
= Rf1 (1  )HAHL 10 + (1  H)
1


AL (L

0)
 1  Rf0

[1  ] A (L1 (sL)) 1 > 0
which is true conditional on Assumption 2.3 being satised.
Proposition 2.3.4: For any n and  and if the net worth constraint binds only in the low state in t = 1
for both the CP and banker in the decentralized equilibrium, then LCP0 > L

0 if
Rf1HAH

1  1


L 10| {z }
underinvestment in t=00
 Rf1 (1  H)AL (1  )

1  1
n

L 10| {z }
"bankruptcy" pecuniary externality0
+ (Assumption 2.4)
  (1  H) 1

h
 A (L1 (sL))
 1  Rf1
i
(1  )

1  1
n

ALL
 1
0| {z }
"net worth constraint" pecuniary externality0
  (1  H) 1


Rf0  

1  (1  ) 1
n

ALL
 1
0

 A (L1 (sL))
 1

1  1


| {z }
underinvestment in t=10
> 0 (B.1.27)
where L1 =
1


AL (L

0)
  Rf1 [L0  N0]

: If Assumption 2.4 is violated, then the banker overinvests relative
to the Central Planner LCP0 < L
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0:
Proof of Proposition 2.3.4: The proof is based on a local perturbation around the decentralized
equilibrium L0 which is without loss of generality given that MB
0 (L0) MC 0 (L0) < 0 and MBCP 0 (L0) 
MCCP 0 (L0) < 0: Re-writing the rst order conditions of the banker from the decentralized equilibrium
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Since MB0 (L0) MC 0 (L0) < 0 and MBCP 0 (L0) MCCP 0 (L0) < 0; then LCP0 > L0 if MBCP (L0) 
MCCP (L0)  (MB (L0) MC (L0)) > 0; which will be true if Assumption 2.4 is satised.
Proposition 2.4.1: Assuming the policy maker can commit and the net worth constraint binds in
the crisis state, the CPs allocation can be decentralized using a lump sum transfer to entrepreneurs, Tt;
subsidy on entrepreneursborrowing rates, st  0; and a capital account control in the form of a tax on
bankers borrowing rates from foreigners,  cct  0: One possible implementation of the constrained Central
Planners allocation is given by: s1 = 1  1 ;  cc1 = 0: If ~ cc0 (s0 = 0) > 0; then  cc0 = ~ cc0 (s0) and s0 = 0: If
~ cc0 (
s
0 = 0) < 0; then 
cc
0 = 0 and 
s
0 > 0; where 
s
0 is pinned down by ~
cc
0 (
s
0) = 0 and
~ cc0 (
s
0) =  Rf1HAH

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i > 0 and CP stands for the optimal allocation of the CP.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.1: In order to determine s1; compare the CPs rst order condition with
respect to L1; Rl1 = R
f
1 to the rst order condition of the banker with respect to L1 from the Ramsey
Problem, Rl1 = (1  s1) (1 +  cc1 ) Rf1 . Since (1  s1) (1 +  cc1 )  = 1 and  cc1  0; s1  0;   1; then  cc1 = 0
and s1 = 1  1 : In practice, the CPs allocation can be decentralized in many di¤erence way. Here, I derive
the general formula for the optimal ~ cc0 (
s
0) as a function of 
s
0 2 [0; 1): Combine the the rst order condition
of the banker with respect to L0 from the Ramsey Problem, equation B.1.19, with the rst order condition
of the CP, equation B.1.11. Taking into account the fact that  cc1 = 0 and 
s
1 = 1  1 ; one can derive ~ cc0 (s0)
specied in the proposition, where LCP1 (sL) =
1
N
CP
1 (sL) =
1


AL
 
LCP0
  Rf0 LCP0  N0 :
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Appendix C
Supplement to Chapter 3
C.1 Appendix
C.1.1 Minimum MSFE Out-of-Sample Test Statistics
The Theils U Test (TU)
The TU test statistic is a minimum MSFE test dened as the square root of the MSFE of the structural
model over the square root of the MSFE of the random walk model. Therefore, a TU < 1 implies that the
structural model outperforms the random walk model. TU is often preferred for its simplicity and intuitive
interpretation and its statistical signicance is tested via a bootstrap. The test we use is a one-sided test.
The Diebold Mariano/West Test (DMW)
The DMW test statistic can be considered an alternative to the TU test. It measures the statistical
signicance of the di¤erence between the MSFE of the random walk model and that of the structural model.
A signicant and positive DMW test implies that the structural model outperforms the random walk. On the
basis of both theoretical and simulation evidence, ?, ?, Clark and McCracken (2001), Clark and McCracken
(2005) and Clark and West (2006) show that, when comparing nested models, the asymptotic DMW test
statistic is undersized, which means that it may not detect statistical signicance (i.e., that the structural
model outperforms the random walk model) even when it exists. While Clark and West (2006) attribute the
poor size of the asymptotic DMW test statistic to small-sample bias, ?, Clark and McCracken (2001) and
Clark and McCracken (2005) claim that the asymptotic DMW is undersized because the limiting distribution
of the DMW under the null hypothesis is not standard normal when nested models are compared. To correct
for this problem, a number of studies opt for the bootstrapped DMW test statistic which does not assume
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any distributional form. This is the approach we take in this paper. Again, we calculate the DMW test as
a one sided test.
The Clark West Test (CW)
To compensate for the fact that the asymptotic DMW test statistic is undersized under the null hypothesis
when comparing nested models and to avoid the use of a bootstrap, Clark and West (2006) and Clark and
West (2007) propose a new asymptotic test for nested models, the CW, that builds on the asymptotic DMW
test. The CW test statistic takes into account the fact that the two models compared are nested by assuming
that, under the null hypothesis, the exchange rate follows a random walk.
When the forecast is calculated using rolling regressions, the limiting distribution of the CW under the
null hypothesis is standard normal. However, when the estimation is performed recursively, the asymptotic
distribution is approximated using Brownian motion. Based on simulation evidence, Clark and West (2007)
suggest that, for recursive specications, one can use a one-sided test and should reject the null hypothesis of
equal forecasting power when the CW = +1:282 at 10 percent and CW = +1:645 at 5 percent (which are the
critical values one would use assuming a normal distribution). Finally, we also calculate the bootstrapped
CW test statistic to test whether the asymptotic CW test is properly sized.
The Clark - McCracken Test (ENC-NEW)
Another relatively new out-of-sample test statistic for nested models, the ENC-NEW, introduced by
Clark and McCracken (2001) and Clark and McCracken (2005), also implicitly assumes that, under the null,
the exchange rate follows a random walk.1 The ENC-NEW and the CW di¤er only by a scaling factor. In
other words, the two test statistics can di¤er slightly because of di¤erent power or size but they test the same
null hypothesis. The shortcoming of the ENC-NEW is that its asymptotic distribution is a function of both
the in-sample and out-of-sample portion of the data which makes evaluation of statistical signicance quite
cumbersome. Therefore, bootstrapping the ENC-NEW is an attractive alternative and this is the approach
we take in this paper.
C.1.2 Proofs: The New Out-of-Sample Tests for Nested Models
1Similarly to the CW, the ENC-NEW has been one of the most widely used out-of-sample test statistics in the exchange
rate forecasting literature. Some of the studies that test out-of-sample forecastability using the ENC-NEW are ?, Rossi (2006),
?, ?.
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In this section of the Appendix we provide a theoretical argument why the CW and ENC-NEW cannot be
considered minimum MSFE tests in cases of severe "scale" forecast bias. We also argue that one should
interpret these out-of-sample tests for nested models as prior tests of whether one can pool the random walk
and the structural model forecast to produce a forecast with MSFE signicantly smaller than the MSFE of
the random walk.
From the Diebold Mariano to the Clark West Test
Before proceeding to the proofs, we present a derivation of the Clark and West test statistic, as presented
in Clark and West (2006). In order to simplify the notation, assume that the forecast is one period ahead
and that the forecast variable is the change in the exchange rate. Assume that yt = st   st 1; where st is
the natural log of the exchange rate for period t: Also let Xt be a matrix of explanatory variables. We are
interested in comparing the forecasting power of the following theoretical models:
Driftless Random Walk Model: yt = e1;t; and
Structural Model: yt = Xt 1b+ e2;t;
where e1;t and e2;t are the unobservable innovation terms.
The CW test assumes that, under the null hypothesis, the exchange rate is a random walk, and therefore,
the population parameter b = 0; and the forecast innovation terms are equal, that is, e1;t+1 = e2;t+1. The
models can be estimated by OLS using either recursive or rolling regressions. The estimated forecasts for
the random walk and the structural model are y^1;t+1 = 0 and y^2;t+1 = Xtb^t respectively. Denoting P as the
number of forecasts, T as the sample length, and R as the sample reserved to calculate the rst forecast, we
can rewrite the sample di¤erence between the MSFE of the two models (which is the main component of
the DMW test statistic) as:
P 1
t=TX
t=R+1
e^21;t+1   P 1
t=TX
t=R+1
e^22;t+1 = 2P
 1
t=TX
t=R+1
(yt+1Xtb^t)  P 1
t=TX
t=R+1
(Xtb^t)
2:
Clark and West (2006) argue that under the null hypothesis e1;t+1 = e2;t+1 = yt+1; and since Clark and
West (2006) assume that the independent variables are not correlated with the theoretical disturbance terms,
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it follows that E(yt+1Xtb^t) = 0:2 Therefore, they argue that we should expect
Pt=T
t=R+1(yt+1Xtb^t)  0 for
both the rolling and recursive specications. However, due to small-sample bias,  P 1Pt=Tt=R+1(Xtb^t)2 < 0:
As a result, the sample di¤erence of the MSFEs of the random walk and the structural model is negatively
biased in favor of the random walk.
The fact that the DMW test is negatively biased under the null hypothesis implies that it favors the
random walk. Therefore, Clark and West (2006) propose an "adjusted" DMW statistic, or the so-called CW
statistic, which tests whether
d^ = 2P 1
t=TX
t=R+1
(yt+1Xtb^t) (C.1.1)
is signicantly greater than zero. If it is, the structural model outperforms the random walk. More formally,
we can dene the CW as
CW =
P 0:5d^p

d^
where 
d^ is the variance of d^: In comparison, one can write the ENC-NEW test statistics as
ENC  NEW = P
Pt=T
t=R+1(yt+1Xtb^t)Pt=T
t=R+1(yt+1  Xtb^t)2
which makes it clear that the CW and ENC-NEW di¤er only by a scaling factor and we would expect that
they behave similarly.
New Out-of-Sample Test Statistics (CW and ENC-NEW) : Not Minimum MSFE Tests
While the CW (and to a lesser degree the ENC-NEW) are often used interchangeably with the older minimum
MSFE tests, we argue that their use as minimum MSFE tests is based on a misinterpretation, and that they
should not be used as a substitute for the TU and the DMW tests. We present a theoretical proof that the
CW is not a minimum MSFE test.3 The proof can be easily generalized for the ENC-NEW out-of-sample
test statistic.
Our proof is based on the rolling window specication (R=P ! 0 and R is xed) which generalizes well
the main point made by Clark and West (2006), namely, the presence of small-sample bias. The proof for
2e1;t+1 = e2;t+1 implies E(yt+1Xtb^t) = E(e1;t+1Xtb^t) = E(e2;t+1Xtb^t). By assumption, E(e2;t+1Xt) = 0. Then if one
assumed that underlying variables are independent, E(e2;t+1Xtb^t) = E(e2;t+1Xt)E(b^t) = 0:
3Clark and West themselves suggest that researchers should interpret the CW as a minimum MSFE test statistic (2007,
pp. 297). Clark and McCracken (2001, 2005) do not make such a claim regarding the ENC-NEW.
160
the recursive case is similar.4 While the proof assumes that the benchmark model is the driftless random
walk, it can be generalized to any nested-model specication.
Assume that all the variables are dened as above. In the rolling regression specication, the null
hypothesis incorporates the presence of small-sample bias and can be dened as Ee21;t+1 = Ee
2
2;t+1(R): The
alternative can be dened as Ee21;t+1 > Ee
2
2;t+1(R): The respective MSFEs are
Ee21;t+1 = E(yt+1)
2; and (C.1.2)
Ee22;t+1(R) = E(yt+1  Xtb^t)2 = E(yt+1)2   2Eyt+1Xtb^t + E(Xtb^t)2; (C.1.3)
where x(R) implies that the variable x is a function of a rolling window of xed size, R: In the rolling
regression case (the extreme version of small-sample bias with respect to the structural model parameter),
R is xed, and b^t never converges to b; regardless of the sample size, T: The larger R is, the smaller the
small-sample bias is. Also, when R is xed, then under mild assumptions, we would expect yt+1Xtb^t to be
a well-behaved iid random variable. Then, it follows that
p lim(P 12
t=TX
t=R+1
(yt+1Xtb^t)) = 2E(yt+1Xtb^t);
where the probability limit is dened with respect to P !1: Given the rolling regression set-up, we proceed
to prove that CW is not a minimum MSFE test statistic. In other words, a statistically signicant CW test
does not imply a statistically signicant minimum MSFE test.
Proposition C.1.1 2E(yt+1Xtb^t) > 0 ; Ee21;t+1   Ee22;t+1(R) > 0:
Proof of Proposition C.1.1. From equations (C.1.2) and (C.1.3), if 2E(yt+1Xtb^t)  E(Xtb^t)2 then
Ee21;t+1   Ee22;t+1(R)  0. However 2E(yt+1Xtb^t)  E(Xtb^t)2 can hold even if 2E(yt+1Xtb^t) > 0. As a
result, 2E(yt+1Xtb^t) > 0 does not imply Ee21;t+1   Ee22;t+1(R) > 0:
4The recursive specication can be analyzed in a framework either with or without small-sample bias. If we assume that
small sample bias is present, even when b^t is estimated using recursive regressions, as Clark and West (2006) argue, we would still
expect under certain assumptions that 2P 1
Pt=T
t=R+1(yt+1Xtb^t)  2E(yt+1Xtb^t). As a result, in the presence of small-sample
bias, the proof we present generalizes to the recursive case.
In the case when R ! 1; P ! 1 (i.e., no small-sample bias is present), the proof we present still holds. However, this
case is irrelevant, given that according to Clark and West (2006)s null hypothesis, if small-sample bias was not an issue, the
adjustment of the DMW the authors propose would not be justied (under the null, the negative bias would disappear since
b = 0 and, as a result, E(Xtb)2 = 0).
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The question emerges how often we would expect the CW(ENC-NEW) and DMW(TU) to produce
di¤erent results due to the fact that the two test statistics test a di¤erent null hypotheses. In other words,
how often we would observe 0 < 2E(yt+1Xtb^t)  E(Xtb^t)2 in practice. The condition 0 < 2E(yt+1Xtb^t) 
E(Xtb^t)
2 implies that if we regress the observed exchange rate change on the structural model forecast and
no constant, the estimated coe¢ cient should be less than or equal to 12 and greater than 0. This is equivalent
to having a signicantly biased forecast (if the forecast is unbiased the estimated coe¢ cient should be 1).5
Forecast bias is a signicant problem in the literature on exchange rate forecasting. Marcellino (2000)
emphasizes the importance of taking into account forecast bias when applying encompassing test statistics.
? and Clements and Hendry (2006) investigate the theoretical relationship between structural breaks and
forecast bias and nd that structural breaks, which are fairly common in forecasting, can lead to forecast
bias.
What Do the New Out-of-Sample Test Statistics for Nested Models Test?
Here we prove that, in theory, a signicant CW test implies that one can pool the random-walk and the
structural-model forecasts and obtain a combined forecast whose MSFE is smaller than that of the random
walk. Again, this proof also applies to the ENC-NEW test statistic.
Similarly to the proof of Proposition C.1.1, we prove the statement above in the context of the rolling
specication, which implies that there is small-sample bias under the null hypothesis. However, a similar
proof can be presented with respect to the recursive specication. The proof here is generalized to any nested
model specication where Model 1 is nested in Model 2. Let yc;t+1 = y2;t+1(R)+(1 )y1;t+1(R); 0    1
be the combined forecast where  is the weight on the structural model forecast. Subscripts represent the
respective model (1 or 2) and c stands for "combined". As before, the variable that we forecast is yt+1: One
can rewrite the CW test statistic as testing whether
d^ = 2P 1
t=TX
t=R+1
e^1;t+1(e^1;t+1   e^2;t+1)
is signicantly greater than zero. Within the more general framework of any nested model specication,
we prove that a signicant CW implies that there exists an optimal combination between the two forecasts
which will produce a combined forecast that outperforms the simpler model (Model 1) in terms of MSFE.
5Note that the analysis refers only to "scale" bias since no constant is included in the forecast bias regression (for details
see Marcellino (2000) and Holden and Peel (1989)).
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Proposition C.1.2 2Ee1;t+1(R)(e1;t+1(R)  e2;t+1(R)) > 0) 9  s: t : Ee21;t+1(R)  Ee2c;t+1(R) > 0
Proof of Proposition C.1.2. The proof we present is similar to the proof provided by Harvey, Leybourne,
and Newbold (1998). In a rolling regression framework and under mild assumptions
p lim(2P 1
TX
t=R+1
e^1;t+1(e^1;t+1   e^2;t+1)) =
2Ee1;t+1(R)(e1;t+1(R)  e2;t+1(R)); P ! 1
We can minimize the MSFE of the combined forecast, by regressing yt+1; the observed series, on y1;t+1(R)
and y2;t+1(R) using OLS and constraining the coe¢ cients to sum to one.
yt+1 = y2;t+1(R) + (1  )y1;t+1(R) + ec;t+1(R); 0    1 (C.1.4)
If  > 0; then combining the forecasts will produce a forecast s.t. Ee21;t+1(R) > Ee
2
c;t+1(R). Equation
(C.1.4) can be rewritten as
e1;t+1(R) = (e1;t+1(R)  e2;t+1(R)) + ec;t+1(R); (C.1.5)
If we estimate equation (C.1.5) without a constant, then
 =
Ee1;t+1(R)(e1;t+1(R)  e2;t+1(R))
E(e1;t+1(R)  e2;t+1(R))2
Testing whether 2Ee1;t+1(R)(e1;t+1(R) e2;t+1(R)) = 0 is testing the same hypothesis as testing whether  =
0 using equation (C.1.4) or (C.1.5). Therefore, 2Ee1;t+1(R)(e1;t+1(R) e2;t+1(R)) > 0) 9  s: t : Ee21;t+1(R) 
Ee2c;t+1(R) > 0
6
As a result, while the CW and the ENC-NEW out-of-sample test statistics cannot be considered minimum
MSFE test statistics, they still provide meaningful information. They can be used as a prior test of whether
a combined forecast exists that outperforms the driftless random walk forecast in terms of MSFE.
6One can also think of CW and ENC-NEW in the framework of encompassing test statistics. If one fails to reject the null
that d^ is equal to zero, then the random walk encompasses the structural model. If one rejects the null that d^ is equal to
zero, then the CW test statistic is statistically signicant and the random walk fails to encompass the structural model. Note
that a signicant CW test statistic does not necessarily imply that the structural model encompasses the random walk. The
distinction is important. If the structural model encompasses the random walk, which would occur if we fail to reject the null
that Ee2;t+1(e2;t+1  e1;t+1) equals 0, then the structural model will have a smaller MSFE than the random walk. As a result,
encompassing will entail MSFE dominance (for proof see ? and Marcellino (2000)).
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C.1.3 Bootstrap
Di¤erent Bootstrapping Procedures
First, we briey discuss alternative approaches to bootstrapping. The standard bootstrap (also known
as "case" bootstrap with replacement), introduced by ?, assumes that the re-sampled data are independent
and identically distributed (iid). If the data are serially correlated or if heteroskedasticity is present (which
is usually the case in time series data), a simple "case" bootstrap leads to inconsistent results. A better way
to bootstrap time series data would be via a block bootstrap which implies that the data is re-sampled in
blocks of a certain length rather than observation by observation, thereby preserving the properties of the
data generating process (DGP). However, nding the optimal block size to preserve the DGP is not that
straight forward. Indeed, Berkowitz and Kilian (2000) suggest that block bootstrapping is not the optimal
way to bootstrap time series data given the state of development of the block bootstrap literature.
As a better alternative, Berkowitz and Kilian (2000) suggest a residual bootstrap procedure which is the
bootstrap specication implemented by Mark (1995) and subsequently improved by Kilian (1999) and Mark
and Sul (2001). The idea of residual bootstrapping is that in specications such as Mark (1995) where the
independent variable is dened as the deviation of the exchange rate from the fundamental, the cointegration
(or the lack of cointegration) will be preserved when one uses the residual bootstrap. One way to implement
it is to estimate an error correction specication, then re-sample the estimated residuals and recursively
simulate the independent variable. (This type of bootstrap is commonly referred to as "semi-parametric"
bootstrap. If one draws the residuals from a normal distribution, the bootstrap will be called "parametric".)
While not always easy to implement, if properly specied, the bootstrap automatically corrects for small-
sample bias and can be also used for forecast horizons greater than one as discussed in Kilian (1999).
Bootstrap Used in the Paper
The bootstrap procedure used to calculate the p-values of DMW, TU, CW and ENC-NEW for all speci-
cations is similar to the bootstrap of Mark and Sul (2001) and ?. The main di¤erence between our bootstrap
and Mark and Sul (2001)s bootstrap is that we use country specic OLS - regressions rather than seemingly
unrelated regressions (SURs). We also perform a "semi-parametric" rather than "parametric" bootstrap.
The data generating process (DGP) is a country specic error correction process. The assumption of no
unit root (or cointegration between the fundamental and the exchange rate) is imposed.
For each country, we estimate the following equations using an OLS regression (the i subscript is
dropped for simplicity) :
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4st = "st
zt = + t+ zt 1 +
dX
k=1
kst k +
lX
k=1
kzt k + "
z
t
where zt is the deviation of the exchange rate from the fundamental (or simply the fundamental) dened in
(3.4.2), (3.4.3), (3.4.4) and (3.6.1). st is the nominal exchange rate. We also dene st = st   st 1; zt =
zt   zt 1 ,  is a constant and t is a trend.
Lags of st and zt are included in the error correction equation to account for potential autocorrelation.
The bootstrap procedure uses the Akaikes information criterion (AIC) method in order to choose between
the appropriate number of lags of st and zt ( d and l can di¤er). The DGP can also di¤er across countries
depending on whether AIC picks a specication with no constant, with constant or with a constant and a
trend. The restriction that the sum of the coe¢ cients of the lags of zt equals one is imposed in order to
avoid exploding simulated series. Then we re-sample the estimated matrix of residuals, ("s; "z), either case
by case (or more precisely row by row) or in blocks of 4 for quarterly data and 12 for monthly data. The
results are relatively robust to the alternative methods of re-sampling of the residuals. Therefore, the results
presented in the paper are based on case by case re-sampling of the residuals rather than block re-sampling.
Once the residuals are re-sampled, the exchange rate and the independent variable(s) are simulated
recursively. The rst 100 simulated observations are discarded in order to attenuate potential bias related
to choosing the starting values of the recursion - the sample averages. With the new generated sample, the
forecasting model is re-estimated and the test statistics are calculated. The p-values of the DMW, CW and
ENC-NEW test statistics are measured as the portion of the distribution above the test statistics estimated
using the observed data (since all these tests are one-sided tests), while the p-value of the TU statistic is the
proportion of the bootstrapped TU distribution below the estimated TU value using the observed data. All
the bootstrapped p-values are calculated on the basis of 1000 simulated distributions.
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